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Abstract 
Floyd Henry Allport (1890-1978) is widely regarded as a significant figure in the establishment 
of experimental social psychology in the United States in the early twentieth century. His famous 
1924 textbook and his early experimental work helped set the stage for a social psychology 
characterized by individualism, behaviorism, and experiment. Allport is particularly well-known 
for his banishment of the group concept from social psychology and his argument that the 
individual is the only viable, scientific object of study for the serious social psychologist. This 
early part of Allport’s career and the role it played in establishing American social psychology is 
relatively well documented. However, there is little scholarship regarding Allport’s work after 
the 1920s. An examination of this time period demonstrates that Allport’s earliest individualism 
was in fact rather short-lived, as he subjected it to serious revision in the early decades of the 
twentieth century. The increasing complexity of the bureaucratic structure of American society 
in the early 1900s, the economic collapse of the 1930s, and the onset of the Second World War 
were significant events in the development of Allport’s ideas regarding the individual. While his 
early work is marked by a concerted effort to create an ideal science for understanding the 
individual and the social, his later work was much more concerned with the social implications 
of individualism and collectivism. As the social world around him grew more complex, so too 
did his own social psychology, culminating in a significant change in Allport’s philosophy of 
science. These findings contribute to our understanding of social psychology and its history by: 
providing a novel view of one of social psychology’s central historical figures; demonstrating the 
difficult, persistent, and context-dependent nature of the individualism-collectivism divide in 
American social psychology; and providing a platform for thinking about the ways in which 
historians remember and write the stories of important figures in the field.    
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Preface 
 As an undergraduate student in my first social psychology class, I recall learning about 
Floyd Henry Allport and the important role he played in establishing social psychology in North 
America. I do not recall the exact textbook that introduced me to him, but I do recall its tone and 
content. Allport was described as the father of experimental social psychology, the man who 
ingeniously demonstrated that the subject matter of social psychology could be studied using 
experimental methods. Prior to Allport’s groundbreaking work, the author noted, the field simply 
did not exist; the kinds of topics we now explore in social psychology were explored by armchair 
philosophers. For a young student enamored with the impressive and seemingly highly relevant 
experimental findings of the field—the Hawthorne effect, cognitive dissonance, Milgram’s 
obedience studies—Floyd Allport seemed an excellent and most worthy ancestor.  
As I moved through my education, encountering social psychology again and again—first 
in advanced undergraduate seminars, and later in the context of graduate coursework and thesis 
writing—this view of Allport became increasingly complicated. It seemed that many 
contemporary social psychologists had little to say about Allport, nominating Kurt Lewin or 
Leon Festinger instead as the progenitor of their practice. I recall browsing The Heart of Social 
Psychology, a book that—according to its subtitle—offered a “backstage view of a passionate 
science” (Aron & Aron, 1986). I was surprised to find that Allport played but a bit part in that 
narrative and, in fact, the authors did not seem to look very kindly on his contributions. As I 
began to study the history of social psychology more intensely, the situation became even more 
convoluted. These narratives gave me a view of Allport as a stubborn scientist that stifled our 
understanding of the very thing that is presumably at the heart of the discipline: the social nature 
of everyday life. These narratives provided me with simultaneous and seemingly incompatible 
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images of Allport as being heroic, insignificant, and villainous. Furthermore, I found the same 
kind of variety in definitions of social psychology itself. For some, the field was the study of the 
individual; for others it was the study of society. And what’s more, the stories that people told 
about the discipline and about Allport’s place in it seemed directly related to their definitions of 
and ideals related to social psychology. It is in this context that I began to explore the life and 
work of Allport in an attempt to understand his contributions to social psychology and his own 
vision for the field on which I myself have become so focused. My intention was to discern 
which of these characterizations was most apt for this founding father, which best described his 
actual and intended contributions to the field. As seems so often the case in the writing of 
history, what emerged instead was an even more complex picture of Allport. The Allport that I 
found in the primary literature and the archives defied the singular characterization that I was 
seeking. Examining his early years, I found an audacious young scholar whose work was timely 
and well-suited to its social context. Examining his postgraduate years, I found a scientist and 
citizen struggling to make sense of the vast social and political changes around him, seeking 
ways to use his science for social change. Finally, examining his later work, I found a troubled 
and careful scientist and philosopher reevaluating his own work and struggling with a 
particularly stubborn subject matter that seemed to resist scientific examination. The narrative 
that follows is an attempt to add to our historical understanding of the field by providing a look 
at all of these aspects of Allport’s work: heroic, inconsequential, villainous, and otherwise.  
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Introduction 
Throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century and continuing throughout the early 
years of the twentieth century, social scientists began to consider the direction that the nascent 
discipline of social psychology would take. Would it be a sociological or a psychological 
discipline (Baldwin, 1897a; Giddings, 1899; Tosti, 1898; Tufts, 1897a)? Would it be a social or a 
natural science (Tufts, 1897b)? Would it study society or socialized individuals (Baldwin, 1897a; 
Ellwood, 1899a; Tufts, 1895)? At the turn of the century, these questions were still highly 
contentious (e.g., Ellwood, 1908a; Hart, 1912; Mead, 1909; Ross, 1910), and the future of social 
psychology remained uncertain.   
Many contemporary historians suggest that this uncertainty came to a halt in 1924 with 
the work of one social psychologist: Floyd Henry Allport (Graumann, 1986; Greenwood, 2000, 
2004). In the early decades of the twentieth century, Floyd Allport (1890-1978) became the 
leading and most outspoken figure in a movement to render American social psychology a 
scientific, experimental discipline rooted in the principles and methods of general laboratory 
psychology. Allport’s work was central in the displacement of philosophical and sociological 
understandings of the social that had been prominent in the early 1900s in both the United States 
and Europe. In addition to influencing the theoretical and philosophical shape of the field, 
Allport also influenced the subject matter and methods of social psychology in this period 
through his substantive research: he was one of the first to demonstrate the possibility of 
manipulating and measuring social behaviors in a laboratory setting (Allport, 1920b). He was 
also the editor of the Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, one of the first journals 
devoted to social-psychological topics. He published prolifically in both academic journals and 
popular magazines for over fifty years, addressing a multitude of topics, including conformity 
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(1934), delinquency (1931a), customs (1939a), public opinion (1937), political institutions 
(1933), and wartime morale (Allport & Lepkin, 1943). He is best known, however, for writing 
one of the first comprehensive textbooks on experimental social psychology (Allport, 1924a), a 
text that has been cited more than 500 times over the last five decades.
1
 Indeed, he is a central 
and important figure in the history of American social psychology and is considered by many to 
be the father or founder of the field (Collier, Minton, & Reynolds, 1991; Katz, Johnson, & 
Nichols, 1998). 
Historians have indeed grasped Allport’s significance in the field and the scholarly 
literature includes a number of discussions focused on his role in the founding and development 
of American social psychology. Most historians of social psychology agree that in many ways, 
Allport’s early work signaled the beginning of a new chapter in the history of social psychology 
(Graumann, 1988; Greenwood, 2004; Morawski, 1986; Post, 1980). This new approach, they 
argue, severed social psychology from its sociological origins and placed it firmly within the 
realm of an individualistic, experimental psychology. While many authors rightly point out that 
the turn towards experimentalism in social psychology was indeed part of a larger revolt against 
social philosophy, they point to Allport’s work as a cornerstone in the success of this revolt. 
Individualism, experimentalism, and scientism were “in the air” and Allport’s work served to 
successfully ground social psychology in the scientific ideals of the day. With only a handful of 
exceptions (Aron & Aron, 1986; Jackson, 1988), this estimation of Allport’s impact has been 
consistent across historical accounts. 
                                                          
1
A Web of Science citation search turned up over 500 results; this is likely a gross underestimation. According to an 
analysis by Collier, Minton, & Reynolds (1991), Allport was among the ten people most frequently cited  by 
psychological textbook authors from the period of 1908 to 1953.  From the period of 1930 to 1942, Allport was the 
number one cited author among both psychological and sociological textbook authors.    
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The Hero and the Villain: Allport in the History of Social Psychology 
Despite general agreement regarding Allport’s importance in the founding and 
development of social psychology, our knowledge of Allport and his work is still rather sparse. 
There is no biography of Allport, nor is there a book-length work that explores his social 
psychology specifically. What we find instead is a substantial body of periodical literature that 
explores his role in the history of the field and debates whether the approach he heralded was 
beneficial or detrimental to the discipline’s development. While these narratives provide insight 
into Floyd Allport’s career, their focus on his role in the discipline’s development does not 
provide a comprehensive narrative of his work. Furthermore, they provide very divergent 
portraits of Allport and his role in the history of social psychology: while many authors present 
Allport’s approach as constituting the impetus to a strong, unified, scientific social psychology, 
others present it as the beginning of a slow descent into a rigid, asocial, and atheoretical social 
psychology. It is in this way that two portrayals of Allport have arisen in the literature: the 
“Allport-as-hero” story and the “Allport-as-villain” story.  
Allport as Hero 
The “Allport-as-hero” story represents a classic example of celebratory history. Such 
accounts first place Allport firmly within an individualistic, experimental framework, and then 
applaud the effects of such a framework on the development of social psychology. One of the 
clearest examples of such an approach is an assessment of Allport that was written shortly after 
his death (Post, 1980). In this account, Allport’s career is described as “one of the most 
important and innovative careers in contemporary psychology” (Post, 1980, p. 369). According 
to Post, Allport’s work came along when the direction of social psychology was largely 
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uncertain; Allport is therefore described as standing  “at the crossroads of two traditions”  (p. 
369). One senses that the discipline could have and perhaps would have developed quite 
differently if Allport had not come forward to free social psychology of its sociological origins.   
 Yet, there is also an element of the Zeitgeist approach in Post’s account; the discipline is 
portrayed as being “ready” for Allport:  
In their eagerness to articulate the issues and problems, the early social psychologists had 
relied on concepts ill-suited to a social theory.  Bloated and stretched beyond recognition, 
group mind and instinct began to topple under their own weight.  Social psychology was 
ready for a new start.  (Post, 1980, p. 370)   
The reader is thus left with the sense that social psychologists had begun to recognize the 
“errors” of their past, yet did not see a new way in which to move forward. Allport’s ingenuity 
therefore lay in his creation of a viable alternative for the discipline.   
 There is perhaps no greater example of a celebratory history than Daniel Katz’s (1968; 
Katz, Johnson, & Nichols, 1998) written recollections of Allport. Katz was one of Allport’s first 
graduate students at Syracuse University and much of his work bears the imprint of Allport’s 
influence (cf, Katz & Cantril, 1940; Katz & Schanck, 1938). Katz (1968) describes Allport as 
“the leader and the prophet”(p. 273) and in a later article argues that Allport’s work not only 
“defined a field of study” but also anticipated a multitude of important social-psychological 
constructs including social-cognitive biases, reference groups, attitudes, the authoritarian 
personality, cardinal traits, and self-schemas (Katz, Johnson, & Nichols, 1998). Given these 
anticipations, Allport is described as “considerably ahead of his time” (1998, p. 135). After 
outlining Allport’s service to the science of social psychology, Katz reminds the reader that the 
field still has much to learn from its founder: “In 1924, Floyd Allport’s voice was crying in the 
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wilderness. Now, three quarters of a century later, some of the foolishness that Allport criticized 
is still with us…and that voice still deserves to be heard”  (p. 140). Interestingly, Katz portrays 
Allport as being not only ahead of his contemporaries, but also ahead of his successors.   
 Similar hero accounts are evident in the work of many other scholars. Murphy and 
Kovach (1972) describe Allport’s dissertation work on social facilitation as the starting point for 
experimental social psychology and state that this early work “demonstrated the revolutionary 
implications of the experimental method for the study of group behavior” (p. 446). They note 
that the “Allport formulation” dominated social psychology in the early years. Jones (1985) 
credits Allport, and particularly his 1924 text, with aiding in the establishment of the field “on an 
objective, experimental basis” (p. 376). He also establishes historical continuity between Allport 
and contemporary social psychology, stating that the 1924 text has a “surprising ring of 
modernity” (p. 376). Indeed, most textbook histories endorse these exact types of assessments.   
 The accounts written by Post (1980), Katz (1968, 1998), and Murphy and Kovach (1972) 
clearly portray Allport as having played a central role in the development of social psychology. 
Furthermore, they represent Allport as having provided a desirable and much-needed direction to 
what was, up to that point, considered an uncertain and unscientific discipline. By liberating 
social psychology from social philosophy and sociology, Allport furnished the discipline with a 
unique subject matter, a credible approach, and perhaps most importantly, a scientific 
methodology. In the “Allport-as-hero” story, these contributions secure Allport’s position as the 
founder of modern social psychology.   
Allport as Villain 
In recent years, the “Allport-as-hero” story has been challenged by a growing number of 
historians who have begun to reevaluate Allport’s role in the development of social psychology. 
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These authors do not dispute Allport’s experimentalism, his individualism, or his influence on 
the discipline; rather, they question whether his ideas have been beneficial for modern social 
psychology. Graumann (1988) states that “it definitely happened that, in the view and work of 
one of the first modern American social psychologists, F. H. Allport…the individualist 
conception coincided and coalesced with a methodological orientation, the experimental-
behavioral approach” (p. 13).  Graumann (1986) argues that this orientation led to the 
simultaneous “individualization of the social” and the “desocialization of the individual.” 
Similarly, Greenwood (2000) argues that Allport “played a major role in reshaping the 
development of American social psychology” (p. 447) and that Allport’s individualism found a 
lasting home in the discipline as “later generations of social psychologists came to follow Floyd 
Allport in denying that there could be a social psychology distinct from individual psychology” 
(p. 446). Like Graumann (1986, 1988), Greenwood (2004) attributes the individualistic 
orientation of contemporary social psychology to the work of Floyd Allport: “The social 
dimensions of cognition, emotion, and behavior were rejected along with the supposed 
metaphysical extravagancies of the ‘group mind,’ largely as a result of the polemics of Floyd 
Allport” (p. 447). Morawski (1986) similarly holds Allport responsible for eradicating the social 
in social psychology and consequently “pre-empt[ing] an understanding of the experience and 
structure of interactions” (p. 59). In contrast to the hero story, where Allport is portrayed as the 
progenitor of a new and successful approach to the study of the social realm, the villain story 
portrays Allport as a rigid and unyielding spokesman of a misguided approach to social-
psychological science.   
Allport in Context  
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These two narratives of Allport’s place in the history of social psychology initially appear 
quite disparate. Yet, these accounts are not quite as different as they seem insofar as they part 
ways only in their valuations of Allport’s contributions to the discipline. Both accounts view 
Allport’s work as rooted in individualism, scientism, experimentalism, and reductionism. Both 
argue that Allport’s steadfast commitment to these positions was what set him apart from his 
contemporaries and ultimately led to his success in altering the course of the discipline. The 
narratives therefore coalesce in their accounts of Allport’s views of social psychology and his 
impact on the discipline; where they differ is in their valuations of those views and their outlooks 
regarding the benefits and detriments of Allportian individualism for American social 
psychology.   
Some authors, however, have presented a more tempered account of Allport's views. 
Brooks and Johnson (1978) note that the individualism-collectivism controversy was prevalent 
for Allport throughout his entire career; his early individualism, they argue, was short-lived. As 
early as 1931, "Allport was no longer denying a role for a social science of groups, and indeed, 
was beginning to put problem ahead of method in his search for a legitimate way to approach 
supra-individual phenomena" (p. 301). This shift gained momentum throughout the remainder of 
Allport's career, culminating in his turn towards a grand theory that attempted to capture the 
complexity of collective constructs. Unfortunately, Brooks and Johnson do not elaborate on the 
theory, but their analysis suggests that Allport's approach to social psychology was much more 
complicated than the historical record indicates.   
Two other accounts, those of Parkovnick (2000) and Samelson (2000), directly challenge 
the ways in which historians have portrayed Allport, his impact on the discipline, and his 
commitment to individualism and experimentalism. In a discussion of Allport's 1924 text, 
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Parkovnick (2000) points out that historical accounts of Allport have been skewed to substantiate 
particular historical claims. He argues that celebratory accounts have overstated Allport's 
influence; Allport was one among many scholars attempting to establish a scientific social 
psychology. Celebratory accounts, however, have at least been successful in covering all of the 
aspects of Allport's approach, while "recent historical writing tends to be more narrowly focused, 
addressing only two planks, science…and methodological individualism" (p. 438). As 
Parkovnick rightly notes, such accounts "narrow and distort Allport's program for social 
psychology and impoverish discussions regarding the nature of social psychology" (p. 438). 
Contemporary histories, Parkovnick argues, are plagued by presentism, which leads to "the 
narrowed version presented in recent retrospective accounts of Floyd Allport's program for social 
psychology" (p. 438).  
One of the most compelling accounts of the complexity of Allport's role in the history of 
social psychology was offered by Samelson (2000). Samelson is one of the few authors to 
suggest that while Allport was perhaps incorrectly identified as the hero of social psychology in 
earlier histories, he is now incorrectly being identified as the villain in the context of more 
contemporary histories. Samelson aptly describes this latter presentation as a game of "pin the 
tail on the donkey" and points out that our conception of Allport as the archenemy of a genuinely 
social social psychology "may be based on a presentist reading of selected quotes from some of 
his earlier writings" (p. 502). Such selective history attempts to counteract Whig history, but falls 
prey to the very same errors. Thus, it becomes simply another version of Whig history. In this 
vein, Samelson (2000) writes: 
[T]he tale is a presentist tale with inverted valuations (from good, progress, success, to 
bad, regress, failure) but still with the retrospective errors of oversimplification of 
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process, neglect of context, misinterpretation, anachronism. Floyd Allport was morphed 
from a pioneer trying out a new approach into the Pied Piper of destructive experimental 
methodology and asocial, individualistic social psychology. (p. 504) 
Samelson argues that this oversimplification conceals the complexity of Allport's social 
psychology and he recommends a more comprehensive account of Allport that aims neither to 
celebrate nor denigrate, but rather to document, Allport's social psychology and its role in the 
larger development of the discipline.    
Reconstructing Allport 
The present work explores these gaps so aptly noted by both Samelson and Parkovnick in 
an attempt to provide a richer, more contextualized narrative of the life and work of Floyd 
Allport and his place in the history of American social psychology. What constitutes a richer 
narrative? The present work provides an account that: extends the history of Allport beyond 
1924; pays careful attention to the social context of the individualism-collectivism debate in 
American social psychology; enriches the intellectual context by moving beyond behaviorism 
and experimentalism and; provides a more concrete, localized history of the individualism-
collectivism debate as it played out for one significant figure in the field.  Such an account has 
much to tell us about Floyd Allport, the history of social psychology, and our current 
historiographical approaches to tracing that history.   
Beyond 1924  
The existing literature on Allport’s work tends to focus heavily on the early years of his 
career when he published his influential text, Social Psychology. While this time frame is 
undoubtedly an important one, it actually represents a very small portion of his life's work. 
Allport continued to publish well into the second half of the twentieth century and he continued 
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to conduct theoretical work right up until the time of his death. To some extent, historians have 
had good reason to disregard Allport’s later work. It was undoubtedly less influential than his 
1924 text and therefore may be deemed less important for a disciplinary history. It is, however, 
central to a history of Allport as well as a history of attempts to understand sociality—something 
that has been at the very heart of social psychology since its founding.  Understanding the 
outcome and development of Allport’s early individualism provides us with a significantly 
altered view of this “founding father.” It also encourages discussion and exploration of social 
psychology’s past and present theoretical orientation towards some of its most central concepts: 
collectivity, sociality, and the socialized individual.  
Allport’s theoretical work during the second half of the twentieth century demonstrates 
the difficulties of an individualistic and reductionist approach to social psychology. Furthermore, 
his work during the 1930s and 1940s demonstrates the political nature of his individualistic 
approach and because of this, it sheds light on the ideological context of this debate in twentieth-
century American psychology. Finally, this later work also uncovers an interesting and important 
aspect of Allport’s work: the so-called father of experimental social psychology conducted very 
few experiments; in fact, a significant portion of his career was spent concentrating on 
theoretical work. Even more surprising is the fact that his withdrawal from experimentation was 
precipitated by a growing discomfort with the kinds of mechanical causality that he once 
championed as the proper foundation of the field. Understanding these later developments helps 
us to see that the discipline adopted some but not all aspects of Allport’s social psychology, a 
nuance that is missed by historians who concentrate only on Allport’s earliest ideas and 
contributions.  
Allportian Individualism in Social Context.  
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Scholars have generally attributed the individualistic nature of American social 
psychology to the rise of the experimental paradigm in general psychology; it is difficult to study 
group-level concepts in the laboratory, but it is comparatively easy to study inter-individual 
influence. This is definitely true, but it is only part of the picture; the problem of the individual 
and the collective was not confined to academic circles. Reconstructing the social context of 
Allport’s work demonstrates that Allport’s individualism rested on his beliefs about science and 
objectivity as well as on his beliefs about the actual and ideal structure of American society. His 
distaste for institutions was rooted in ideas about what constitutes an empirical object of study, 
but it was also influenced by his wariness of an increasingly corporate society. His research on 
patriotism during the Second World War was an attempt at recasting sociological “abstractions” 
in a psychological, experimental framework, but it was also an attempt to restore the freedoms 
and responsibilities of the individual in a time when devotion to one’s country was emphasized. 
Similarly, his research on public opinion polling was an attempt to create more accurate, 
scientific polls, but it was also an attempt to reinstate the voice of the individual in American 
politics. More generally, the battle between individualistic and collectivist approaches to social 
psychology was indeed a debate about the boundaries, methods, and approaches of social 
psychology, but it was also a debate about the ultimate outcome of a society that was both 
increasingly chaotic and increasingly regulated. Allport’s struggle to redefine the concept of 
collectivity in the early twentieth century must therefore be viewed not only as a reaction to 
philosophical notions of the social mind, but also as a reaction to the changes he witnessed in 
American society. 
The Individual and the Social in American Social Psychology 
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Many historians have discussed the conflict between individualism and collectivism in 
early American social psychology and most of these discussions have lamented the 
“disappearance of the social” in the discipline. The history of social psychology is therefore full 
of rich discussions of the differing trends of individualism and collectivism in social 
psychology’s past. For the most part, however, these works chart the general rise of 
individualism and the decline of collectivism. My own approach differs in a number of ways. I 
am less concerned with tracing the general decline of collectivism over time and more concerned 
with focusing on specific, local debates between central players in the first half of the twentieth 
century. I therefore do not provide a complete picture of the individualism-collectivism debate in 
American social psychology, but by focusing on Allport, his supporters, and his critics, I aim to 
add a level of concreteness to these broader histories of the individual and the social.  
 Previous histories of this debate, focused on the relative benefits and detriments of 
individualism and collectivism, frequently begin with an account of what constitutes a truly 
social social psychology and then provide a history of how that approach declined in the 
twentieth century. My account is more concerned with what was at stake for the historical actors 
in this debate and how they themselves conceptualized their discipline. How did Allport define 
“social psychology” and how did these definitions change over time? Why did Allport adopt 
individualism? Why did his followers accept his vision for social psychology and why did his 
critics reject it? The present account, though admittedly much more narrow than existing 
histories, suggests that conceptualizing and constructing the social was a complicated affair and 
the act was anything but linear. For Allport, the social proved stubborn for scientific analysis, a 
theme that seems to appear again and again in the discipline’s history. In many ways, then, this 
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work is an attempt to provide not just an intellectual biography of Allport, but also a very 
localized biography of the individualism-collectivism debate in American social psychology. 
The Historiography of Social Psychology 
Although this work is not motivated by intentions to reassess the orientation of 
contemporary social psychology, it is motivated by other contemporary concerns. In the 
concluding chapter of this work, I reflect on my findings in order to raise critical questions 
regarding the historiographical orientation of contemporary histories of social psychology. Is 
Allport in fact the villain or the hero and, more importantly, why have histories of the discipline 
been so focused on his role? My goal is not to reach a verdict regarding Allport’s status as the 
founder of social psychology; instead, I aim to draw attention to the ways in which we choose 
our founders, heroes, and villains and how we decide on what constitutes a “choice point” in the 
history of psychology. I explore the idea that contemporary stories of social psychology’s history 
tell us as much about the past that they document as they do about the culture in which they are 
created. Historians have aptly applied this kind of analysis to early histories of the psychology, 
but I suggest that it can be fruitfully applied to our contemporary accounts. Our own histories, 
like those of our predecessors, can be viewed as cultural stories reflecting the values, goals, and 
beliefs of the current culture of historians of social psychology.  
Methods and Sources 
 The present attempt to reconstruct Allport diverges from previous attempts not just in 
approach, but also in method and sources. Our current understanding of Allport is directed 
primarily by the published record; it is based mostly on Allport’s published writings, the writings 
of his critics and supporters, and the secondary literature documenting his work. There has been 
very little scrutiny of Allport’s work as it is represented in the unpublished record. The current 
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work uses all of these sources, published and unpublished, drawing heavily on several archival 
collections. The main archival repository used for this work was the Floyd Henry Allport Papers 
housed at Syracuse University. The collection, containing 24 boxes of correspondence, 
unpublished manuscripts and conference papers, handwritten research notes, and other materials, 
provided a wealth of information regarding the conception, development, and—in some cases—
the demise of Allport’s ideas directly related to social psychology. In this regard, it provided 
ample opportunity to explore, expand upon, and challenge our current understandings of 
Allport’s views on social psychology and the larger role of the individual in society. Viewing the 
unpublished record also provided a view of Allport’s work as something that was constantly 
under revision, a nuance that is missed when the published record serves as our central source of 
evidence.  
 It must be noted, however, that the archival record failed to provide some of the resources 
that I was seeking. Importantly, there is very little biographical information in the Allport papers 
and the papers contain few materials that reveal insight into Allport as a person. For the most 
part, the collection documents Allport’s professional career, while details regarding his personal 
life are noticeably absent. It is certainly possible that Allport removed these materials from the 
collection. Indeed, there is some evidence that Allport was cognizant of the collection as a 
research resource; for example, he left a note on a folder of correspondence between himself and 
his brother, indicating that the materials would be relevant “for those interested in my 
relationship with Gordon.” There is much for the historian to ponder in this collection regarding 
Allport’s personality and the lack of personal materials alone seems to support a view of Allport 
as somewhat solitary and private, but for the most part one is left still wondering who he was as a 
person. For this reason, there is perhaps less biographical information in the present work than 
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there might have been otherwise. Where possible, I have used the biographical sources available 
to me to reconstruct as much of Allport’s life as possible but the narrative has most definitely 
been directed by the sources, focused primarily on an intellectual history of Allport’s social 
psychology.  
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Chapter One 
Sociology, Psychology, and the Emergence of Social Psychology 
In 1890, the same year in which Floyd Henry Allport was born, William James published 
his monumental two-volume text, The Principles of Psychology. The tenth chapter, titled “The 
Consciousness of Self,” included a compelling discussion of the nature and importance of the 
social realm in the development of self. In addition to the material self, the ego, and the spiritual 
self, James called attention to a fourth dimension, the “social self”:  
A man’s Social Self is the recognition which he gets from his mates…Properly speaking, 
a man has as many social selves as there are individuals who recognize him and carry an 
image of him in their mind. To wound any one of these his images is to wound him 
(James, 1890, pp. 293-294) 
The individual life, James contended, was an inherently social one, filled with envy, pride, love, 
and ambition and directed by the pursuit of an ideal social self and the desire to please others. 
For James, the effects of social others on the self were critical in the consciousness and behavior 
of the individual. In short, the social self was as real and as important to consciousness as the 
material self.  
 James’ work on the social self, a work still cited frequently by contemporary social 
psychologists, was just one among many works to emerge in the late nineteenth century focused 
on explicating the relationship between mind, body, self, and society. Indeed, discussions of the 
social nature of the individual and the structure, function, and development of societies have 
maintained a constant and dynamic presence in social philosophy for centuries (Ellwood, 1938; 
Karpf, 1932; Mackenzie, 1890). However, these discussions took on a new form in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century as new academic disciplines—including psychology, 
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sociology, anthropology, and political science—began to formalize. The simultaneous 
emergence of these disciplines necessitated the creation of disciplinary boundaries, a process that 
contributed to debates regarding the proper scope and subject matter of each discipline (Ross, 
1991; Smith, 1997). By the close of the nineteenth century, scholars from a wide variety of fields 
were debating the nature of the social individual, the notion of “society” as an object of scientific 
study, and the contours, boundaries, and methods of a new field that would study these emerging 
concepts.   
The emergence of American social psychology occurred in this context of 
professionalization and disciplinary boundary-building (Good, 2000). Early American 
sociologists sought to distance themselves from historically and biologically-oriented social 
theories of late nineteenth-century European scholarship. In the process, they began focusing on 
the psychological mechanisms of social life. Similarly, psychologists began to abandon atomistic 
approaches to the study of the individual and began to examine the functional relationship 
between the individual and the natural and social worlds. In addition, both groups of scholars 
were searching for a way to address the tumultuous conditions of turn-of-the-century American 
life. The result of these factors was the rudimentary beginnings of a new science—social 
psychology—that could address the interaction between the individual and the social world. 
Though there was little agreement regarding what such a science might look like, the field of 
social psychology had clearly come to occupy a permanent if somewhat precarious place in the 
landscape of American social science by the first decade of the twentieth century.  
Debating the Social in Nineteenth-Century Europe 
Discussions regarding a science of the social became quite prominent in European 
scholarship in the second half of the nineteenth century, with the study of society reflecting the 
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social and cultural climate of late eighteenth and early nineteenth-century Europe. Instability 
created by the French Revolution, tensions resulting from the Industrial Revolution in France, 
and increased attention to nationalism instigated in part by German unification brought collective 
concepts like “state,” “nation,” and “social class” into very sharp focus (Blackbourn, 2003; 
Harrington, 1999; Picon, 2003). Understanding the nature of social unities, the relationship 
between individual autonomy and social solidarity, and the mechanisms behind group level 
concepts like conflict and cooperation therefore became of increasing importance throughout the 
nineteenth century.  
The Social Organism 
Most nineteenth-century European scholars seemed to agree that an understanding of 
collective concepts was needed; however, there was little agreement on how such concepts 
should be approached or analyzed. Formulations of a science of society therefore began with 
fundamental questions regarding the nature of social collectives, the relationship between such 
collectives and their component parts, and the possible methods of studying these entities and 
relationships. Attempts to unify the study of collective life were usually met with strong criticism 
frequently aimed at the scientific status of such approaches. This was the case with organicism, 
one of the most prominent nineteenth-century approaches to the study of collective life. 
Organicism, represented in the work of scholars such as Herbert Spencer, René Worms, Albert 
Schäffle, and Alfred Espinas, was rooted in the analogy between society and the biological 
organism. According to organicists, society is an integrated entity, comparable to a living 
organism (Barberis, 2003; Giddens, 1971). Although organisms are comprised of individual units 
such as cells and organs, they are nonetheless integrated entities capable of scientific study. 
Similarly, society may be comprised of individuals, but it maintains its own existence. Society, 
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like an organism, functions as an independent whole, despite the interdependent functioning of 
its individual components. For the organicists, a science of society could therefore be modeled 
on the science of biology. 
In many ways, organicism was not a new concept. Theorizing about society as an organic 
whole has occurred throughout the history of social philosophy; Jonathan Harris, for example, 
has traced the concept back to the twelfth century (Harris, 1998). However, as Giddens (1971) 
notes, Charles Darwin’s work on evolution had provided a natural-scientific framework for 
conceptualizing society as an evolving, adapting being. Major advances in nineteenth-century 
life sciences undoubtedly seemed an attractive foundation on which to build a science of society 
(Cohen, 1994). Organicists employed such biological analogies to argue that society was not just 
an independent object; it was a natural object. That is, they argued that society was not 
something invented or created by humans. Like any other organism, it contained its own levels 
of complexity and it developed spontaneously, according to the discernible principles of 
evolution (Barberis, 2003). According to the organicists, the social organism and the biological 
organism differed primarily in complexity; the social was more complex than the biological, but 
it was not substantively different. 
Critics of organicism opposed the analogy of the social organism, arguing that because 
individual entities comprising society are capable of leaving social groupings at any time, society 
could not be viewed as a single organism; simply put, social collectives were too unstable. 
Critics also noted several other difficulties with the analogy: individuals may simultaneously 
belong to several societies or “organisms”, they are conscious entities with individual purposes 
and wills, and they are physically separated from one another. Such critiques eroded perceptions 
of the utility of the analogy and contributed to the eventual demise of organicism around the turn 
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of the century. As Daniella Barberis has noted, organicism also faded as a result of a growing 
distaste for seemingly metaphysical, grand systems of knowledge and, after the Dreyfus affair, a 
distrust of theories that rested on biology or promoted individual subordination (Barberis, 2003). 
As Barberis (2003) notes, the appeal of organicism had come in part from the utility of the 
approach in demonstrating the necessity of hierarchies within a social system and in countering 
the rise of individualism; according to the organicists, individuality was the product of social 
bonds and the individual was and therefore should be dependent on the collective (Barberis, 
2003).  As anti-individualist sentiment faded in Europe, so too did the organicist approach. All of 
these factors combined proved to be fatal to organicist thought; in the late nineteenth century, the 
analogy between biological and social organisms began to disappear from social-philosophical 
writings (Barberis, 2003).   
Völkerpsychologie 
Other approaches to social life were also being formulated in Europe in the mid-
nineteenth century, with some scholars proposing the establishment of a new field to address the 
study of collective concepts and their relationship to individual psychology. In Germany, the 
work of philosophers Moritz Lazarus and H. Steinthal promoted a science focused on religion, 
mythology, language, and other collective concepts. This new Völkerpsychologie, which 
resembled contemporary anthropology much more than contemporary psychology or sociology, 
would examine the development and general properties of the “folk mind” or culture, as well as 
the properties of the cultures of different groups (Diriwächter, 2004; Kalmar, 1987; Klautke, 
2010; Smith, 1997).  Lazarus and Steinthal viewed Völkerpsychologie as the study of both 
individuals and nations, arguing that there is a dialectical relationship between the individual 
mind and the social or “objective” mind, such that the individual mind both produces and is a 
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product of the larger social mind. Nonetheless, they firmly held that individual psychology was 
rooted in the nation, that “the nation prevailed over the individual,” and therefore individual 
psychology must be explained in reference to the larger collective (Klautke, 2010, p. 6). They 
advocated applying psychological laws of the individual mind to an understanding of the social 
mind, creating a sort of psychology of social and cultural life. 
Lazarus and Steinthal’s Völkerpsychologie was both criticized and further developed by 
Wilhelm Wundt (Fuhrer, 2004). Wundt argued that instead of applying abstract psychological 
laws to social life, Völkerpsychologie should examine the mental products of social life, tracing 
the progressive historical development of language, myth, and customs within society 
(Greenwood, 2004). Employing methods similar to those of Darwin (Kroger & Scheibe, 1990), 
Wundt examined the “vestiges” of social and cultural life in order to understand the development 
of mind. As Greenwood (2004) points out, Wundt believed this kind of study would shed light 
on the psychological processes responsible for the production of these shared social forms.  
The work of Lazarus, Steinthal, and Wundt left a significant mark in the human sciences, 
influencing the theories and approaches of many important scholars, including Franz Boas, W. I. 
Thomas, and George Herbert Mead (Klautke, 2010). Nonetheless, the approach also had many 
critics who viewed Völkerpsychologie as far too vague and abstract, based on casual observation 
and anecdote. As one critic noted in a review of Wundt’s work, “There is far too much theory, 
and too little fact to please us” (Hales, 1903, p. 239). While Wundt’s experimental psychology 
became the model for experimental psychology in the United States (Rieber & Robinson, 2001), 
his program for a Völkerpsychologie was practically ignored (Blumenthal, 1975; Danziger, 1979) 
ignored. Others rejected the notion of a national spirit or soul and critiqued Lazarus and 
Steinthal’s notion of a psychology of nations, arguing that psychological processes occur only 
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within individuals (Klautke, 2010). Many of these authors agreed that an understanding of the 
social aspect of human psychology was needed. However, they argued that Völkerpsychologie, 
with its focus on the “folk spirit” and its failure to address the interaction between individuals, 
would not suffice (Klautke, 2010).  
Social Statistics, Social Facts, and Social Contagion 
The study of collective concepts by way of biological or psychological analogy—along 
with approaches rooted in large-scale comparative, historical research—received a serious 
challenge from approaches rooted in the study of social statistics. The establishment of statistical 
offices was widespread in Europe in the early nineteenth century, contributing to increased 
attention to social phenomena such as crime rates, population, suicide rates, and poverty 
(Hacking, 1990; McDonald, 1982; Schweber, 2001). As Schweber (2001) notes, these elusive 
non-material social phenomena became visible and analyzable with social statistics; regularities 
in one aspect of social life could be linked with regularities in another. Furthermore, the spread 
of a given social phenomenon could be tracked and observed in a seemingly objective manner. 
This provided a method of studying social phenomena without reliance on biological analogies 
or extensive historical-comparative system-building.  
The utility of social statistics in building a science of collective concepts is exemplified in 
the work of French scholar Emile Durkheim. Considered by many to be the founder of sociology 
Durkheim was a strong critic of organicism and had encountered  Wundt’s work while studying 
in Germany during the year 1885 to 1886 (Mestrovic, 1993). Throughout the latter half of the 
nineteenth century, he began attempting to theorize a more adequate conceptualization of society 
and social facts—a science of sociology—that would go beyond biological analyses and 
historical examinations of collective mental life (Durkheim, 1982; Giddens, 1971).  Employing 
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social statistics (Porter, 1996), Durkheim argued for the reality of collective concepts, noting the 
statistical regularity and stability of social phenomena such as suicide and crime. Durkheim 
referred to such collective concepts as “social facts”, and argued that they could be studied 
scientifically, without biological analogies and without relying on explanation by way of 
psychological processes (Durkheim, 1982).  
One of Durkheim’s central arguments was that sociology could be a science completely 
independent of other sciences; social facts, he argued, need not be reduced to psychological or 
biological facts in order to be explained and understood. His critics in turn argued that societies 
must be explained in reference to the elements of which they are composed. Like the work of 
Lazarus and Steinthal, Durkheim’s work was criticized for its focus on the collective and its 
disregard for inter-individual interaction. As Gustav Tosti wrote, “Durkheim completely 
overlooks the fact that a compound is explained both by the character of its elements and by the 
law of their interaction” (1898, p. 474). Other critics expressed concerns that Durkheim’s 
examination of “social facts” would preclude the development of a science of the social based on 
generalizations across the realm of individual social forms (Small, 1905).  
The strongest critiques came from scholars who viewed Durkheim’s notion of social 
collectives as independent entities as a return to philosophical, metaphysical conceptions of the 
social. Gabriel Tarde, a social statistician and scholar of social life, argued that society is simply 
an aggregate of individual beings and criticized Durkheim for his belief “that the simple 
relationship of several beings can itself become a new being” (Tarde, 1969, p. 122). For Tarde, 
psychological processes, such as imitation and invention, provided the proper foundation for a 
study of collective concepts (Tarde, 1903). Tarde therefore proposed a new science, “psycho-
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sociology” or “social psychology” that would study the psychological mechanisms responsible 
for social life.  
Other European scholars similarly employed social statistics to study contagion, fads, the 
spread of deviance, and the general spread of ideas and behaviors throughout groups and 
populations. In Italy, Scipio Sighele studied the evolution and characteristics of the criminal 
crowd (van Ginneken, 1992). In France, Gustav Le Bon’s (1896) work on crowds brought the 
psychological aspects of social forms into focus by examining the ways in which these kinds of 
“mental contagion” arise from individual thought and behavior. Crowd psychology and the 
processes behind mental contagion were also explored in France through nineteenth-century 
work on suggestibility, hypnosis, and altered states of consciousness (van Ginneken, 1992). Such 
work increasingly drew attention to the importance of inter-individual influence and the rise of 
social forms (Leach, 1992).  
The work of Lazarus and Steinthal, Wundt, Durkheim, Tarde, and other scholars had 
demonstrated that there were many ways of approaching the study of social life. Such 
approaches included: the historical and comparative study of collective concepts like class, myth, 
and religion; observation and reflection on psychological mechanisms of social life, such as 
imitation, invention, suggestibility, and contagion; and the examination of social regularities 
through the study of social statistics. These multiple approaches and their reception within 
academic circles also revealed several problematic, recurring issues in the study of social life, 
including the relationship of a science of the social to other sciences, such as biology and 
psychology; the nature of social wholes and their relationship to the individuals of which they 
are composed; and the methods most appropriate to a study of the social. Despite these issues 
and the lack of agreement regarding the contours of a science of the social at the end of the 
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nineteenth century, European scholars had begun to reveal the myriad possibilities for such a 
science.  
Debating the Social in Early Twentieth-Century America 
 The degree of intellectual exchange between Europe and the United States facilitated the 
migration of debates regarding the social from one continent to the other. In 1895 alone, 514 
American students were enrolled in German universities (Martindale, 1976). Many individuals 
who would go on to become leaders in the development of the social and behavioral sciences—
including Albion Small, Richard Ely, G. Stanley Hall, and George Herbert Mead—were among 
the more than 8000 Americans who received some training in Germany between 1820 and 1920 
(Martindale, 1976). By the turn of the century, the discussions regarding the study of the social, 
which had been so vibrant in Europe therefore become standard fare in the American discourse 
of newly emerging academic disciplines that were directly concerned with the study of social 
life, including sociology, psychology, and eventually, social psychology.  
The Study of Society: American Sociology at the Turn of the Century 
 American sociology emerged as an academic discipline in the late nineteenth century, 
developing in the wake of growing interest in the establishment, development, and dissolution of 
social institutions instigated in part by the Civil War and changing social conditions (Martindale, 
1976; Ross, 1991). As Smith (1997) notes, rapid immigration contributed to massive population 
growth and rapid urbanization, both of which dramatically altered the landscape of America and 
contributed to the development of several disciplines devoted to studying social history and 
social change.  
The early history of sociology, exemplified by the work of William Graham Sumner and 
Lester Frank Ward, resembled European social philosophies rooted in historical analysis and 
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biological analogies (Bannister, 1987; Ross, 1991). Both scholars viewed society as progressing 
through stages of development governed by historical laws (Ross, 1991).  Sumner relied heavily 
on Social Darwinism to explain the past and present state of American society and to argue for a 
laissez-faire approach to government. Ward also relied on evolutionary theory, arguing that 
psychic and social life developed out of biological life. Unlike Sumner, however, Ward 
promoted the thoughtful direction of society. Following Auguste Comte, he held that science and 
social governance could prescribe and guide the future direction of the social world, ensuring 
intellectual progress. In the closing decades of the nineteenth century, the views of these two 
men dominated American thought on the establishment and development of social life and they 
were considered leaders in the newly developing field of sociology. This is perhaps best 
evidenced by the fact that Ward and Sumner served as the first two presidents of the American 
Sociological Society, formed in 1905.
2
  
The work of Ward and Sumner, however, was not well suited to the developing ethos of 
specialization and disciplinary differentiation that came to dominate the human sciences in the 
twentieth century. The subject matter of the social world was slowly divided between these 
disciplines and generalist approaches that cut across these boundaries became less conventional 
and less popular (Smith, 1997). This specialization contributed to and reflected the 
institutionalization of separate disciplines. Academic societies reflecting differentiated, 
disciplinary subject matters were formed, including the American Historical Association, the 
American Economic Association, and the American Psychological Association (Smith, 1997).  
Similarly, academic courses and departments devoted to separate fields of study were 
                                                          
2
 The Society changed its name from the American Sociological Society (ASS) to the American Sociological 
Association (ASA) in 1959 upon request from the membership (Martindale, 1976). 
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established, resulting in differentiated training models and a focus on differentiated subject 
matters.  
Sociology was one of many disciplines to emerge during this period. During the 1890s, 
the field acquired all of the usual procurements of an independent discipline (Camic, 1995; 
Martindale, 1976). Several courses in sociology were offered during the 1890s and in 1892, the 
first department of sociology was established by Albion Small at the University of Chicago. In 
1894, a professorship of sociology was created at Columbia and in 1895 the American Journal of 
Sociology was founded. Several textbooks devoted to the fundamentals also emerged in the late 
1800s, including Franklin Giddings’ (1896) Principles of Sociology and Albion Small’s 
Introduction to the Study of Society (Small & Vincent, 1894).  
These institutional acknowledgements of the fledgling field brought a sense of 
confidence for scholars of social life in both Europe and North America. During the late 
nineteenth century, American journals were filled with confident statements about the future of 
the discipline. In 1897, American social philosopher James Hayden Tufts confidently stated that 
“unless all signs fail, the study of sociology is to take its place not merely in the graduate schools 
of universities, but in the under-graduate work of the colleges” (Tufts, 1897a, p. 660). Similarly, 
in an article titled “The Era of Sociology,” Albion Small pointed to the growing ubiquity of the 
new field, noting that sociology “has a foremost place in the thought of modern men” (1895, p. 
1). As one scholar put it, sociology seemed to be entering “a stage of definition” (Simmell, 1898, 
p. 662).  
Despite this optimism, however, many scholars also acknowledged that the field was still 
in a rather confused state; indeed, disagreements regarding its aims, methods, and subject matter 
were as profuse as they had been in the European context. American sociologists, like their 
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European counterparts, were searching for a way of conceptualizing social phenomena. 
However, from the start, American sociology took on a character that was markedly different 
from that found in Europe. As Dorothy Ross (1991) has noted, the turn of the century was a 
period of massive social and industrial upheaval and rapid social change, resulting in a “sense of 
disjunction with the past” and a “new liberal search for a social ethic” (p. 148). Ross suggests 
that these changes led to a new focus on fact-oriented approaches that were grounded in concrete 
social forms: 
The new concentrations of economic power, the teeming, polyglot cities, and the 
expansion of urban, state, and federal governance created new worlds that required 
detailed knowledge. The great preponderance of social scientists’ publications during 
these years were empirical studies of the concrete operation of business, government, and 
social life (Ross, 1991, p. 157).  
These changes and the turn toward a more detail-oriented approach were indeed evident in the 
early sociological literature, where critiques of grand social theories were abundant. Abstract 
sociological stage theories that posited a natural and predictable development of human social 
life over the course of human history were the object of much criticism in early American 
sociology.  Grand social theories, such as those of Lazarus and Steinthal, Vico, Herder, and 
Hegel were viewed as teleological, putting forward the notion of a social ideal that was more 
closely approximated with the passing of each developmental stage (Adams, 1904). Approaches 
that presented society as changing but unchangeable, were not amenable to the American 
temperament. As sociologist Albion Small explained, a more scientific, process-oriented 
approach was wanted: 
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The notion of an ideal social condition, in the static sense, can never again secure even 
quasi-scientific endorsement. Progressive functional adaptation to conditions that 
change in the course of the functioning is human destiny…There will be increasing work 
and demand for men trained in knowledge of social processes (Small, 1905, p. 9).  
Small and other early sociologists therefore slowly abandoned the search for historical paths to a 
given social ideal and began searching for the rubrics of a science that could address adaptation 
and social process. Sociologists therefore turned to topics such as social interest, competition, 
cooperation, and assimilation.  
The debates on the nature of the social, which had permeated European social science, 
were also standard fare in late nineteenth-century American scholarship. Like their European 
counterparts, American scholars also struggled to define the social. As Martindale notes, the 
collectivism that was considerably widespread in European scholarship failed to take root in 
America: 
The concept of society as a superindividual entity that obeyed its own laws and was the 
source of all good and evil was alien to the American experience. Such an ideal 
immediately conjured up the worst forms of European authoritarianism. Society to most 
early Americans was a set of interpersonal arrangements established at the town hall 
meeting and subject to change whenever they proved problematic (Martindale, 1976, p. 
35) 
Collectivist theories of society were therefore greeted with much skepticism and were frequently 
associated with the now outdated organicism of the mid-nineteenth century. By 1905, theories 
that posited the existence of a social mind or social organism were therefore considered to be of 
little use, except as analogies for the functioning of society (Thomas, 1905). As was the case in 
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European social science, collectivist approaches came to be viewed as vague and metaphysical, 
representative of philosophy rather than science (Adams, 1904). Many sociologists therefore 
began searching for a new unit of analysis that was more amenable to scientific analysis. As 
sociologist Edward Allsworth Ross noted, 
Sociology…must select some simple relation or interaction and pursue it through all the 
infinite variety of its manifestations. From detecting vague and superficial analogies 
among a small number of complex wholes it must pass to the discovery of true and deep-
lying resemblances among a large number of simple elementary facts (Ross, 1903, p. 
191). 
Many scholars agreed with Ross’s rejection of large-scale social theorizing, arguing that the new 
field had to adopt a more manageable subject matter, different from that of other social sciences 
(Small, 1904; Willcox, 1897).  
The Study of the Individual: The Emergence of American Psychology 
 At the same time that sociologists were debating the contours of their discipline in the 
late nineteenth century, the field of psychology was also taking its place among the many 
emerging human sciences. The first graduate programs in psychology began to emerge in the 
United States in the 1880s (Benjamin, 2001), and in 1892, the American Psychological 
Association was founded (Sokal, 1992). Journals also began to appear in the late nineteenth 
century: the American Journal of Psychology was founded in 1887 by G. Stanley Hall and by 
1917, there were 10 journals devoted exclusively to psychology (Johnson, 2000). Laboratories of 
psychology also began to proliferate in the late nineteenth century; approximately 41 had been 
established by the turn of the century (Benjamin, 2000).  
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Late nineteenth and early twentieth century American psychologists initially drew 
heavily on the practices of German physiological psychology, studying the principles, structures, 
processes and contents of the average, normal, adult mind (Cravens & Burnham, 1971; 
O’Donnell, 1985). Studies of sensation, perception, memory, thinking, and reaction time made 
up the central cannon of American experimental psychology in the late nineteenth century and 
the experimental method became one of the defining features of the field (Boring, 1950; Coon, 
1993). The majority of early American psychologists viewed psychology in a very broad fashion 
as the study of mind or consciousness: Edward Bradford Titchener defined the new field as “the 
science of mind” (Titchener, 1898, p. 1); James Mark Baldwin described it as the “science of the 
phenomena of consciousness” (Baldwin, 1893, p. 1); and William James defined it as the 
“Science of Mental Life” (James, 1890, p. 1). These early textbook definitions, with their focus 
on science and their dismissal of the soul as a feasible subject matter for the new field, reflected 
psychology’s gradual and purposeful movement away from philosophy (Reed, 1997). 
Although this new psychology, with its experimental methods and its focus on 
consciousness, indeed bore the stamp of nineteenth-century German physiological psychology, 
American psychology was decidedly different from its German counterpart by as early as the 
turn of the century. This was partially due to the fact that the program of research inspired by 
Wilhelm Wundt and his followers became riddled with difficulties and inconsistencies at the end 
of the nineteenth century, resulting in disagreements and new interpretations of data gleaned 
from that program (Green, 2009). Furthermore, like sociologists, early American psychologists 
were searching for a psychology that could address the abrupt urbanization, labor unrest, and 
general change and upheaval that was so characteristic of turn-of-the-century American life. 
Psychology, like sociology, was physically situated in some of the largest and most tumultuous 
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of urban environments—Chicago and New York City. It is not surprising, therefore, that they too 
turned away from abstract theories of the mind toward theories and approaches that were more 
amenable to understanding individual differences, change, and adaptation (Cravens & Burnham, 
1971; Green, 2009).  
The psychology that developed in this context was a functional psychology rooted in 
evolutionary theory (Green, 2009). Darwin’s Origin of Species had demonstrated the critical 
importance of environment in the survival of species and his work on emotion had begun to 
demonstrate the possibilities for applying the theory to humans. Leading psychologists of the late 
nineteenth century, such as William James, John Dewey, and James Mark Baldwin framed their 
approaches to the new psychology in the context of evolutionary theory. Studies of abstract 
mental principles and laws therefore gave way to studies focused on the “acts,” “habits,” and 
“coordinations” of the organism; such approaches treated the organism as a coordinated, 
adaptive, changing unit and treated mental life or consciousness as an adaptive tool that 
facilitated the adjustment of organism and environment (James, 1890).  
One of the outcomes of this shift in perspective was an increased emphasis on the role 
played by the social environment in the life of the individual. As John Dewey (1884) explained, 
mental life could no longer be viewed as “a rendezvous in which isolated atomic sensations and 
ideas may gather” (p. 287). Instead, mental life was considered an integral part of the adapting, 
changing organism in a constantly changing environment (Dewey, 1884; James, 1890). That 
environment, Dewey (1884) argued, included “that organized social life into which [the 
individual] is born, from which he draws his mental and spiritual sustenance, and in which he 
must perform his proper function or become a mental and moral wreck” (p. 287). Dewey and 
others therefore began espousing a science of psychology that attended to the plasticity of human 
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thought and behavior, the creation of social habits, and the general ways in which organisms 
adapted to both the natural and social environment (Baldwin, 1897a; James, 1890; Judd, 1910). 
Scholars interested in psychological approaches to consciousness began expanding their 
approaches to examine “social consciousness,” “social habits,” “social activities,” and the “social 
environment” (Ames, 1906; Baldwin, 1896; Dewey, 1900; Washburn, 1903). The notion of the 
solitary individual, existing outside of social relations soon no longer seemed tenable. As one 
scholar explained, “The consciousness of the present is distinctively social and tends to the 
merging of the individual more or less completely in the social organism” (Ormond, 1901, p. 
27). As Ormond noted, such sensibilities were new ones for psychology which had previously 
“been styled the psychology of the solitary” (p. 27).  
Society and the Individual: The Emergence of Social Psychology 
 With sociologists searching for a more manageable unit of analysis for understanding the 
social world and psychologists seeking to understand the relationship between the social 
environment and the individual, a new field of study began to emerge: social psychology. Many 
sociologists and psychologists began proposing social psychology as a discipline that would 
study neither the large-scale collective entities of sociology nor the individual-level phenomena 
of psychology; instead, social psychology would adopt some intermediary level of analysis 
omitted by these two disciplines. Discovering this intermediary level, however, proved difficult 
and the varieties of social psychology that emerged from these formulations reflected an ongoing 
struggle to define the nature of the relationship between the individual and society.  
Many of these early approaches conceptualized social psychology as the study of the 
development of social consciousness in the individual. This approach was most fully laid out by 
James Mark Baldwin in his 1897 text, Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental 
                                                                                                                                          36 
 
Development: A Study in Social Psychology (Baldwin, 1897b). In this work, perhaps the first 
prominent work on social psychology in the United States, Baldwin argued—just as James had 
in 1890—that the self was essentially a social product. The development of this social self or 
socius, Baldwin suggested, occurs through the process of imitation. For Baldwin, sociality 
develops through a dialectic of personal growth, where individuals imitate and become imitative 
models for social others. Understanding this socius was the subject matter of social psychology. 
He criticized attempts to understand society or individual psychology without studying both 
together. For Baldwin, social psychology required an understanding of the psychology of the 
socius as well as the social conditions under which the socius develops (Baldwin, 1897b).  
 Baldwin’s theory of the socius was heavily critiqued by psychologists and sociologists, 
primarily because of his reliance on the concept of imitation as the basis of sociality and his 
seemingly circular explanations of the relationship between the individual and society (Dewey, 
1898; Washburn, 1903). Nonetheless, many scholars heralded Baldwin’s approach as the proper 
foundation upon which to build a new science of social psychology that was based not on 
abstract generalities or isolated individuals, but rather on the social process. William Caldwell 
noted that while Baldwin’s work was flawed and incomplete, it demonstrated the importance of 
the relationships between individuals in mental development and specifically, “the part played by 
social contact, by social action and reaction, in the mental development of the individual” 
(Caldwell, 1899, p. 183). Gustav Tosti similarly noted that Baldwin’s work on imitation had 
drawn attention to social consciousness and inter-individual influence, helping to define social 
psychology as the study of “the genesis of that particular state of consciousness which is 
consequent in the individual upon the presence of and the contact with his fellows” (Tosti, 1898, 
p. 358). Tosti employed Baldwin’s work to suggest that social psychology was responsible for 
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studying the development of the social state of mind in the individual as a result of the social 
environment, while sociology would study the social environment and the ways in which that 
environment is altered by the social individual.  
 The notion of social consciousness as a cornerstone in an understanding of social life was 
further elaborated by sociologists. Charles Horton Cooley (1902, 1909) also argued that the 
individual and the social are essentially inseparable in individual development. However, unlike 
Baldwin, Cooley adopted an organic view of society, arguing that society must be viewed as a 
complex whole rather than as simply the compilation of many imitative individuals. The social 
whole, he argued, must not be reduced in an attempt at explanation. Instead it must be 
approached as a unity and the individual and society must be studied without separation: “A 
separate individual is an abstraction unknown to experience, and so likewise is society when 
regarded as something apart from individuals” (1902, p. 2). For Cooley, those theories (including 
psychological theories and approaches) that focused on the individual apart from the social were 
“artificial” (1909, p. 3); an adequate understanding of both society and the individual required 
constant alternating or simultaneous attention to both aspects. Cooley’s own work focused on 
primary groups and the development of the social or “looking-glass” self (Collier, Minton, & 
Reynolds, 1991).  
The early twentieth century also saw the first publications of George Herbert Mead, who 
followed the emerging literature on social psychology carefully. He also began contributing to 
this literature, working out an approach to social psychology rooted in social consciousness and 
the social act. The approach was a novel one that went beyond Baldwin’s focus on the 
development of social consciousness and both Tarde and Baldwin’s focus on imitation and 
suggestion. Mead (1910) suggested that the proper unit of study for social psychology was the 
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social act, which involves interactions between individuals where “one individual serves in his 
action as a stimulus to a response from another individual” (p. 397). These basic stimuli and 
responses form the basis of adjustment and habit, as well as social meaning and social 
consciousness. Meaning arises in these responses and adjustments and then comes to dictate the 
relationship between stimulation and response. Mead’s approach, rooted in the functionalist 
framework promoted by John Dewey (1896), provided a new way of thinking about the social 
realm in the functionalist language of adjustment and habit formation.  
The influence of Mead and Dewey on the emerging field of social psychology is perhaps 
most evident in the work of sociologist, Charles Ellwood. Ellwood—who received his Ph.D. at 
the University of Chicago under the mentorship of Albion Small, John Dewey, and George 
Herbert Mead—critiqued Baldwin’s focus on the individual and argued that social psychology 
must be a psychology of the group, a “functional psychology of the collective mind” (Ellwood, 
1899a, p. 100). For Ellwood (1899a, 1899b, 1899c), social psychology was essentially a 
psychology of society, where the principles of individual, functional psychology are transferred 
to society. A group could be conceived of as a “social coordination” similar to an individual 
coordination, involving a group of individuals acting together and maintaining patterns of 
relationships. Just as successful individual coordinations become habits, successful social 
coordinations become social habits, which are essentially social customs, institutions, and all 
other organized social forms. Social change may be viewed in much the same way as individual 
adaptation, where the breakdown of a coordination requires readjustment and change until new 
coordinations are built. Social psychology, he argued, was responsible for explaining these 
“group psychical processes” (Ellwood, 1899a, p. 657) and all “psychic phenomena related to 
group life” (p. 657). Such phenomena included political revolutions, mob behavior, family life, 
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and the behavior of committees. An understanding of the psychic phenomena of group life would 
result in an understanding of these larger social structures.  
Definitions of and approaches to this emerging field of social psychology continued to 
proliferate around the turn of the century, with many scholars seeking ways of differentiating 
social psychology from its parent sciences of sociology and psychology. In fact discussions of 
the social had become so profuse that one scholar bemoaned the “exaggeration of the social” 
noting that “it has seemed that nothing is significant which is not ‘social’” (Fite, 1907, p. 393). 
Others lamented the ambiguity that was arising in reference to the word “social,” noting that it 
could be applied to the relations between individuals, to communities, to groups, or to individual 
consciousness (Tufts, 1904).  
Discussions regarding social psychology also fueled the flame of nineteenth-century 
debates on the possibility of a social mind or collective consciousness. Sociologists continued to 
debate the notion of the social mind, recognizing its value for understanding social life, while 
also refuting nineteenth-century theorizing on the historical development of a collective mind or 
folk spirit. Sociologist George Vincent, for example, argued that social life could not be reduced 
to the interaction of individuals, but also urged scholars to attend to the ways in which the “social 
mind” affects the individual (Vincent, 1897). Ellwood (1899d) argued for maintaining the 
concept of the social or collective mind, but cautioned that  scholars must view the social mind 
not as an entity, but rather as a “psychical process which mediates the new adjustments in the 
group life-process” (p. 224). For psychologists, however, the notion of the social mind had begun 
to fade with the adoption of Baldwin’s genetic approach to the social. While taking stock of the 
field in 1905, one scholar noted:  
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There is a marked tendency to agree that a so-called ‘social mind’ does not exist and that 
social phenomena do not exist apart from the individual. Social psychology now tends to 
devote itself to a study of the individual mind in so far as it presents what is known as 
‘group consciousness’ (Buchner, 1905, p. 96).  
James Hayden Tufts likewise noted that “there is coming to be a consensus of opinion that the 
field must lie in the consciousness of the individual as affected by his group relations” (Tufts, 
1905, p. 397). Nonetheless, sociologists and psychologists were still somewhat at a loss as to 
how to account for the social without invoking the notion of a collective mind. Both groups 
struggled to understand how social psychology could dismiss or reconceptualize the social mind, 
while still accounting for the social world.  
Sociologist W. I. Thomas captured the difficult situation of social psychology in a 1904 
address before the Congress of Arts and Science: 
There is at present a tendency to agree that there is no social mind and no social 
psychology apart from individual mind and individual psychology; at the same time 
individual mind cannot be understood apart from the social environment, and society 
cannot be understood apart from the operation of individual mind (Thomas, 1905, p. 392) 
By the first decade of the twentieth century, social psychology had come to occupy a somewhat 
elusive space in the expanding and increasingly divided terrain of American social science, 
where the study of the social and the study of the individual seemed both complementary and 
contradictory. The position of social psychology within this landscape would continue to be 
contested in the early twentieth century as sociologists and psychologists continued to sharpen 
the contours of their own disciplinary spaces. The increasing separation of psychology and 
sociology meant that social psychology, which initially seemed to have the potential to serve as a 
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bridge between the two fields, instead occupied an increasingly interstitial space that did not fit 
adequately within the realm of either discipline. At the start of the twentieth century, young 
scholars like Floyd Allport who were interested in the problems of the social world therefore 
found themselves entering a field that was not well defined, cloaked in controversy, and very 
much in its infancy.  
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Chapter 2  
Allport at Harvard (1915-1922) 
 In the latter half of the nineteenth century, the Harvard Department of Philosophy 
experienced tremendous growth. Harvard president, Charles Eliot, had expanded the 
undergraduate curriculum at Harvard and secured funding for additional professorships across 
the University. Furthermore, in 1872, Eliot organized a Graduate Department, which was 
reorganized as the Harvard Graduate School in 1890. The success of the Graduate school rivaled 
that of Johns Hopkins only 10 years later. By 1900, the Harvard Department of Philosophy could 
boast some of the most celebrated names in the business, including William James, Josiah 
Royce, Hugo Münsterberg, George Herbert Palmer, and George Santayana. Kuklick (1977) 
describes the period from approximately 1869 until 1912 as the “golden age” of philosophy at 
Harvard.  
However, the turn-of-the-century success that the Department enjoyed was followed by a 
period of disorganization and doubt. In 1907, William James retired and, three years later, died. 
This was followed by Santayana’s resignation in 1912 and Palmer’s retirement in 1913. Finally, 
in 1916, both Royce and Münsterberg also died, leaving the Department scrambling for new 
hires that could sustain the reputation of these celebrated scholars (Kuklick, 1977). This situation 
led to internal strife as well as a string of temporary hires. Furthermore, in the absence of 
established and vocal scholars, the Department came to lack its previous atmosphere of intense 
and productive philosophical debate. As Kuklick notes, “the junior members of the old 
department and those who joined them initially had no idea of where philosophy should go; they 
were not only searching for new personnel but also for a new vision of speculation and their 
place in it” (p. 416).  
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 To make matters more complicated, the Department would also have to contend with a 
new difficulty. While the previous generation of Harvard philosophers struggled with the 
conceptual relationship between psychology and philosophy, the new generation would also have 
to struggle with the organizational relationship. In 1912, the Department of Philosophy was 
renamed the Department of Philosophy and Psychology. Kuklick argues that “this change only 
formally signaled the increasing disparity between those who studied the one and those who 
studied the other” (p. 242). Furthermore, the new president, Lawrence Lowell, and the 
philosophically-oriented members of the Department did not see the development of psychology 
as a priority. Despite many opportunities to secure promising scholars in the field, including 
Robert Yerkes, E. B. Titchener, and James McKeen Cattell, psychology remained largely 
subordinate to philosophy and would not begin to build up a promising line of development until 
the 1930s (Kuklick, 1977).  
 It was in this somewhat chaotic environment that a young Floyd Henry Allport began his 
days as a graduate student at Harvard in 1915. While at Harvard, Allport was immersed in both 
the traditional philosophical debates of the Department and the discipline, as well as the new 
experimental methods being taught and practiced in the Harvard Psychological Laboratory. Both 
of these aspects of his training would later manifest themselves in his attempts to solve the 
perennial problem of the individual and society using experimental methods. Allport’s close 
contact with Edwin Bissell Holt and Ralph Barton Perry provided him with a behavioristic, 
analytic framework for the study of social phenomena. The platform of the New Realist 
philosophy, developed in part by his mentors, helped him to rethink popular terms such as 
“social consciousness” and the “social will” and redefine the “social” as an objective property of 
the external environment. And of course, the brief but important time he spent working with 
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Hugo Münsterberg provided him with a dissertation topic that would serve as an exemplar of the 
possibilities of studying social behavior in a laboratory setting.  
Allport’s Early Life 
 Floyd Henry Allport was born in 1890 in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, the second of four 
sons.
3
  His father, John Edwards Allport, was a doctor who ran his practice out of the family 
home and often took his sons on house calls (G. Allport, 1967). His mother, Nellie (Wise) 
Allport, was a teacher prior to her marriage and was a very religious woman. Both parents had a 
high-school education. When Floyd was born, John Allport was 28 and Nellie Allport was 29 
and the family lived in a rural village with a  population under 1000 (“Factors in Psychological 
Leadership,” 1952). The household was a very full one; Allport’s maternal grandparents, who 
were founders of the Free Methodist Church in Fulton, New York, lived with the family for 
much of Allport’s childhood. His father’s brother also resided with them for a time as did John 
Allport’s patients when necessary. By 1896, Nellie had given birth to three sons, Harold, Floyd, 
and Fayette, and was pregnant with her last child, Gordon. The family moved to Baltimore in 
1896 so that John could complete his medical education at the Baltimore Medical College. Their 
stay in Baltimore, however, was short-lived
4
 and the family relocated first to Montezuma, 
Indiana, then to Streetsboro, Ohio, then to Hudson, Ohio, and finally to Cleveland, where they 
would remain until all of their sons had left home.
5
 
                                                          
3
 As noted in the introduction, the details of Allport’s youth have been particularly hard to locate. To reconstruct this 
period, I’ve relied primarily on an autobiographical chapter written by Allport in 1974, Harvard College Class 
Reports, correspondence between Floyd and Gordon Allport, and the reminiscences of Gordon Allport found in the 
Gordon Allport Papers as well as in Nicholson’s (2003) work on Gordon. 
4
 Prior to their move to Baltimore, John Allport had purchased a patented drug in Canada and sold it for profit in the 
United States. He was charged for violating patent rights and when officers arrived at the family home to present 
John Allport with a summons, he “vaulted the back fence and skipped out” (G. Allport, n.d., p. 16). Nellie and the 
children fled Baltimore and returned to Fulton, while John remained in hiding. Nellie eventually visited the law firm 
in charge of the case and had the charges against John dropped.  
5
 The dates of the family’s various relocations are uncertain, but they were situated in Cleveland as early as 1913 (G. 
Allport, 1967) 
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The Allport home was a very religious one, due largely to Nellie’s strong Methodist 
upbringing. In their autobiographies, both Floyd (1974) and Gordon (1967) recalled the influence 
of their mother’s faith. In raising her sons, Nellie’s highest aspiration was to pass her faith on to 
her children. She had particularly high hopes for Floyd. In an 1896 diary entry, she wrote: 
Little Floyd’s heart yields to religious influences apparently more than Harold’s, and 
evidently God has chosen him for His work. At 6 ½ years he said, ‘Mama, somewhere, 
there is a pulpit for me, isn’t there?’ And he often says, ‘Mama, I shall be a missionary.’ 
O, how much wisdom I need to make and not mar these little lives.” (G. Allport, n.d., p. 
15).
6
  
Allport would later recall attending “many revivals, camp meetings, and the like” (Allport, 1974, 
p. 3) as part of his Methodist upbringing, but his own religious sentiments during his youth were 
somewhat mixed. He later described periods of religious conversion followed by periods of 
“much let down when the emotional fervor had passed” (Allport, 1974, p. 3). As a teenager, 
Allport turned to reading philosophy as a way to “break away from the dogma of youthful 
religious training” (Allport, 1919b, p. 3). Daniel Katz7 attributed much of Allport’s approach to 
social psychology to his small-town upbringing and specifically to the values of “individual 
responsibility, independence, integrity and sensitivity” (Katz, n.d., p. 4) that were emphasized in 
the Allport household. These values, Katz argued, “were so deeply ingrained in Floyd that they 
colored his way of thinking, motivated his assault on institutional fictions…In Allport’s view, 
rather than reify some group concept, we should make people the causal agency of social 
behavior” (p. 4).  
                                                          
6
 These recollections of Nellie Wise are found in a booklet in the G. W. Allport papers. The booklet was created by 
Gordon Allport titled The Quest of Nellie Wise. In it, he reprinted significant portions of his mother’s personal diary.  
7
 Allport’s first graduate student, Daniel Katz (1903-1998), remained a friend and supporter of Allport until his 
death. It becomes apparent that Katz did not always agree with Allport’s views on social psychology and sometimes 
seemed very hesitant about Allport’s later work. Nonetheless, he stayed in close touch with him for nearly 50 years.  
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Upon graduating high school in 1909, Allport went to Harvard to study biology. With the 
help of several scholarships and fellowships (Allport, 1919b), he completed his Bachelor of Arts 
degree after four years of study, with a major in biology and minor concentrations in psychology, 
anthropology, and music. Although there is little documentation concerning these years,
8
 Allport 
(1919b) recalls that it was at this time that he became oriented towards natural science as well as 
towards graduate work: 
I became passionately interested in natural science, especially zoology and the law of 
evolution. Species, animal forms, and the like thrilled my imagination. At the same time I 
wanted to be “master of my fate” and so my soul demanded some sort of purposive 
outlook upon life. I was extremely ambitious to achieve something (p. 4) 
After receiving his degree, Allport returned to his parents’ home in Cleveland, Ohio for a brief 
period and taught English at his old high school. He then spent a year working with his father, 
serving as a publicity manager for a campaign to raise hospital funds. After two years away from 
Harvard, Allport decided to return:  
I realized that mixed with the wild, and adventurous spirit of youth I had a sober, 
scientific propensity. I remembered how psychology had fascinated me in the good, old 
days, so I came back to be one of those unspeakable fossils known as "graduate students" 
(Allport, 1917a) 
In 1915, Allport left Cleveland, returned to Harvard, and began his doctoral studies in the 
Harvard Department of Philosophy and Psychology.  
The Beginnings of Allportian Individualism 
                                                          
8
 Again, it is difficult to say how much interaction Allport had with Harvard psychology and philosophy during his 
undergraduate years. Given his focus on biology and his self-expressed interest in zoology, one would expect that he 
had some interaction with Yerkes, who was conducting work on comparative psychology in the laboratory at the 
time (see Kuklick, 1977). Yerkes left Harvard in 1917.  
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Allport’s years as a graduate student were filled with both the mundane and the unusual. 
When he arrived at Harvard, Hugo Münsterberg was assigned as his dissertation supervisor, but 
when Münsterberg died at the lectern in 1916, Allport turned to E. B. Holt and Herbert Langfeld 
for mentorship. This situation may not have been much of a loss to Allport, who was not 
particularly fond of Münsterberg’s ideas; he also expressed distaste for the approaches of other 
Department members, including Ernest Hocking, George Santayana, and later, William 
McDougall (Allport, 1974). According to Allport’s recollections, he was not well-liked in the 
Department during his years as a student and later as an instructor
9
 and he felt the tension in 
Emerson Hall between the first-floor philosophers and the top-floor psychologists. Despite 
Allport’s admiration for some of the philosophers, primarily Ralph Barton Perry, his relationship 
with Langfeld and his penchant for science ensured he would be associated first and foremost 
with the psychologists.  
The intellectual atmosphere at Harvard during Allport’s years as a graduate student seems 
to have been characterized by a struggle to define psychology as a science and an uncertainty 
regarding just how psychology would sit in relation to philosophy. Debate regarding the nature 
of consciousness, the relative utility of introspective methods, and the proper place for 
comparative psychology was rampant in the Department (Kuklick, 1977). There was, however, 
one thing that all of Allport’s early mentors, including Münsterberg, Holt, Langfeld, and Perry 
advocated: exact, experimental science. Although Holt and Perry were primarily philosophers, 
their philosophical writings promoted and paved the way for a psychology that was separate 
from speculation and based on observable behavior and experimental methods.  
                                                          
9
 Allport anticipated becoming a faculty member at Harvard (Allport, 1919b). This, however, did not occur. By 
Allport’s own account, the Department underwent a reorganization when E. G. Boring arrived, and Allport was 
asked to leave (Allport, 1974).  
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Through his time as Langfeld’s assistant in introductory experimental psychology 
courses, Allport learned the ins and outs of early twentieth-century laboratory psychology. 
Herbert Sidney Langfeld (1879-1958) had earned his Ph.D. in 1909 under Carl Stumpf at the 
University of Berlin (Zusne, 1975). He arrived at Harvard that same year, working his way up to 
Associate Professor by 1924 (Barlett, 1958). During his time at Harvard, Langfeld was interested 
in general sensory and motor processes and later in aesthetics (see Langfeld, 1920). In 1916, he 
and Allport co-authored a laboratory manual for the field (Langfeld & Allport, 1916), a work 
that likely resulted from Allport’s years as Langfeld’s assistant in introductory psychology 
courses.  
The manual was essentially a “how-to” guide for new psychology undergraduates 
beginning to learn their way around the laboratory. It outlined a number of studies that could be 
performed in one semester with minimal equipment, employing another student as a participant. 
The experiments were divided into studies on sensation, perception, attention, motor processes, 
association, memory, imagery, and affection. The work essentially outlined the classic 
experimental methods and studies, including studies of differential thresholds, introspective 
comparisons, and sensory and motor responding. The manual also included more novel 
experiments, one in which a student is instructed to commit a small crime and then free 
association techniques and reaction times are used to distinguish between the “criminal” student 
and an “innocent” student.10 Writing this manual with Langfeld and working alongside him in 
the Harvard laboratory undoubtedly help to initiate Allport into the culture of experimental 
psychology. As Daniel Katz noted, “Langfeld’s emphasis upon scientific rigor helped Allport 
                                                          
10
 This experiment was likely not devised by Langfeld and Allport. Münsterberg describes similar experiments and 
approaches in On the Witness Stand (1908) and Psychology: General and Applied (1914).  
                                                                                                                                          49 
 
recognize the importance of appropriate techniques and contributed to Allport’s scientism” 
(Katz, n.d., p. 6).
11
 
Allport also worked closely with Münsterberg for a brief period, serving as his assistant 
in introductory psychology in 1915 (G. Allport, 1967). Importantly, it was Münsterberg who 
suggested the topic for Allport’s dissertation on social facilitation. Although Allport was not 
particularly fond of Münsterberg’s ideas, he was undoubtedly influenced by his devotion to 
careful experimentation and his promotion of a new, experimental social psychology.
12
 In 
Psychology and Social Sanity, for example, Münsterberg (1914a) provided a lengthy argument 
against the idea that history, literature, and folk lore could provide insight into psychological 
processes. These bodies of work, he contended, contain little aside from vague generalities and 
metaphors. Such aphorisms, he argued, would be no replacement for firm, experimental findings: 
“The mathematical statistics of the professional students of the mind and their test experiments in 
the laboratories are certainly less picturesque, but they have the one advantage that the results are 
true” (p. 319).  
In this same text, Münsterberg laid the groundwork for experimental social psychology 
arguing that the time was ripe for the application of these exact methods to the study of the 
individual in relation to the social world. He argued that in addition to studying the laws of the 
individual mind, psychology must also seek to explain “the working together of human minds” 
beginning with the “simplest contact” between individuals and eventually shedding light on “the 
widest circle of the civilized nations” (p. 4). To understand these topics, psychology would 
necessarily extend its subject matter to a study of the “behavior of the social group and the laws 
                                                          
11
 The relationship between Allport and Langfeld ended up being quite beneficial for Katz. After completing his 
doctoral degree he was hired at Princeton, where Langfeld had gone after leaving Harvard.  
12
 Allport later noted that his relationship with Münsterberg was “rather casual” and stated that “Münsterberg was 
conscientious and helped when I went to him which was not often” (“Factors in Psychological Leadership,” 1952).  
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of the social mind and the meaning of the social impulses” (p. 4). Münsterberg saw his inclusion 
of social psychology as one of the features that differentiated his text from its predecessors, 
which had focused only on individual psychology.   
Allport’s devotion to scientific methods and laboratory methodology may have been the 
result of his close association with Langfeld and his time as Münsterberg’s assistant, but his 
philosophical framework was influenced largely by Edwin Bissell Holt (1873-1946) and Ralph 
Barton Perry (1876-1957). Langfeld (1946) described Holt as “the real guide of the graduate 
research” (p. 253) at Harvard; although Münsterberg often assigned the dissertation topics, Holt 
assisted the students in carrying out the research properly and finding their way around the 
Harvard Psychological Laboratory. In his first book-length work, The Concept of Consciousness, 
Holt laid out the beginnings of what Kuklick (1977) has aptly described as a framework for 
philosophical behaviorism. Holt, a student of James and Münsterberg, was well aware of the 
difficulties of idealism as well as the many varieties of realism; he was also aware of the 
difficulties inherent in psychology due to the intangible nature of consciousness and its relation 
to the external world. His own contribution to these debates began with his 1914 work, The 
Concept of Consciousness. In this text, Holt attempted to relocate consciousness, placing it 
outside of the organism, and redefining it in terms of environmental cues and behavioral 
responses. In doing so, he created an intricate philosophical framework for psychology as the 
study of behavior.  
 In The Concept of Consciousness, Holt (1914) essentially argued that what had been 
termed consciousness was nothing more than that portion of the environment to which an 
organism responds. If an organism responds distinctly and repeatedly to a given portion of the 
environment, one can say that that stimulus is part of the organism’s consciousness or “psychic 
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manifold.” This psychic manifold includes not only physical objects, but also non-physical 
properties such as intensity and direction. He stressed that both the physical objects and the non-
physical properties are outside of the organism. Thus, Holt argued, “consciousness or mind is not 
inside the skull nor secreted anywhere within the nervous system; but that all objects that one 
perceives, including the so-called ‘secondary qualities,’ are ‘out there’ just where and as they 
seem to be” (p. 181). In other words, the environment consists of all possible physical objects 
and non-physical properties of objects. Consciousness, on the other hand, consists of all of those 
objects and secondary qualities of objects of which the organism is aware. Understanding 
consciousness or the “psychic manifold” involves determining the distinct responses of the 
organism to different objects and properties in the environment: “the knowing process is 
deducible from the life-process of response” (p. 183). 
 Holt expanded his concept of psychology as the study of response in 1915. In a 
supplement at the end of The Freudian Wish,
13
 Holt (1915a) argued for a study of the 
organization of behavior over and above the study of reflex action; in essence, he advocated a 
study of the functions of behavior instead of the physiological processes underlying behavior.
14
 
He urged his colleagues to “put our microscope back into its case” (161), and instead examine 
behavior as a function of and purposive response to the environment: 
the behaving organism…is always doing something, and the fairly accurate description 
of this activity will invariably reveal a law (or laws) whereby this activity is shown to be 
a constant function of some aspect of the objective world (p. 166)  
                                                          
13
 This supplement in The Freudian Wish had also appeared the same year as an article in the Journal of Philosophy, 
Psychology, and Scientific Methods (Holt, 1915b).  
14
 This is very similar to the arguments that Allport would make much later in his career in the context of event-
structure theory.  
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In this work, Holt stressed the idea of purpose in behavior, reaffirmed his idea of consciousness 
as a relation between organism and environment, and reiterated the idea that the study of 
behavior illuminates this relationship.  
 Allport’s later pronouncements of social psychology as the study of behavior mirror 
Holt’s careful arguments for behavioral response as a guide to conscious awareness. Allport 
certainly felt indebted to Holt, as evidenced by the acknowledgements section in his 1924 text.
15
 
However, Allport’s platform for a behavioristic social psychology was also strongly rooted in 
arguments against the notion of the social mind; in formulating these arguments, he would have 
found no better ally than Ralph Barton Perry. Like Holt, Perry fought long and hard against 
idealism, using his skills as a logician to identify errors in the arguments of the idealists (Perry, 
1910). He also used the same set of skills to argue against the notion of consciousness as an 
entity (Perry, 1912) and in doing so, laid out a set of propositions regarding what does and does 
not constitute an independent entity. Importantly, Perry here set out a discussion of the 
relationship between parts and wholes. He argued that while whole entities are dependent on and 
can be analyzed into their parts, parts are not dependent on wholes; according to the tenets of 
neo-realism and its focus on analysis, wholes must be analyzed into their constituent parts.  
In 1922, Perry also applied his rigorous logic to the notion of the social mind and the 
possibility of considering the social mind as a collectivity. In this two-part article (Perry, 1922), 
he argued that the problem of defining the social mind was an important one; it was not, as other 
                                                          
15
 Later in life, when asked to name and rate the leadership qualities of his mentors, Allport chose Holt as his 
number one influence, followed by Perry and Langfeld. He rated Holt and Perry both very highly on a number of 
factors, including warmth, originality, and research abilities. Interestingly, he rated both as having great difficulty in 
being decisive on controversial issues. Langfeld’s ratings were somewhat lower on all positive characteristics, and 
Allport noted that he seldom worked harder or longer than others  and was not particularly warm, funny, or 
ambitious (“Factors in Psychological Leadership,” 1952).   
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scholars had contended, a minor quibble regarding words. Conceiving of a collectivity as an 
independent entity has consequences for the ways people feel and behave:  
In accordance with a deeply rooted and apparently inalienable trait, when a man finds 
himself in the presence of what he calls a person of a higher order, he worships it, or 
rather him or her. It would make a considerable difference to a man’s conduct if he 
should regard corporations as having souls to save, or a state as having a divinity to 
worship (1922, p. 565) 
In much the same way as he had previously dismissed the notion of the absolute in idealistic 
philosophy (cf. Perry, 1904), Perry aimed his criticism at the notion of the social mind. Perry did 
not, however, dismiss the reality of collectivities all together. He noted that society may indeed 
be logically characterized as a whole, but such a characterization should not provide scholars 
free reign to confer honorific status upon such wholes. There is, Perry (1922) argued, no 
difference between a social whole and a row of books and “there is nothing…which exalts a row 
of books, or impels us to spell it with a capital letter and worship it” (p. 572). 
 In the second article, however, he considered the more crucial question of whether 
society is the same kind of compound as an individual; in other words, can we speak of a social 
mind in the same sense that we speak of an individual mind? Perry concluded that this is true to 
some extent, but that a social whole is far less unified than an individual. Furthermore, when 
social wholes do become highly unified, the individuals of which they are comprised suffer in 
the process. Perry clearly held that groups were inferior to the lone individual:  
In so far as social organizations…approach the single organism in the solidarity of their 
unity, they debase their members…the whole of each of these originally and potentially 
human beings would be reduced to being a fraction of some human function. The result 
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would be to make one man grow where several thousand or million grew before. And the 
chances are that this sole survivor would be considerably less of a man, same only in 
stature, than those whom he absorbed” (p. 732).  
He concluded that social wholes are indeed wholes, but “they are wholes of a type inferior to the 
best that is typical of their human members” (p. 734). Perry closed the article by discussing the 
place of the social mind in the new study of social relations, or the study of “man in the relations 
which he sustains with others of the same species” (p. 735). Perry argued that to explain the 
behavior of man in the crowd does not require reference to the “crowd mind.” Just as the 
individual behaves differently on dry land and in water, he behaves differently in the presence of 
others and in solitude: “A man’s behavior is always a function of his environment” (p. 735). In 
essence, Perry consented to a place for the social mind in social philosophy, but dismissed it 
from the newly developing field of social psychology.  
These two articles illustrate Perry’s promotion of individualism in both science and 
society. The political aspects of his individualistic approach were also evident in earlier pieces 
written in the context of the First World War, when he criticized the complacency and 
compliance of American citizens and argued for a more informed citizenry characterized not by 
empty flag-waving, but by individual expression and rational decision-making (Perry, 1916). In 
this work, Perry reconsidered the nature of democracy in the context of war and concluded that 
the central goal of a democratic nation should always be “to promote the happiness and well-
being of individual men and women” (p. 26). These conclusions are strikingly similar to the ones 
that Allport would reach more than two decades later in the context of the Second World War.  
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 Holt and Perry’s philosophical writings were part of a larger movement known as New 
Realism or Neorealism, which was centered primarily at Harvard during the early twentieth 
century. This movement was very influential for Allport, who noted in 1919: 
through the influence of Professors Perry and Holt, I acquired a deep aversion to all 
forms of idealism…I have, I think, permanently espoused the epistemology of Neo 
Realism and lean strongly toward the behavioristic views of psychology which 
harmonize with that philosophy (Allport, 1919b) 
The New Realists stressed an outlook that would come to dominate Allport’s work at the end of 
his graduate career. They pressed for exactitude in philosophy and science through: use of clear 
definitions of concepts by means of “careful reference to their objective purport” (Holt et al., 
1912, p. 22); the analysis of complex entities into simpler entities, and;  the replacement of large, 
indefinable philosophical questions with the explicit formulation of testable propositions. 
Furthermore, this group of individuals provided a useable philosophical platform for American 
behaviorism (Leahey, 2000; Mills, 1998; O’Neill, 1968, 1995). A student of both Holt and Perry 
during the years in which neo-realism developed, Allport absorbed many of these ideas and 
incorporated them into his behavioristic social psychology. Furthermore, the assault of the New 
Realists on consciousness and idealism provided a framework for Allport’s later assaults on the 
social mind. 
Harvard at War 
Aside from his co-authorship of the laboratory manual with Langfeld, Allport’s only 
other publication during his graduate years was a short article published in March of 1917 in a 
special “war preparedness” issue of the Harvard Illustrated. The article, titled “How to Give and 
Receive Commands: The Psychology of the Raw Recruit,” is an odd piece that provides tips on 
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increasing the efficiency of commanding officers and new recruits, but it does reflect Allport’s 
training and interests at the time. In this article, one can also see Allport applying the concepts 
and methods of classic experimental psychology to the realm of social influence. Allport (1917b) 
discussed the difference between sensory and motor responders (cf. Baldwin, 1895) and the ways 
in which the performance of each type could be improved. Allport’s work on social influence 
also finds its way into the article: “Among the facilitating conditions which the officer should 
understand, the social influence is very important…We do better work when we are aware that 
our movements are synchronous with those of our comrades.” He therefore recommended that 
officers should march in “columns of squads” rather than in “double file” (p. 34).  
Three months after writing about the raw recruit, Allport would become one himself. In 
1917, one month after the United States entered World War I, Allport left the Harvard 
Laboratory and entered first officer’s training camp in Plattsburgh, New York. Plattsburgh, like 
most training camps instituted during the War, was a society in and of itself; recruits were 
provided with various forms of entertainment including lounges, cinemas, and local civilian and 
soldier performers, the purpose of which was to entertain the recruits, but also to discourage 
prostitution and drinking (Ellis, 1916; Keene, 2006). After three months of training, he was 
commissioned as Second Lieutenant in the Artillery Section of the Officers Reserve Corps and 
learned he would shortly be shipped overseas. Prior to leaving the United States, Allport married 
Ethel Margaret Hudson.
16
 In 1920, he recalled his wartime marriage as somewhat hasty: “A 
sudden madness seizes me. I write a poem and then rush into matrimony, just three days avant de 
                                                          
16
 Allport likely met Hudson back in Ohio. She was born in Akron, Ohio in 1893 (“Ohio Births and Christenings, 
1800-1962”).  
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partir! I decide to live if possible; if not, to die beautifully” (Allport, 1920a, p. 6). Although the 
marriage indeed survived for twenty years, the couple eventually divorced in 1937.
17
  
From the fall of 1917 until the spring of 1918, Allport served in France, taking up various 
positions including Instructor in Artillery Communication, balloon observer, and assistant 
regimental adjutant (Allport, 1919b). He received the Croix de Guerre from the French Army 
Corps when he parachuted from an observation balloon that had been attacked by German 
artillery fire. However, he describes these years as “on the whole uneventful” (Allport, 1974, p. 
4). Like so many other American soldiers in France (Kennedy, 2004), Allport seems to have 
participated in very little combat; as he noted in 1919, he was “involved in nothing but the noise” 
(Allport, 1919b, p. 6). He did, however, experience the highly regimented and hierarchical nature 
of military life and the constant propaganda promoting “the cause” (Kennedy, 2004), both of 
which undoubtedly conflicted with his early leanings towards individualism (cf. Allport, 1919b). 
Allport returned to the United States in May and served as a radio instructor at Camp Jackson in 
South Carolina. In September, he was promoted to First Lieutenant and after a brief stint in 
Michigan doing liaison work, he was discharged in January of 1919 (Allport, 1920a). He 
returned to Harvard and resumed his studies, completing his dissertation studies and his Ph.D. 
the following June.   
The Beginnings of Social Facilitation Research 
Allport’s affiliation with Hugo Münsterberg may have been short and perhaps as Allport 
later recalled not particularly congenial (Allport, 1974), but it would have a direct impact on the 
focus of his work for many years to come. It was Münsterberg that suggested the topic of 
Allport’s doctoral dissertation, The social influence: An experimental study of the effect of the 
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 Allport later noted that he was “not well adjusted” in his first marriage, a situation that he believed hampered his 
career (“Factors in Psychological Leadership,” 1952).  
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group upon individual mental processes (Allport, 1919c). When Allport began his work on the 
social psychology of the individual and the group, there was little experimental research in the 
area. Perhaps the earliest and most well-known experiment on what would later be labeled 
“social facilitation” was published in 1898 by Norman Triplett (Davis, Huss, & Becker, 2009). 
Triplett (1898) became interested in the presence of spectators and coactors
18
 on the performance 
of cyclists. Data provided to Triplett by the Racing Board of the League of American Wheelmen 
indicated that cyclists completed races more quickly in the presence of other coacting 
competitors or pacers, as compared to when they completed the race alone. In order to test these 
effects experimentally, Triplett (1898) devised an experiment where children were required to 
reel in silk cords on fishing reels as quickly as possible either alone or in the presence of a 
coactor. All participants used the reels to wind the same amount of cord and Triplett used a 
kymograph to record curves representing the speed of their actions and a stopwatch to determine 
the amount of time required to complete the task. Triplett found that children completed the task 
more quickly when they worked in the presence of coactors than when they worked alone.
19
 
Based on these findings, he concluded that “the bodily presence of another contestant 
participating simultaneously in the race serves to liberate latent energy not ordinarily available” 
(Triplett, 1898, p. 533). 
Scholars have frequently associated the beginnings of social facilitation research, and 
experimental social psychology more generally, with Triplett’s work (Bond & Titus, 1983; 
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 The word coactors is used to refer to individuals performing an activity alongside another  individual who is also 
performing that same activity. The two do not work together, nor are they explicitly placed in a competitive 
situation. This is different from spectators, who are present when an individual performs a task but they do not 
perform the task alongside the individual (Bond & Titus, 1983; Dashiell, 1935).   
19
 Strube (2005) reanalyzed Triplett’s original data and found that in fact Triplett’s findings were not statistically 
significant and furthermore, that they were compromised by a number of factors. Taking all of these things into 
account, Strube concluded that, by modern standards, Triplett actually found little evidence of social facilitation.  
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Guérin, 1993).
20
 However, the largest and perhaps most influential body of early work in this 
area came out of Germany in the early twentieth century. Interestingly, German research into the 
influence of coactors on individual behavior was driven in large part by experimental pedagogy, 
and more specifically, by a desire to understand the effectiveness of homework for 
schoolchildren (Burnham, 1905, 1910).
21
 German teachers and scholars had begun conducting 
experiments examining how well academic tasks were completed in the home environment 
versus the school environment. Early studies demonstrated that students working at home in 
solitude made more errors on arithmetic tasks, but performed much better when writing essays 
(Burnham, 1905). Others scholars were not interested in homework per se, but rather in the 
effectiveness of the classroom environment. Specifically, they were interested in whether 
students completed their work more effectively when surrounded by their peers in the classroom 
or when working alone in the classroom (Burnham, 1905). These studies demonstrated that, 
when working in the presence of their peers, students completed their work more quickly and 
their work was of a higher quality. However, when students were told to take their time and work 
carefully, students working in isolation performed better than those working in the presence of 
others.  
Not all of the research on the individual-in-the-group phenomena arose in the classroom. 
German psychologist Ernst Meumann’s work on the problem in 1904 is said to have arisen from 
his accidental interruption of a subject working with an ergograph (Burnham, 1905). He noticed 
that when he was in the room, the subject performed more efficiently. This surreptitious finding 
                                                          
20
 The validity of Triplett’s work as representing the “first” social-psychological experiment or the “first” 
experiment on social facilitation will not be discussed here (see Danziger, 2000; Haines & Vaughn, 1979). I will 
briefly state, however, that while the experiment was surely not the first to suggest that a group presence affects the 
individual (i.e., mere presence effects), it may have been the first to directly examine the effect of a coacting group 
on individual performance.  
21
 All of these early studies were conducted in Germany and have not been translated. I have therefore relied on 
secondary sources to describe them. Burnham (1905) outlines each study in detail. Further summaries of the 
findings can be found in Allport (1924), Jahoda (2007), and Dashiell (1935).  
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led him to the schools, where he examined students’ performance in the presence of the group, in 
the presence of the teacher, and in solitude. He too found that students were less productive when 
working in solitude. When children were asked whether they would prefer to work alone or in 
the classroom, only a small minority of “sensitive, nervous, or weak children” (Burnham, 1905, 
p. 221) chose solitude.  
In general, these studies had reached a consensus regarding the utility of homework. 
Homework was not desirable unless the task at hand was one that required higher mental 
capacities such as imagination and judgment. Meumann therefore recommended that homework 
was generally undesirable.
22
 However, these studies had also revealed a novel way of 
conceptualizing the individual in the group. As Burnham (1905) explains: 
pupils in a class are in a sort of mental rapport; they hear, see, and know continually 
what the others are doing, and thus real class work is not a mere case of individuals 
working together and their performance the summation of the work of many individuals; 
but there is a sort of class spirit, so that in the full sense of the word one can speak of a 
group performance which may be compared with an individual performance. The pupils 
are members of a community of workers. The individual working by himself is a 
different person (p. 220) 
In many ways, this research therefore provided a novel way of conceptualizing the relationship 
between the individual and the group as well as popular and important nineteenth-century 
concepts such as mental rapport, the group mind, and the crowd.  
Early social facilitation research was continued in early twentieth-century Germany by 
Walther Moede (1888-1958), a student of Wilhelm Wundt, who went on to become a central 
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 Interestingly, these findings were used by Burnham and other progressive intellectuals as part of what Gill and 
Schlossman (1996) describe as an “antihomework crusade” that swept the United States in the early twentieth 
century.  
                                                                                                                                          61 
 
figure in the history of applied psychology. As early as 1914, Moede had begun a series of 
studies examining the performance of individuals in the presence of co-acting groups of various 
sizes (Allport, 1924a; Danziger, 2000; Dashiell, 1935; Jahoda, 2007).
23
 Moede varied the nature 
of the psychological processes measured (e.g., attention, memory, word association), the size of 
the group, as well as the nature of the situation (e.g., mere presence of others vs. others in 
competition with the individual). Moede’s findings were varied; for example, he found that  
tapping speed increased when coactors were present, but only for those participants that were 
significantly slow at the task to begin with. Furthermore, the presence of a coactor with inferior 
abilities led to performance detriments. As with the studies conducted by other German scholars, 
Moede found that the presence of coactors leads sometimes to performance benefits and 
sometimes to detriments. Nonetheless, this research added to the growing consensus that social 
actors could be viewed as experimental social stimuli.  
As Danziger (2000) has noted, Moede’s work on social facilitation was different from the 
work of Triplett or those working in experimental pedagogy because he was primarily a 
psychologist interested in institutionalizing the study of experimental crowd psychology. His 
work was not intended to solve a particular practical problem and it constituted more than a loose 
collection of related experiments; Moede was attempting to extend the principles of experimental 
psychology to the study of the crowd. In his 1920 work, Moede eventually abandoned 
experimental social psychology and turned towards applied psychology, applying his findings on 
the individual-in-the-group to industrial psychology. Nonetheless, his work, and particularly his 
methodology, had a lasting impact on the field of American social psychology through the work 
of Allport. 
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 The experiments were eventually published in a book titled Experimental Crowd Psychology: A Contribution to 
Experimental Group Psychology. Unfortunately, the work has not been translated from German and I have relied on 
secondary sources to describe its contents.  
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Münsterberg’s suggestion for Allport’s dissertation undoubtedly arose from these studies 
conducted in Germany, as well as from his own work in industrial psychology. It is quite likely 
that Münsterberg followed Moede’s work, since both men were students of Wundt and both were 
beginning their work on applied psychology in the early 1900s.
24
 Münsterberg also followed 
studies in experimental pedagogy, providing an overview of them in his text, Psychology: 
General and Applied. His interest in education was closely linked to his interest in industrial 
efficiency; both were rooted in the idea of a perfect fit between the person and the environment 
and the provision of an environment that generally produces maximum efficiency. In his 
discussions of industrial psychology, Münsterberg (1914b) considered every aspect of the 
industrial situation, including the color of the workers’ surroundings, noise, and the quality and 
quantity of stimuli presented to the worker, as potential factors in the efficiency of the worker. 
Münsterberg’s suggestion of an examination of coactors as situational factors affecting 
individual performance was therefore likely drawn largely from his familiarity with experimental 
pedagogy and his interest in industrial efficiency.  
Allport’s (1919c) dissertation, The social influence: An experimental study of the effect of 
the group upon individual mental processes, outlined a number of studies that examined the 
effects of coactors on individual performance. The template for all of these experiments was 
generally the same: subjects completed a task alone and then completed the same task in the 
presence of other individuals working independently at the same task. The quantity and quality 
of the work completed was then used as a measure of the influence of the group on individual 
performance. The term social increment was used to refer to an increase in the quantity of 
individual work done in the presence of coacting others, while social decrement referred to a 
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 It is questionable how much of Moede’s work Allport actually read. Allport was able to read German with slight 
difficulty (Allport, 1919b) , but in his 1924 text, Allport does not discuss Moede’s 1920 book on experimental 
crowd psychology. Instead he refers only to Moede’s 1914 article on competition (cf. Danziger, 2000).  
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decrease in quantity. Social supervaluence referred to an increase in the quality of work done in 
the presence of coacting others, while social subvaluence referred to a decrease in the quality of 
work done in coacting situations. Allport measured these outcomes across a variety of tasks, 
manipulating only the presence or absence of others. The tasks involved free association, vowel 
cancellation, multiplication, analysis of philosophical passages, reversible perspectives tests, and 
judgments of odors and weights. His conclusions across all of the studies were based on mean 
differences between the two conditions and his interpretations of the findings were directed 
primarily by the post-study introspective comments of his subjects.  
From the start, Allport’s work on the social seemed to indicate to him that the 
individual’s intellectual abilities were hampered by the group. He generally found evidence of a 
social increment in performance; subjects produced more free associations, completed more 
multiplication items, and provided more arguments against philosophical passages when they 
were in the presence of coacting others. Allport attributed this to social facilitation, “which 
consists of an increase of response merely from the sight or sound of others making the same 
movements” (Allport, 1924a, p. 262). In terms of the quality of performance, however, Allport 
found evidence of social subvaluence; although subjects produced more in the presence of 
others, their work was of lower quality.  For example, they made more errors on the 
multiplication tests and provided less sophisticated arguments against philosophical passages. In 
short, the presence of a group increased the quantity but not the quality of individual work. This 
notion—that the group somehow lessens the capabilities of the individual—came to permeate his 
work.  
Allport also conducted an additional series of experiments examining the effects of 
coacting others on individual judgment. In these experiments, subjects were presented with a 
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series of odors ranging from very unpleasant to very pleasant and they rated the pleasantness of 
the odor. Subjects made these judgments alone and in coacting groups. Allport found that, when 
making judgments in the presence of others, subjects’ judgments were less extreme. The same 
experiments were repeated with judgments of weights as the dependent variable and the same 
findings emerged; subjects avoided extreme judgments in the presence of coacting others.  
Allport reported his dissertation findings first in 1919 at the annual meeting of the 
American Psychological Association, which was held at Harvard.
25
 The following year, he 
summarized some of them for an article appearing in the Journal of Experimental Psychology 
(Allport, 1920b). Aside from Triplett’s studies, Allport’s were the first of this kind in North 
America. They also differed from the work done in Germany in that Allport employed adult 
subjects as opposed to children; this difference was a significant one, given that children were 
thought to be much more susceptible to social influences (cf Allport, 1924a). Furthermore, 
Allport’s experiments were much more systematic, conforming to the ideals of laboratory 
experimentation emphasized at the time. For example, he implemented counterbalancing 
techniques to avoid practice effects and fatigue, he took great care to standardize all aspects of 
the experiment to exclude extraneous variables, and tried to eliminate potential confounding 
variables such as feelings of rivalry or competition.
26
 In addition, Allport’s dissertation 
conformed wholeheartedly to the implicit standards and accepted experimental philosophies and 
practices of early twentieth-century American psychology. As Ash (2003) has noted, these 
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 Allport’s paper was presented in a session for “Social and Applied Psychology.” The content of this symposium is 
indicative of the state of social psychology in 1919: Allport’s paper was the only one that dealt specifically with 
social psychology; the remainder all dealt with applied work done on individual testing (Gates, 1920).  
 
26
 This is not to say, however, that there were no problems with the methods by current standards. Allport used the 
same 26 subjects in all of his experiments, with less than 15 being employed in each experiment. In some of the free 
association experiments, only 3 subjects participated. Furthermore, many of these subjects were graduate students, 
many of whom likely had some insight into his purposes. For example, his brother Gordon served as one of the 
participants.  
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practices included the use of the word experimental, the restriction of subject matter to those 
topics that could be addressed using experimental methods, and the use of rhetoric that 
emphasized an explicit separation of science and philosophy. 
Allport’s work on social facilitation was well-received and sparked interest in the area, 
giving rise to a number of experiments on the influence of the presence of others on individual 
performance and behavior. Current scholars have rightfully traced the history of social 
facilitation and conformity research back to Allport (Guérin, 1993) and there is little doubt that 
he indeed opened up new vistas of research in these areas. However, Allport’s early research 
provided much more than a new topic of study for social psychology; it also contributed to a new 
problem-oriented and seemingly cumulative laboratory approach to studying the social, one that 
could be replicated. Allport’s findings were extended to include the effect of audiences (Gates, 
1924; Travis, 1925) and the impact of the experimenter’s presence (Ekdahl, 1929). The impact of 
individual differences in intelligence on social facilitation was examined (Anderson, 1929; 
Weston & English, 1926), and the research was extended to diverse populations (Travis, 1928). 
Throughout all of this research, several new problems were identified based on previous findings 
and each new experiment generally represented a manipulation slightly different from that used 
in previous experiments. In addition, Allport provided a new kind of exemplar for social 
psychology—one focused on studying the behavior of the individual in relation to social stimuli. 
This focus on behavior was new for a field that had struggled to find a definable, discernible unit 
of analysis. The influence of Allport’s early experiments therefore seems to have been two-fold: 
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he opened up a new area of research devoted to the various forms of inter-individual influence 
and he provided an adaptable exemplar for the experimental study of social behavior.
27
   
Conclusion 
Six months after completing his doctoral degree at Harvard, Allport published his first 
academic article, which served as his first definitive statement on the science of social 
psychology. In “Behavior and experiment in social psychology,” Allport (1919a) drew a clear 
line of separation between the social psychology of the past and that of the future. Armed with 
the philosophies of his Harvard mentors and his own experimental findings, he proposed a new 
era in the study of social psychology: 
The time has come to abandon speculations about types of groups, social organization, 
self and crowd consciousness, instinct and imitation. When social psychologists focus 
their attention upon the behavior of the individual under direct and incidental stimulation 
from the behavior of others, then the most vital questions of the social order will find 
their solution (p. 305) 
 Social psychology, Allport argued, must follow in the footsteps of general psychology, which 
had broken with its “rationalistic” and “pre-experimental” past. In this article, Allport—drawing 
on Holt’s arguments about individual consciousness—cast aside the notion of social psychology 
as the study of group mind or social consciousness and instead presented it as the study of the 
distinct and repeated responses of the individual to the social aspects of the environment. Like 
“consciousness,” the “social mind” could be reformulated as a behavioral response, thereby 
                                                          
27
 Perhaps the strongest (but least acknowledged) impact of Allport’s facilitation research was the attention it drew 
to the influence of the experimenter on subjects’ behaviors. In extensions of his work, researchers began to realize 
that the presence of the experimenter in the “alone” condition altered behavior and was enough to produce a 
facilitating effect. Long before Robert Rosenthal and his colleagues formalized research on the social psychology of 
the psychological experiment, researchers were well aware of the artificiality of their findings. As Luther Lee 
Bernard stated in 1931: “The process of the experiment brings a new and powerful set of conditioning factors into 
the situation, with the result that the responses of the person who is the subject  of the experiment are not necessarily 
made to the stimuli set for him, but to those set about him as controls” (p. 74).  
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making it measurable and observable. Employing the analytic, reductionist approach of his 
mentors, Allport argued for a social psychology focused on the “elementary facts” that 
characterize social aggregates; those elementary facts, he argued, are inter-individual stimulation 
and response. All previous contributions to the discipline were dismissed: “True social 
psychology is a science of the future; its data are at present unrecorded” (p. 297). 
When Allport completed his graduate work in 1919, he had been strongly affected by the 
ideas and approaches of his Harvard mentors. Allport’s doctoral studies and his years in the 
Harvard Psychological Laboratory had clearly provided him with a solid understanding of and 
appreciation for contemporary experimental methods. His friendship with leading members of 
the New Realist school provided him with a philosophical framework characterized by 
reductionism and a firm commitment to objectivity and behaviorist principles. Perhaps most 
importantly, Allport’s years at Harvard left him with the firm belief that this approach, which 
had come to dominate experimental psychology, could also be fruitfully applied to the 
developing field of social psychology.  
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Chapter 3 
The “Struggle for Supremacy:” Allport and the Establishment of an Individualistic Social 
Psychology  
 The years following Allport’s completion of his doctorate were busy ones, rife with 
personal and professional change and productivity. Though Allport’s plans had included 
remaining at Harvard to take a faculty position (Allport, 1920a),
28
 he was never offered one. 
Instead, he served as an instructor at Harvard and Radcliffe—teaching social, experimental, 
child, and comparative psychology—until 1922 when his teaching position was not reinstated 
(Allport, n.d.). During that year, major changes were made in the Department when E. G. Boring 
was hired and according to Allport (1974), he was asked to leave the department.
 29
 Allport then 
went to the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, where he took a position as Associate 
Professor of Psychology. He remained at Chapel Hill until 1924, when, with a recommendation 
from sociologist Franklin H. Giddings, he was offered a position as Professor of Social and 
Political Psychology at the Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse 
University (Allport, 1974). In addition to these geographical changes, Allport and his wife also 
started and completed their family; by 1924, he and Ethel had three children: Edward, Dorothy, 
and Floyd (Allport, 1941). The growth of his family, however, coincided with loss: in 1923, 
Allport would deal with the death of his father (Deaths, 1923), to whom he would later dedicate 
his famed 1924 textbook, Social Psychology.  
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 Allport noted in his entry in the Harvard college class records in 1920, “Am an instructor, an aspirant to a definite 
seat on the faculty — sometime — but that’s up to President Lowell” (Allport, 1920a, p. 7). 
29
 One of Allport’s mentors, Herbert Langfeld, also left the Department at this time. He was asked to reduce his 
position to half-time. He refused, choosing instead to take a position at Princeton, where he became the Director of 
the Psychological Laboratory (Allport, 1974). It is unclear why Allport was asked to leave. Historian Sam 
Parkovnick has indicated in personal communications that when Boring’s position replaced Langfeld’s, Allport’s 
position was also replaced by a faculty member who arrived with Boring. I have not examined the E. G. Boring 
papers, which likely hold the answer. It is interesting to note that Floyd’s brother Gordon was offered a position at 
Harvard in 1929. Gordon remained at Harvard for the remainder of his career (Nicholson, 2003).  
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 Despite these noteworthy changes, Allport’s postgraduate years were productive ones 
that marked him as a significant figure in the newly emerging field of social psychology. By 
1924, he was described by one scholar as “one of the outstanding figures among the younger 
American psychologists” (Wells, 1924, p. 441). He began presenting his work at prominent 
conferences, including the meetings of the American Psychological Association, the 
International Congress of Psychology, and the American Sociological Association. He also 
began publishing work on social psychology, motivation, personality, and other topics in a 
variety of prominent journals. In 1921, he became coeditor of the Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology and Social Psychology, serving as the expert on social psychology while Morton 
Prince served as the expert on abnormal psychology. And of course, in 1923, he completed a 
textbook on social psychology that became the standard guide for the emerging field.  
 As many historians have noted, Allport’s textbook was widely successful, helping to 
institutionalize social psychology in American colleges and universities. Upon its release in 
1924, the text was described by Harry Hollingworth as “one of the most significant books in 
psychology published in recent years;” by Lewis Terman as “the best general text in its line;” by 
Kimball Young as “the most adequate textbook with which to introduce the students into the 
subject of social psychology;” and by J. R. Kantor as “by far and away the best book that I have 
yet seen on this subject.” Furthermore, the book was one of eight social science books chosen by 
the American Library Association as the most important books of the year (Houghton Mifflin, 
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March 24, 1926). By 1929, approximately fifty schools were making use of the text in various 
courses (Houghton Mifflin, January 25, 1929).
30
  
The text, however, was also highly polemical. In it and in his other works during this 
period, Allport’s promoted a narrow view of social psychology that focused on the individual 
and critiqued the approaches of those studying social groups. Crafted initially in the context of 
his behaviorist, experimentalist, anti-idealist training, and fueled further by strong critiques of his 
work, throughout the 1920s Allport waged an almost fanatical war on collective concepts 
prevalent in the social scientific literature. The group mind, crowds, publics, the social oversoul, 
the general will, and the social organism all came under attack. In a now infamous excerpt from 
his text, Social Psychology, Allport (1924a) dismissed the group as a valid object of scientific 
social psychology: “There is no psychology of groups which is not essentially and entirely a 
psychology of individuals…There is likewise no consciousness except that belonging to 
individuals. Psychology in all its branches is a science of the individual” (p. 4). Within ten years 
of obtaining his doctoral degree, Allport had written no less than ten articles, a significant 
number of book reviews and critiques, and his textbook—all of which argued for the banishment 
of the group concept from the realm of social psychology.  
As was noted in the introduction to this work, histories of social psychology frequently 
provide the impression that Allport’s social psychology was well-received, conforming to the 
Zeitgeist of early twentieth-century social science and providing a solid platform for an uncertain 
field. While the work was indeed well-received among most psychologists, it is also important to 
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 In a different vein, the book was also described as “obscene, vile, and vicious” by a Florida citizens’ committee in 
1927 because “many of the passages relating to sex were highly obscene.” The committee, named the Florida Purity 
League, was seeking to have it removed from the libraries of the Florida State College for Women at Tallahassee 
and the University of Florida at Gainesville. Other authors charged included G. Stanley Hall, George Bernard Shaw, 
Freud, and Upton Sinclair (Excerpt from American Mercury, 1927). More recent scholarship indicates that the group 
also opposed the evolutionary framework employed in many of these works (Faunce, 1975).  
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recognize that Allportian individualism caused considerable controversy in the social sciences 
and responses to it were not all laudatory. Allport’s denouncements of the group concept 
reverberated throughout the emerging discipline, resulting in what sociologist Luther Lee 
Bernard described as a “struggle for supremacy” (Bernard, 1924a, p. 739). In a 1924 review of 
the field, Bernard noted that two major struggles were occurring in the field of social 
psychology. Initially, “it was McDougall against the whole field in the matter of the instinctivist 
brand of social psychology. In the second struggle for supremacy, it is almost equally the whole 
field against Allport” (p. 739). Indeed, in the years following the publication of Allport’s Social 
Psychology, Allport bore the brunt of much criticism, most of it aimed at his extreme objectivism 
and his polemics against collective concepts. In his 1974 autobiography, he recalled that his 
assault on the sociological conception of the group mind and collective consciousness drew 
widespread criticism, noting “I became known as the whipping boy of the sociologists” (p. 16). 
The impact of Allport’s work during the 1920s is very much rooted in his 1924 textbook, 
which differed significantly from its predecessors. In this work, Allport provided social 
psychologists with a template for experimental, individualist social psychology and supplied a 
manual for teaching this new template to incoming students. However, Allport’s work during 
this period contributed to the development of social psychology in a second and equally 
important way:  by discouraging collaboration or cooperation between social and behavioral 
scientists. Through scathing book reviews, conference presentations, and journal articles, Allport 
contributed to increased hostility between the two groups and his extremist views may have 
perhaps made intellectual differences between the disciplines seem insurmountable. The 
divergence of sociologically and psychologically oriented forms of social psychology—noted 
repeated by scholars throughout the twentieth century (Stryker, 1977; Thoits, 1995)—therefore 
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began to take shape in the 1920s, fuelled in large part by debates that arose in the context of 
Allport’s promotion of an individualistic social psychology.  
Textbook Social Psychology 
 In 1924, textbooks on social psychology were few and far between. In fact, books of any 
sort bearing the titled “social psychology” were rare before the 1930s. James Mark Baldwin’s 
Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development was an exception, bearing the subtitle 
A Study in Social Psychology. Similarly, American sociologist William I. Thomas’s book Sex 
and Society was subtitled Studies in the Social Psychology of Sex. Neither of these works, 
however, was written with the aim of defining a new field of study or determining the boundaries 
of an existing one. Baldwin (1897b) did note that he wanted to provide a book specifically on 
social psychology “which can be used in the universities in connection with courses in 
psychology, ethics, and social science” (p. viii-iv). However, his intent was to explore the social 
aspects of individual development as well as the individual aspects of societal continuity and 
change using the principles of genetic or developmental psychology. Though Baldwin explored 
the development of sociality extensively, the phrase “social psychology” appears only a handful 
of times in the book and is never defined or explained. Instead, French explorations of 
suggestibility and imitation are described in passing as being the exemplar of good social 
psychological work. The reader is left with little sense of what is meant by the phrase. Thomas’s 
(1907) work is not even remotely concerned with carving out a field of study; in fact, the phrase 
“social psychology” does not appear anywhere in the book except the title. Thomas’s intent was 
to examine differences between the sexes, driven by the argument that they are due to both 
biology and custom, and demonstrating how they give rise to different forms of social 
organization. Although the two authors proceed in very different fashions, both Baldwin and 
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Thomas explore the ways in which biological and psychological foundations give rise to a 
variety of social forms and processes. Readers of these two texts are left with the idea that 
psychology and biology must address the social aspects of individual development and action, 
but neither book suggested a field of study for that distinct purpose.  
 Though the definition of social psychology continued to be debated in the periodical 
literature in the early twentieth century, no serious attempts were made to define it as a new field 
of study until 1908, when two books appeared almost simultaneously: Edward A. Ross’s Social 
Psychology in June and William McDougall’s Introduction to Social Psychology in October. As 
many scholars have noted, these two textbooks presented two very different versions of or 
approaches to social psychology (G. Allport, 1968; Bar-Tal, 2006; Cartwright, 1979; Pepitone, 
1981). For Ross (1908), social psychology was the study of “planes and currents that come into 
existence among men in consequence of their association” (p. 1). These planes and currents 
included phenomena such as mobs, fashions, customs, and public opinion. Ross asks, for 
example, what is a crowd? How do crowds form? What psychological aspects of the individual 
facilitate crowd behavior? For Ross, these kinds of uniformities in thought, feeling, and behavior 
resulting from association are all the more interesting because they overpower the diversity that 
arises from heredity: “the individuality each has received from the hand of nature is largely 
effaced, and we find people gathered into great planes of uniformity” (p. 1). It was the task of the 
social psychologist, he suggested, to describe and explain these uniformities resulting from 
association. By doing so, the social psychologist explains society, since social forms are the 
result of psychological processes such as imitation, invention, and association. In some respects, 
Ross’s view was similar to that of Baldwin, as it was rooted in French research on suggestion 
and imitation and it examined society as resulting from individual psychological processes.  
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 Ross’s view of the field was very different from that expressed by McDougall in his 
Introduction to Social Psychology. For McDougall (1908), the social was not something that 
arose despite heredity; instead, social forms developed out of specific innate tendencies. The task 
of the field, therefore, was to determine how society and social aspects of individual cognition, 
emotion, and behavior developed from the “native propensities and capacities of the individual 
human mind” (p. 15). Understanding these basic propensities was a necessary precursor for a 
new science of social psychology and McDougall considered his book as a “propadeutic” for 
social psychology outlining the “fundamental tendencies of the human mind” (p. 265). 
McDougall’s book covered territory that was familiar for early twentieth century psychologists, 
including instincts, volition, consciousness, and emotions. His outlook was also one that would 
have appeal for psychologists, since he suggested that psychology was in fact the basis of all 
social sciences, given that the social world was rooted in the springs, motives, and impulses of 
human conduct. McDougall was highly critical of brands of psychology that focused on 
analyzing consciousness and intellectual processes such as ideation, conception, or comparison. 
Instead, he—like many other early twentieth-century psychologists—advocated a psychology 
that was separate from philosophy and rooted in evolutionary processes.  
In many respects, both Ross’s and McDougall’s texts were highly successful. Both works 
went through several editions and were widely reviewed and cited in the literature. Nonetheless, 
for a variety of reasons, both ultimately failed to become the standard textbook for the emerging 
field of social psychology. The central critique of Ross’s text concerned his reliance on anecdotal 
evidence and his use of florid prose. Ross’s text indeed lacked the simplicity, directness, and 
summary nature of a typical textbook. As reviewers of the text would note, 117 out of 366 pages 
of the work consisted of lengthy quotations from drama, literature, and history (Mussey, 1909; 
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Vincent, 1909) and Ross’s evidence was almost always offered in a manner not readily verified; 
proof is offered in the form of statements such as “It is said that…” or “The experienced orator 
knows that…” (cf Ross, 1908, p. 44). One reviewer seemed to enjoy Ross’s literary style, but 
noted that many sociologists were “beginning to fear that he is going too far, and is sacrificing 
clearness and sometimes exactness to the striking, the vivid, and the picturesque” (Vincent, 
1909). Another bemoaned the heavy quotations, and described the work as “written far too 
largely with scissors and a paste pot” (Mussey, 1909, p. 254).31 
 Though Ross’s florid prose was the most common point of criticism, the reviewers also 
expressed a general discontent with the abstract, intellectualist approach that permeated the 
work. Reviewers noted that while the book included long descriptions of phenomena that were of 
interest to the psychologist, it lacked a certain in-depth style of analysis sought after by 
psychologists. Margaret Floy Washburn (1908) noted that in reading the book, “the psychologist 
feels the lack of any true psychological analysis…there is a tendency to rest satisfied with 
showing the causes of the psychic phenomena treated instead of dissecting the phenomena 
themselves” (p. 666). James Hayden Tufts (1909) similarly pointed out that while the work was 
highly descriptive, there was no discussion of causal relationships and because of this 
“explanation must be cut short in an unsatisfactory fashion” (p. 360). Others simply noted that 
the book did not fit well with the conventions of psychological textbook writing of the time. 
Charles Ellwood pointed out, “It does not begin with a summary of present knowledge 
concerning the psychology of the individual” (Ellwood, 1908a, p. 381), but instead follows the 
older tradition laid out by Tarde and the crowd psychologists. Ellwood also argued that the 
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 It should be noted that Ross’s book was positively reviewed by Lester Ward, who applauded the continuity with 
the Tardean approach. Ward viewed Ross’s approach as a welcome alternative to psychological approaches to social 
life, which he characterized as “so loaded with a mass of technical terms, borrowed from their psychological 
jargon…the reader’s mental stomach is so turned by their pedantic iteration that it is incapable of following what 
little thought they may represent” (Ward, 1908, p. 55).  
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subject matter was simply not appropriate for beginner students who “should be put upon more 
tangible and concrete problems than those afforded by suggestion and imitation, custom and 
convention” (Ellwood, 1908b, p. 238). The work, it seemed, was part of an outdated nineteenth-
century tradition that was no longer the preferred approach in the study of the individual and the 
social world.
32
  
McDougall’s introduction to the field initially fared much better among social and 
behavioral scientists. It was described as “original and important” (Sorley, 1908, p. 418 ),“an 
indispensable text-book” (Granger, 1909, p. 515), and marked by “considerable originality and 
definiteness of presentation” (Leuba, 1909, p. 289). McDougall was praised for taking a 
psychological approach to understanding the social (Ellwood, 1909), but it should be noted that 
the phrase “social psychology” almost never appears in any of the reviews of the book (cf 
Marshall, 1910; Solomon, 1915). As Rudmin (1985) rightly points out, the work was hardly 
considered a book on social psychology, but rather as a work on the role of instincts in individual 
behavior. McDougall himself never meant it as a textbook on social psychology; instead, it was 
written as part of a projected series of semi-popular scientific works. As McDougall described it 
in his autobiography: “I had no thought that it might be used as a college textbook. I wrote for 
the general public” (McDougall, 1930, p. 208). It is not surprising that reviewers (and likely 
most readers) viewed and wrote about the book as a treatise on instincts rather than a treatise on 
social psychology.  
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 In his 1936 autobiography, Ross nonchalantly accepted that his version of social psychology had not come to be 
the dominant one, noting that “what has come to be called ‘social psychology’ in this country now deals with the 
psyche, not so much of groups or collectivities as of individuals developing in a social setting and interacting 
constantly with others.” He went on to note that though his approach dissipated, “I am content. I lift my hat to such 
‘stout fellahs’ as Dewey, Mead, Cooley, Veblen, Thomas, Park, Burgess, Young, Allport, Krueger, Reckless, 
Bernard, Folsom, Bogardus and Brown, creators of the other social psychology. But didn’t I have a run for my 
money?” (Ross, 1936, p. 114).  
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Though McDougall’s work received praise from some quarters, it came under increasing 
scrutiny and attack in the early decades of the twentieth century as the mechanistic, objectivist 
framework began to dominate early twentieth-century American psychology (O’Donnell, 1985). 
This was due in part to McDougalls promotion of hormic psychology, a brand of psychology that 
sought to describe and explain behavior teleologically, in terms of the organism’s purposes or 
ends (Innis, 2003). This purposive behaviorism, combined with McDougall’s defense of 
animism, was antithetical to mechanistic explanations of behavior rooted in the language of 
stimulus and response. As Innis (2003) explains, McDougall also maintained and pursued 
interests in a variety of unconventional topics including Lamarckian evolution and psychic 
phenomenon; his forays into these areas “made his more conventional ideas suspect” (p. 107).  
McDougall’s approach, built on the foundation of innate tendencies, stood little chance in 
the climate of early twentieth century American psychology. The influence of Watsonian 
behaviorism spread quickly, from the relatively tame version espoused in 1914 to the much more 
extreme, radical version presented in 1925 (Watson, 1914, 1925). The new approach filled 
newspapers, lecture halls, and text books by the 1920s and in 1924, it was the subject of a public 
debate between Watson and McDougall, who had exchanged critical commentary in periodicals 
since Watson had begun popularizing it around 1915. Though McDougall is said to have won the 
debate by a margin of 20 votes (Larson, 1979), behaviorism continued to remain dominant, while 
McDougall’s views came under increasing attack.    
The central point of disagreement with McDougall’s approach to social psychology was 
the emphasis placed on the role of instincts in human behavior. Many viewed McDougall’s 
instincts as reminiscent of the old faculty psychology; like the concept of faculties, instincts 
seemed to serve as convenient labels that provided a method of side-stepping in-depth 
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explanations of behavior (Allport, 1919a; Field, 1921). It was also argued that much of what was 
described as instinctive could in fact be shown to have been acquired (Allport, 1920c, Bernard, 
1924b, Kantor, 1920). Some indeed suggested that the concepts of instincts should be altogether 
abandoned (Kuo, 1921), while others held that at the very least, the concept required a serious 
rethinking and much more refined conceptualization (Dunlap, 1919). Throughout the early 
decades of the twentieth century, instincts were the subject of much controversy, particularly in 
relation to the development of social psychology. As McDougall noted, by 1921, attempts to 
understand social behavior in terms of instincts “provoked a violent reaction, and hardly a week 
passes without the appearance of some article which attacks these attempts, pours scorn or 
ridicule upon them, and proposes to repudiate completely the notion of Instinct in Man” 
(McDougall, 1921, p. 285). Though scholars would continue to debate the relative effects of 
heredity and environment, formulations built upon the foundation of specific instincts fell out of 
favor during the 1920s. This included McDougall’s Social Psychology. Both his work and Ross’s 
seemed to have been classified as outdated, belonging to an earlier period in psychology’s 
history. 
A few more books on social psychology appeared in the period following the publication 
of Ross’s and McDougall’s work. Some of them were not actual textbooks, but rather syllabi or 
suggested readings for the field (Bogardus, 1917; Howard, 1910); the diversity of the readings, 
which ranged from Plato and Tocqueville to Tarde and Ross, demonstrates the broad spectrum of 
the field in the early 1900s. Other monographs were intended as textbooks (Bogardus, 1920; 
Ellwood, 1917; Gault, 1923) and some books published during this period would perhaps be 
better categorized as studies in social psychology rather than textbooks introducing or outlining 
the field (Dewey, 1922; Williams, 1922). Reviews of these works point to a slowly emerging but 
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unmistakable trend in the field: the move towards an objectivist, scientific social psychology 
rooted in the language, principles, and methods of physiology, the natural sciences more 
generally, and the emerging study of behavior and adjustment. Works that conformed to this 
framework were applauded while those that favored other approaches were dismissed or 
critiqued.  
Bogardus’s (1920) work was critiqued for its appeal to authority as evidence and its 
reliance on “outworn conceptions” such as imitation and instinct (G. Allport, 1922, p. 106). 
Williams (1922) was similarly critiqued for his emphasis on instincts and his lack of attention to 
the results of laboratory psychology, which according to the reviewer was indicative of the 
author’s lack of awareness of “how much water has passed under the bridge” (Dickinson, 1923, 
p. 370). Another reviewer characterized it as “untechnical and popular in tone” (Marett, 1923, p. 
388).
33
 Dewey’s Human Nature and Social Conduct: An Introduction to Social Psychology was 
positively reviewed, but it was not intended as a textbook on social psychology and does not read 
as an introduction for beginner students. Instead, Dewey (1922) outlines the relationships 
between impulses and the social environment in relation to habits, intelligence, custom, and other 
common psychological concepts. Reviews of this work, however, also provide insight into what 
was wanted of a new social psychology: Dewey was critiqued for failing to include a discussion 
of neurophysiological processes as well as for his lack of attention to the exact mechanisms of 
habit formation within the individual (Cason, 1924). The work was described as “not technical 
nor deeply analytical, but commonsense and descriptive,” which “makes more difficult the task 
of the psychologist” (Brunswick, 1923, p. 73).  
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 It is important to note that many of these reviews were written by scholars outside of psychology, including 
economists, ethicists, and others. Nonetheless, they represent and reflect the general sense in the human sciences 
that social psychology (and perhaps the human sciences more generally) required a more technical, scientific 
approach.  
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Out of all the textbooks published prior to Allport’s 1924 work, Robert Gault’s Social 
Psychology: The Bases of Behavior Called Social was perhaps most in line with the direction of 
1920s American psychology. Gault had done his graduate work at Cornell, Clark, and the 
University of Pennsylvania and was well-connected in the discipline. His definition of social 
psychology as the study of “interactions among animals” and “reaction of members of the human 
race to one another” was similar to the one that would be espoused by Allport a year later.  He 
promoted the study of behavioral adjustment of the individual to the environment and to other 
individuals, dismissed the notion of specific instincts, and directly denounced the philosophical 
notion of the social mind. Nonetheless, it received scant attention in the literature. It was 
reviewed in a rather summary fashion in the Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social 
Psychology, where the reviewer did critique the lack of attention to physiology and comparative 
psychology (Rosenow, 1924). The other review, written by Floyd Allport himself, was nothing 
short of glowing; Allport (1924b) described the book as marking “the beginning of a new era in 
social psychology” (p. 647).  
It is difficult to comprehend why Gault’s work did not receive much attention in the 
psychological literature. It is possible that this was due in part to Gault’s heavy focus on social 
consciousness, which echoed Baldwin’s notion of the ejective self. This may have been 
unappealing for 1920s psychologists, who were turning to behaviorism and stimulus-response 
psychology. It is also possible that it was simply overshadowed by Allport’s work, which 
appeared shortly after Gault’s and amended minor shortcomings; Allport’s text included ample 
reference to both comparative and physiological psychology, paid far less attention to 
consciousness, and was written in a more forceful style that represented a clear break from the 
past and a solid attempt at a new beginning for the field.  
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A Scientific Social Psychology 
On December 28, 1922, the attendees of the annual meeting of the American 
Psychological Association gathered together for the convention banquet in the large, oak-paneled 
living room of the Harvard Union (Boring, 1923; Harvard Union, 1913). At the close of the 
banquet, Knight Dunlap rose to give his presidential address, titled “The foundations of social 
psychology.” In this address, Dunlap (1923) applied his unique brand of humor and biting 
sarcasm to the fledgling field. He described social psychology as an “orphan subject…in danger 
of being declared an illusion” (p. 81) and admitted that he often began class lectures on it by 
stating that he did not have a clue what it was. He explained that although there had been plenty 
written on the topic, the literature was “no more psychology than Christian science is science” 
(p. 82). He described this literature as 
in part speculation, with neither foundation nor means of checking, in part a collection of 
platitudes stated in imposing words, and in part the mere grouping of phenomena under 
new names, none of which excite my interest to any great degree, because this doesn’t 
seem to get us anywhere (p. 82) 
Finally, he indicated that while he enjoyed history, anthropology, and politics in his “leisure 
moments,” he did not believe these subjects yielded suitable methods for social psychology: “I 
have no interest in social psychology, except in so far as it may promise to become a science” (p. 
98).  
 Dunlap was indeed expressing a sentiment that reverberated throughout psychology and 
many other human sciences, where scholars were calling for subject matter and approaches to 
social life that adopted an objectivist, experimental framework (Kantor, 1923; Schneider, 1920). 
There was a growing agreement—at least among psychologists—that social psychology was not 
                                                                                                                                          82 
 
the study of social consciousness, social instincts, or the group mind, but that instead, it studied 
the behavior of individuals towards and in response to other individuals, and the roots of such 
behavior in the nervous system (Hunter, 1919; Smith & Guthrie, 1923; Warren, 1922).  
This approach to social psychology mirrored changes that had occurred in general 
psychology in the early 1900s. As Kantor (1922) noted in his review of psychological textbook 
writing, several trends had gained prominence in the field’s writings, including increased 
attention to objectivity, less borrowing from other disciplines and an increased focus on 
psychological data, more focus on the nervous system, and a dismissal of any concept that was 
not amenable to exploration via scientific methods. The adoption of this objectivist approach 
seemed particularly important for social psychology, where the inherently political and ethical 
nature of the subject matter rendered it fertile ground for bias. As Paul Young noted in 1923, 
“prejudices frequently block the road to experiment in social psychology; but there is hope that 
experimental methods will be developed” (p. 644). It was clear by 1923 that a social psychology 
rooted in the methods and approaches of individual psychology was wanted.  Furthermore, the 
proliferation of social psychology courses in colleges and universities in the 1920s ensured that a 
textbook presenting such a social psychology would have a potentially vast audience.
34
 Allport’s 
Social Psychology, completed in 1923 and published in 1924, was in this respect, perfectly 
timed.  
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 A cursory search of catalogues, yearbooks, and bulletins from American universities and colleges during the early 
1920s indicates that social psychology was being offered at the undergraduate level in the majority of institutions 
and in some cases also at the graduate level. Interestingly, by 1922, it was also being offered in at least 7 high 
schools (United States Bureau of Education, 1922). At the post-secondary level, it was being offered under a variety 
of disciplines, including sociology, psychology, philosophy, ethics, anthropology, and political science. It was also 
defined very differently both within and between disciplines. Subject matter covered included suggestion and 
imitation, social attitudes, the social survey, social progress, social customs and conventions, social consciousness, 
native traits and the social self, and social environment and the individual mind. Few of these catalogues note the 
textbook used; those that do point to the texts of McDougall, Ross, Bogardus, and in one case, Graham Wallas’s The 
Great Society.  
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Allport’s Social Psychology presented the field as a rather simple extension of individual 
psychology, rooted in behaviorism, comparative psychology, adaptation and adjustment, and 
evolution. As Allport (1924a) explained in the preface of the book, social behavior was simply a 
subcategory of general behavior:  
Behavior in general may be regarded as the interplay of stimulation and reaction between 
the individual and his environment. Social behavior comprises the stimulations and 
reactions arising between an individual and the social portion of his environment; that is, 
between the individual and his fellows (p. 3) 
Though social behavior was perhaps more complex, it was not substantively different from the 
kinds of behaviors studied daily within the psychological laboratories that had spread across the 
United States in the early twentieth century. Reactions to people were no different, he argued, 
than reactions to objects; both involved a state of need or maladjustment in the organism, 
followed by a behavior aimed at adjustment or adaptation of the individual to the environment.  
With this framework established, Allport stated his definition of social psychology as  
the science which studies the behavior of the individual in so for as his behavior 
stimulates other individuals, or is itself a reaction to their behavior; and which describes 
the consciousness of the individual in so far as it is a consciousness of social objects and 
social reactions. More briefly stated, social psychology is the study of the social behavior 
and the social consciousness of the individual (p. 12) 
Allport was careful to note that consciousness in this case was a state of mind that accompanied 
a behavior. It was never a causal link in the stimulus-response chain and minds, he pointed out, 
never stimulate one another or act on one another. Furthermore, he argued that this science of the 
social behavior and consciousness of the individual was foundational to but completely separate 
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from sociology, which studied the “formulation, solidarity, continuity, and change” of social 
groups (p. 10).   
 Following this very direct and rather succinct definition of the field, Allport presented the 
reader with material that would be found in any introductory psychology text of the time: an 
introduction to the adaptive function of behavior and an overview of the physiological aspects of 
behavior, including basic concepts such as effectors and receptors, neurons, the reflex arc, and 
the general structures and functions of the brain and the nervous system. Though this was 
common practice for introductory psychology texts of the time (Kantor, 1922), such explanations 
of neurophysiology did not appear in social psychology textbooks. He then moved on to discuss 
the hereditary bases of behavior, dealing with the controversial issue of instincts in a rather deft 
manner. Noting that the theory of specific instincts was no longer a tenable one, Allport argued 
that it was equally untenable to do away with the role of heredity completely. Therefore, in the 
place of instincts, Allport posited prepotent reflexes, which are groups of muscular, skeletal, and 
somatic responses to a given stimuli. These reflexes are strong, most are functional at birth, and 
they have a potent influence on conduct throughout the lifespan. Behavior, including social 
behavior, is built on these prepotent reflexes as classical conditioning and trial-and-error learning 
result in the formation of new habits and new behavior patterns.  
Overall, there was very little in Allport’s Social Psychology in terms of content that was 
entirely novel. With the exception of his unique discussion of attitudes, social facilitation, gender 
differences, sex, and a few other concepts, Allport’s presentation consisted primarily of familiar 
material that drew on many of the classic studies and findings from the field at the time, 
including reference to Clever Hans, the talking horse; Thorndike’s experiments with the puzzle 
box; and Watson’s work with Little Albert. What made the book unique, however, was its 
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presentation of social psychology as a distinct discipline, separate from anthropology, sociology, 
economics, and political science and founded on the principles of individual psychology. In the 
opening chapter of the book, titled “Social psychology as a science of individual behavior and 
consciousness,” Allport stated in a rather matter-of-fact manner that social psychology was the 
study of individual behavior and consciousness. He presented this not as an argument, but rather 
as “the present standpoint” of the field. He then went on to dismiss various forms of what he 
called the “group fallacy.” For Allport, writers fell prey to this fallacy each time they “postulate a 
kind of ‘collective mind’ or group consciousness’ as separate from the minds of the individuals 
of whom the group is composed” (p. 4). He noted that the fallacy had taken many forms, 
including notions of the “crowd mind,” the “collective or class mind,” the “group mind,” and 
biological forms of the fallacy as exemplified by organicism.
35
 All causes of behavior, he argued, 
lie within the individual and explaining behavior requires looking to individual behavior 
mechanisms.  
 It is also in this opening chapter that Allport explains the proper relationship between 
sociology and psychology. Again, the material is presented not as an argument, but rather as a 
statement of facts:  
The study of groups is…the province of the special science of sociology. While the social 
psychologist studies the individual in the group, the sociologist deals with the group as a 
whole. He discusses its formation, solidarity, continuity, and change. Psychological 
data…are explanatory principles upon which sociology builds in interpreting the life of 
groups (pp. 10-11) 
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 In critiquing organicism, Allport points directly to his original dissertation supervisor, Hugo Münsterberg, as 
providing “an elaborate and ingenious social organism metaphor” (p. 10) in Psychology, General and Applied.  
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For Allport, social psychology did not require the study of groups at all; instead it would focus 
on the social behavior and consciousness of the individual. Sociologists could then make use of 
the data uncovered by social psychologists to describe group processes. One of the outcomes of 
this disciplinary arrangement was that sociological approaches were denied explanatory power. 
According to Allport, unless group processes were reduced to individual behavior mechanisms, 
as psychological social psychologists would do, the examination of groups remained a 
descriptive rather than an explanatory enterprise.   
 Following these introductory chapters, Allport turned to the study of social behaviors, 
drawing largely on research on animal behavior, beginning with descriptions of social behavior 
among insects and then working up to apes. Later chapters discuss various forms of “social 
stimulation”—such as language and facial and bodily expression—and various forms of response 
to these stimulations, including sympathy, the formation of attitudes, and laughter. More 
complex responses include those found in face-to-face and coacting groups (as in Allport’s work 
on social facilitation) as well as in competitive situations. Throughout the work, Allport 
repeatedly emphasized the importance of explaining social phenomena in terms of individual 
behavior and adjustment. For example, in his discussion of crowd phenomena, Allport was 
careful to emphasize that a crowd is simply a group of individuals focusing on the same stimulus 
in a situation where prepotent, elementary drives are thwarted. A crowd therefore, is made up not 
of a collective mind teeming with crowd impulses (as Gustav LeBon had suggested); instead, an 
individual already engaged in a struggle response finds his or her emotions further elevated by 
the presence of others, whose drives have also been thwarted in the same manner. In another 
chapter, Allport describes social attitudes, treating them as “preparations for response” or 
“neural settings” (p. 320). Mental conflict is similarly described as a struggle “between two 
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antagonistic drives” or “socialized habits” (p. 337). Throughout the work, many familiar 
concepts are reframed in this fashion in terms of behavior and adjustment.
36
  
 When Allport’s text was released in 1924, it was widely and, for the most part, positively 
reviewed. Many reviewers applauded Allport’s dismissal of instincts, his use of the principles of 
learning, and his inclusion of a broad spectrum of contemporary research and resources 
(Bernard, 1924a, 1926; Wells, 1924; Wolfe, 1924; Woodworth, 1925).
37
  The most common 
sentiment expressed in the reviews, however, was that Allport’s text represented a novel and 
refreshing approach to a troubled field. It was described as “refreshingly objective” (Wolfe, 
1924, p. 583) and as a “significant advance” (Woodworth, 1925, p. 92). Many seemed to view 
Allport’s book as belonging much more to the genre of textbooks than did the work of his 
predecessors. Bernard (1924a) noted that while previous works often appeared to be the work of 
a “social essayist,” Allport’s work was clearly that of a serious scholar. Simarily, Wolfe (1924) 
described the book as “a near approach to the ideal textbook” (p. 585). Woodworth appreciated 
Allport’s matter-of-fact tone, describing the work as have a “textbook quality” and noting that it 
was “thoroughly serious, not intended simply to stir up thought in the student” (Woodworth, 
1925, p. 92). In the same vein, reviewers also applauded Allport’s general approach and writing 
style, which they categorized as marked by precision (Bernard, 1924a) and rooted in facts rather 
than “arguments and abstractions” (Zirbesi, 1924, p. 255). In general, Allport’s audience was 
impressed with his ability to present social psychology in such a precise, objective, and 
incontrovertible manner. In short, the book was perfectly suited to serve as an introductory text. 
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 Throughout the text, Allport draws on findings and concepts from psychoanalysis to discuss basic drives such as 
hunger and sex, to examine the family as a face-to-face group, and to describe the origins of gender differences. He 
accepted what he saw as the basic facts and findings of psychoanalysis, including repression of sexual tendencies 
and concealed attachment to the opposite sex parent. He did not, however, accept many of the basic postulates of 
psychoanalysis, including infantile sexuality.  
37
 There were, however, some reviewers that perhaps rightfully questioned whether Allport’s “prepotent reflexes” 
were all that different from McDougall’s instincts. Chicago sociologist Ellsworth Faris (1925) described prepotent 
reflexes as simply a clumsier way of describing instincts. Economist/sociologist Floyd House agreed (House, 1925).  
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 From the start, however, there was some uncertainty regarding the adequacy of Allport’s 
approach for understanding social life. Though responses to the book were generally positive, 
almost every reviewer of the work closed his or her review with a brief and often vague 
statement of doubt regarding a mechanistic, individualistic social psychology. Woodworth 
(1924) noted that Allport’s individualistic approach seemed perhaps inadequate for 
understanding face-to-face interaction or coordination, such as that found in teamwork. Kimball 
Young (1924) suggested that Allport’s approach would perhaps be incapable of incorporating the 
social environment, a variable of considerable importance for understanding social behavior. 
Even Luther Lee Bernard, one of the book’s most ardent promoters, noted at the close of his 
review that Allport “does not offer an adequate account of how individuals behave collectively” 
(Bernard, 1926, pp. 288-289).
38
 Indeed, among all of these positive reviews, there is a general 
sense that Allport’s social psychology had somehow omitted some central aspect of social life.  
However, these concerns did not seem to overshadow the general acceptance of the work, 
at least among psychologists. Employing the then dominant principles of behaviorism and 
stimulus-response psychology was highly advantageous for Allport, helping him to secure quick 
and copious support for his textbook from prominent scholars in the field. For psychologists, the 
work offered a firm and familiar foundation for studying subjects that had previously seemed 
metaphysical, philosophical, and—perhaps most importantly—value-laden. Subjects like 
nationalism, submission to authority, religious beliefs, and war could now be examined not as 
outcomes of a long and complicated social and political history, as was suggested in previous 
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 Bernard noted in this review that it was generally known that Allport intended to release a second volume that 
would address collective behavior. This was indeed the case. In 1931, Allport indicated he was working on a second 
edition of the textbook, which would be enlarged to two volumes. The first volume would be titled Social Behavior 
of Individuals and the second volume would be titled Societal Behavior of Individuals (Allport, 1931b). Neither 
work appeared. Instead, Allport decided to incorporate all of that writing into his manuscript on The Structure of 
Nature, which he failed to complete before his death in 1978.   
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approaches to social life such as Durkheimian sociology and Wundtian Völkerpsychologie. They 
did not require an anthropological explanation of human groupings or even a sociometric 
examination of individual relationships. Instead, they could be conceived of as behaviors that 
were built out of individual responses and adjustments to social stimuli. In short, Allport’s social 
psychology, rooted in the stimulus-response oriented behaviorism of the day, demonstrated the 
possibility of experimenting on the social world in a controlled laboratory setting. As Harry 
Hollingworth noted in a letter to Allport, “We have long been waiting for someone to apply the 
verifiable principles of individual psychology to the various social phenomena, and at last you 
have done it” (Hollingworth, 1924).  
The Group Fallacy and the Response from Social Science 
 Social Psychology was just one of a number of publications issued by Allport in the 
1920s that critiqued sociological conceptions of the group and denied explanatory power and 
scientific status to sociology and related social sciences. In the years leading up to and following 
the publication of the textbook, Allport used conference presentations, book reviews, and journal 
articles to promote his individualistic approach and argue vehemently against sociological 
conceptions of social psychology.  He also made advantageous use of his tenure as co-editor of 
the Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology to redefine social psychology as the 
study of individual behavior. In the very first issue in which the name of the Journal was 
changed to include social psychology, the editors—Allport and Morton Prince—made it clear 
that a particular brand of social psychology would be represented in the Journal’s pages. It was 
noted that the field of social psychology had broken with its past and “through the enterprise of 
the pioneers” had “grown into a science having as its field a unique set of natural phenomena” 
and a “distinct method” (Prince & Allport, 1921, p. 1). This new social psychology took as its 
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point of departure the individual and “the adjustment of the individual to the social environment” 
(p. 2). It was clear from this introductory editorial that while the Journal had been expanded to 
include social psychology, it would include only a particular brand of social psychology.  
 The editors indeed followed through with this plan. Articles published in the earliest 
years of the joint Journal focused on individual adjustment and behavior, and the content of 
these articles was frequently aligned with Allport’s approach to social psychology. These 
included an article by Robert Gault (1921) repudiating the social mind, an article by Floyd  and 
Gordon Allport (1921) interpreting personality as a social stimulus that produces adjustment and 
response, an article on sympathy as a conditioned reflex (Humphrey, 1922), and a host of articles 
debating the concept of instinct in social psychology (Hocking, 1921; McDougall, 1921). This 
content stands in rather stark contrast to the articles published during the same period in the 
American Journal of Sociology, which included an article on the social organism (Park, 1923), 
an article on the importance of understanding culture (Herskovitz & Willey, 1923), an 
observational study of neighborhoods in Columbus, Ohio (McKenzie, 1922), and a study of 
instinctive and cultural factors in group conflict (Case, 1922). By the 1920s, a division of labor 
had clearly begun in terms of explaining and describing social life.  
 Allport further disseminated his own views on social psychology in a number of book 
reviews written and published throughout the 1920s. In a review of  Albert Balz’s The Basis of 
Social Theory, for example, Allport critiqued the author’s idea that the group is causally prior to 
the individual and that all psychology is therefore social psychology. Allport argued that causal 
explanation must lie in the laws of individual learning and physiology: “Whatever causal 
significance exists here arises not from a social situation…but from the social behavior of 
individuals” (Allport, 1924c).  He made a similar argument in a detailed, five-page review 
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critiquing sociologist W. F. Ogburn’s Social Change, noting that “human action is the force; 
culture the result” (Allport, 1924d). In his review of another book on social groups, Allport 
accused the author, B. Warren Brown, of ascribing individual attributes and processes such as 
purpose and conflict to groups and therefore committing the group fallacy (Allport, 1930). Even 
psychologists who examined the nature of groups and institutions were not immune; though they 
were applauded for adopting a psychological standpoint, any notion of the group as an entity in 
and of itself was immediately pinpointed and critiqued (Allport, 1924e, 1926).  
 In addition to these book reviews, Allport published a number of articles outlining the 
group fallacy. These articles pinpointing and condemning the group fallacy appeared in a number 
of leading journals, including the American Journal of Sociology, the Journal of Abnormal and 
Social Psychology, and Psychological Bulletin. These views were also summarized in a 1923 
presentation given to the American Sociological Society. There, Allport accused sociologists and 
anthropologists of unconsciously falling prey to the group fallacy. When ascribing actions, 
attributes, and causes to group-level phenomena, he argued, scientists may perhaps be intending 
nothing more than a metaphor. However, such metaphors may lead to error: 
So long as the language is intended and accepted as purely descriptive and metaphorical 
no confusion exists. But the transition from description to explanation is in such cases 
very subtle, and not always recognized. The intangibility of the phenomena combines 
with the collective or abstract use of language to produce an error. This error is the 
attempt to explain social phenomena in terms of the group as a whole, whereas the true 
explanation is to be found only in its component parts, the individuals (Allport, 1924f, p. 
60).  
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Allport then went on to point out this error in the work of a number of social and behavioral 
scientists, including sociologist Charles Ellwood and other scholars such as Alfred Kroeber and 
W. H. R. Rivers.
39
 Again, he reiterated that all sciences must look to sciences below them for 
explanatory power. As such, sociology must look to psychology:  
the sociologist describes social or collective phenomena and explains them in terms of 
individual behavior; the psychologist describes behavior and explains it in terms of reflex 
mechanisms; the physiologist describes the reflex mechanism and explains it in terms of 
physical and chemical changes (p. 71).  
Allport closed the talk by stating the task of sociology:  
The work of sociology, therefore, would be to describe aggregates and social change in 
terms of the group, but to explain these phenomena in terms of the social psychology of 
the individual (p. 73). 
This distinction between description and explanation permeated Allport’s discussions of the 
group fallacy throughout the 1920s.  
 Perhaps understandably, the reactions of social scientists to Allport’s writings were not 
generally very positive. In a response to the 1923 paper, anthropologist Alexander Goldenweiser 
(a student of Franz Boas) argued that social scientists did not posit a group mind or a social 
psyche, nor had they done so since the days of Lazarus and Steinthal (Goldenweiser, 1924). He 
also took issue with Allport’s notions of causation, description, and explanation. Causation, he 
argued, may lie within the individual or within the realm of social and cultural factors in much 
the same way that individual or historical forces may be seen as the cause of change. As for 
Allport’s notion of description and explanation, Goldenweiser argued that explanation can 
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 I have been unable to ascertain whether Kroeber and Rivers were present at this meeting. They were not members 
of the ASS. Ellwood was present; he became the president of the ASS the following year.  
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include how something occurs as well as what occurs. In neither case is reductionism necessary 
for explanation. Bain (1930) agreed, noting that to reduce a fact to a lower level is a case of 
“throwing out the baby with the bathwater,” since the fact disappears in the attempt to explain it. 
Sociologist Ellsworth Faris, in his review of Allport’s textbook, focused his critique on the 
behaviorist approach to social life, noting that although the individualistic approach to studying 
social life had been present in psychology since the early twentieth century, Allport’s work had 
taken this position to the extreme: “it is one thing to investigate the persons in a society and quite 
another to assume that the institutions of society are all to be explained as a result of the reflexes 
of babies” (Faris, 1925, p. 720).  
In what is perhaps the most thoughtful article critiquing Allport’s approach, sociologist 
Malcolm Willey (1929) argued that group level concepts such as cultures or institutions may 
serve as a stimulus to individual behavior. These “integrated behavior patterns” (p. 213) produce 
responses: “these are stimuli to behavior, and stimuli that would not derive from any single 
individual” (p. 214). Willey also analyzed Allport’s assertion that sociology must remain a 
descriptive enterprise, suggesting that there was no hard and fast line between scientific 
description and scientific explanation:  
Ultimate, first-cause explanation is not within the province of science; explanation can 
mean nothing more than description that is sufficiently accurate, including the description 
of the attributes of a phenomenon or phenomena, to permit of prediction…Instead of two 
discrete categories, there are here involved only different degrees of the same category 
(p. 215).  
Willey then went on to draw examples from the natural sciences where a given phenomenon 
such as the rising of the sun or the growth of an organ is explained both in terms of that 
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phenomenon as well as through reduction to lower level phenomena. Both explanations, he 
argued, are valid.  
 These published reactions to Allport’s work were very direct and critical, but they were 
far more polite than those represented in the unpublished record. Five years after Allport 
presented his paper on the group fallacy at the ASS meeting, Charles Ellwood’s ire was still 
evident. In a letter to Luther Lee Bernard, he wrote of Allport’s work: 
It makes my blood boil. Why do not some of you younger chaps reply to him? Of course, 
I have not the fighting strength and energy which I once had. Allport has simply 
pulverized the very foundations of sociology as we understand it. I made up my mind that 
he was out to do this when I listened to his paper on ‘The Group Fallacy’. Deny it as 
much he wishes, he attempts nothing less than to destroy the concept of the group as a 
natural object (Ellwood, 1928 as cited in LoConto, 2011, p. 120).  
Others agreed with Ellwood’s sentiments. William McDougall’s characterized Allport’s text as 
“utterly incompetent” and noted that it “betrays such complete blindness and bland self-satisfied 
indifference to gross inconsistencies in his own treatment.” He went on to note that Allport’s 
work was nothing more than evidence that “grossly incompetent work can be ‘put over’ on 
American Colleges on a considerable scale” (McDougall, 1934).40 W. I Thomas’s assessment of 
Allport’s attack on the group fallacy was similarly harsh: “I don’t think Allport has anything.  I 
think he is cracked. He made quite a flop at the Sociological meeting in 1927”41 (Thomas, 1929).  
Stuart Chapin was somewhat less harsh regarding Allport’s views on the group concept, but he 
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 The letters in this section come from the appendix of a 1935 Master’s thesis on Allport’s theory of the group 
fallacy (Cornell, 1935). To view the individually cited letters, see Cornell’s thesis. Sociology graduate student B. 
Dean Cornell and his advisor Thomas Eliot made a list of the people that Allport had accused of committing the 
group fallacy, contacted them, and asked them to respond to a series of questions related to Allport’s views as well 
as their own. The appendix also contains letters between Cornell and Allport. All of the letters are reproduced in 
their entirety in the appendix.  
41
 At the 1927 meeting of the American Sociological Society, Allport again presented a paper on the group fallacy 
(Allport, 1928b). 
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noted that  “a consistent application of his principles would deny the reality or independent 
existence of biological organisms, personalities or astronomical systems as well as of groups” 
(Chapin, 1929).  
 Many others seemed rather indifferent or perhaps slightly annoyed by Allport’s polemics, 
seeing them as a mistaken and hasty interpretation of sociological work rather than as a serious 
threat to the scientific status of the field. Edward Ross took little offense to Allport’s criticism of 
him, noting that he had never “conceived of the group as other than an outgrowth of the 
interaction of minds of individuals” (Ross, 1929). Robert S. Lynd indicated that he believed 
Allport was simply overemphasizing the importance of the individual because sociologists had 
overemphasized the group; he suggested that everyone move on from the debate and “focus on 
data-gathering” (Lynd,1929). Bernard indicated that he was sympathetic to Allport’s point of 
view, though he did note that “he goes much too far” in casting all collective concepts aside 
(Bernard, 1929). R. M. MacIver agreed with Allport’s denouncement of the group mind insofar 
as it was being used in a matter analogous to individual minds, but he saw Allport’s denial of the 
objective character of any kind of group structure as a “logical error.” (MacIver, 1929). Even 
Alfred Kroeber, whose work had been on the receiving end of much of Allport’s polemics was 
rather nonchalant, analyzing Allport’s views objectively. He noted that that Allport had taken a 
psychological approach, while he had taken a sociological one and concluded: “Between us, in 
our several ways, we are both fighting the battle of better understanding” (Kroeber, 1934).  
 According to Allport he did have some supporters. In a 1928 letter to sociologist Thomas 
Eliot, he indicated that he had received 16 letters from sociologists who supported his view 
(Allport, 1928). When he looked back on this period nearly five decades later, however, he 
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recalled that his work on the group fallacy had not earned him many friends among the 
sociologists:  
The climax came when I was publicly denounced in an address made by the president of 
the American Sociological Society at their annual meeting. I was not present, but the 
affair was related to me by a friend who reported the speaker's statement as follows. He 
said that in the Middle Ages people got to quoting Aristotle so vigorously, and sometimes 
to so little purpose, that someone had to rise up and say "There's no truth in Aristotle." 
"So now," he continued, "I say there is no truth in Floyd Allport." At this point, as he 
made a sweeping gesture, his hand struck a glass chandelier, sending the pieces flying 
about the room (Allport, 1974, p. 16)
42
 
Given his previous presentations in front of this Society and his repeated critiques of its 
membership, it is not difficult to believe this somewhat dramatic account was at least somewhat 
grounded in truth. 
 By the 1930s, there was still much confusion in the field regarding the definition and 
methods of social psychology. Nonetheless, there was a growing understanding that sociological 
and psychological approaches to social psychology were perhaps not compatible. As one scholar 
noted in 1936, it seemed that sociologists, who focused on the products of social relationships 
and socialization, worked deductively. Psychologists on the other hand worked with the 
individual and interindividual interactions and proceeded inductively: “The two schools proceed 
from different concepts” (Lemmon, 1936, p. 666).43 Another author similarly noted in 1940 that 
two schools of social psychology had developed 
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 It is not known which meeting this may have been, but in personal communications, other historians of social 
psychology have suggested it may have been during Ellwood’s presidency in 1924.   
43
 This particular author adopted Allport’s approach that sociology could describe what happened in the social 
world, but only a social psychologist could explain how it happened.  
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One is an attempt to explain social behaviour largely by means of the concepts of 
individual psychology adjusted somewhat to meet group behaviour situations. The work 
of Floyd Allport typifies this approach and his efforts have added little to the body of 
knowledge dealing with social behaviour of man (Dawson, 1940, p. 162). 
The author described the second approach as a sociological one, focused on the effects of social 
institutions on the individual and exemplified in the work of W. I. Thomas. A third author 
writing on the status of the field in 1940 further supported this view, noting that the field had 
been “divided into two distinct and mutually exclusive schools of thought” (Reuter, 1940, p. 
299), one psychological and one sociological. Allport was again identified as the leader of the 
psychological approach. This literature from the two decades following Allport’s persuasive 
arguments for a psychological social psychology contains innumerable references to these two 
schools or approaches and offers unmistakable evidence that a rift—due in no small part to 
Allport’s efforts—had developed in social psychology.  
Conclusion 
As the debate between Allport and his critics continued throughout the 1920s, Allport’s 
work received much attention from all quarters. In an analysis of citations of textbooks published 
between 1908 and 1929, Collier, Minton, & Reynolds (1991) note that Allport was the third most 
frequently cited author among both psychological and sociological textbook authors. From 1930 
to 1942, he rose to the top of the list as the most cited author among both groups of scholars.
44
 
His textbook had indeed demonstrated the possibility of a social psychology built entirely on the 
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 In the 1908 to 1929 lists, he was tied with Charles Darwin for third place. It should be noted that this analysis did 
not pay any attention to the way in which the authors were cited. Glances at the literature suggest that Allport’s work 
was frequently cited among both groups, but perhaps in different ways. Among psychologists, his work was cited as 
a reference on particular topics such as laughter, sympathy, attitudes, social facilitation or instincts. Among 
sociologists, he was frequently cited in discussions of sociological theories and methods, often standing as the figure 
head for an individualistic approach to group-level concepts.  
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foundation of individual psychology and its success was undoubtedly due in part to the fact that 
it fit very well within the trends of mainstream psychology. Psychologists now had at their 
disposal a textbook for initiating a new generation of scholars into the field of social psychology. 
As historians have noted, the book therefore “represents a turning point in American social 
psychology” (Collier, Minton, & Reynolds, 1991, p. 99).   
Perhaps even more importantly, however, Allport’s work in the 1920s had a significant 
impact on the relationship between sociologically and psychologically oriented scholars of social 
life. His repeated attacks on sociologists, anthropologists, and other authors who promoted the 
study of group-level concepts created animosity between social and behavioral scientists. It also 
shone a light on seemingly insurmountable differences between these two groups of scholars, 
particularly in regards to their prevailing philosophies of science. While some psychologists 
were perhaps slightly uneasy with Allport’s reductionist, objectivist approach, they seemed to 
generally accept it as a starting point for an experimental social psychology. Such an approach 
was, after all, familiar to them, as it had come to permeate the field of psychology; the inability 
to adequately formulate social reality may have seemed a small price to pay for natural-scientific 
status (Diserens, 1925). Sociologists and anthropologists, however, had a much stronger reaction, 
viewing Allport’s work sometimes as a direct attack on the foundations of their field and 
sometimes as a rather harmless but very base misinterpretation of their work. In both cases, 
Allport’s work did little to engender cooperation or collaboration between the two groups of 
workers. Furthermore, Allport’s presentation of individualism and collectivism as mutually 
exclusive approaches may have discouraged attempts at bridging these two positions by seeking 
out shades of grey between sociologically- and psychologically-oriented work.  In these ways, 
Allport contributed significantly to what scholars would later describe as the development of 
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“two social psychologies” that operated independently, with each being unaware of findings and 
advances in the other (Stryker, 1977).  
The exchange between Allport and group-oriented scholars in the 1920s had another 
significant outcome, not necessarily in terms of the development of the field of social 
psychology, but rather in terms of the Allport’s own intellectual development and his approach 
to individual and group phenomena. Resisting his repeated attempts to analyze group-level 
concepts into their constituent parts, scholars pointed to a glaring error in this approach. Allport’s 
critics argued that—taken to its logical conclusion—such an approach would deny existence to 
all entities, since entities at all levels of existence may be reduced to more basic levels of 
existence. By the 1930s, he had become aware of the inadequacy of the position he had taken in 
his 1924 textbook, a position which he said “sociologists had rightly criticized as slighting the 
actual social reality” (Allport, 1974, p. 16). However, he also still firmly believed that 
sociological conceptions were equally inadequate. Much of the remainder of his career would 
therefore be devoted to attempts at accomplishing a perhaps impossible task: creating an 
individualistic social psychology that successfully accounted for social reality.  
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Chapter 4 
Social Psychology, Social Institutions, and Social Control (1925-1940) 
In 1924, after completing his textbook at the University of North Carolina Chapel Hill,  
Floyd Allport received an offer from Syracuse University. He was invited to become Professor 
of Social and Political Psychology at a new, interdisciplinary department: the Maxwell School of 
Citizenship and Public Affairs. The Maxwell School was established in October of 1924 with the 
goal of teaching good citizenship and training students for positions in public affairs (Maxwell 
School, 2012). Liberal arts undergraduates participated in the program’s citizenship curriculum 
and the program was also home to graduate students in the new field of public administration. 
The Maxwell School was a unique one from the start. Its interdisciplinary focus is best evidenced 
by a series of topic-centered seminars established in 1926. Faculty members were recruited from 
a wide variety of disciplines, including social psychology, history, international relations, 
economics, and social biology. A topic was then chosen; these topics included prohibition, 
propaganda, newspapers and public opinion, America’s relation to China, war guilt, and debt. 
Faculty would give formal presentations on the topic followed by open discussion among faculty 
and students (Willey, 1928). Daniel Katz, Allport’s first graduate student at Syracuse, described 
the Maxwell School as highly interdisciplinary, having as its primary goal “the achievement of 
theoretical integration of the behavioral sciences” (Katz, Johnson, & Nichols, 1998, p. 124). 
Allport accepted the position, relocating to Syracuse in 1924 and remaining there until his 
retirement in 1956.  
 Allport settled into life at Syracuse, teaching a variety of courses including psychology, 
social psychology, psychology of nationalism, and scientific methods. In addition to his teaching, 
he maintained an active research program, involving many graduate students. His students could 
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often be found in various corners of the state of New York observing and recording a wide 
variety of social behaviors. Daniel Katz, Dale Hartman, and Arthur Jenness gathered attitude and 
opinion data at Syracuse University (Allport & Hartman, 1925; Jenness, 1932; Katz, 1929), 
while Richard Schanck gathered data on attitudes toward card-playing among religious groups in 
rural New York (Allport, Dickens, & Schanck, 1932). Miriam Gartner examined pedestrian 
behavior at crosswalks in urban New York and Hawley Simpson recorded the amount of time 
motorists parked their cars in time-limited lots (Allport, 1934a). Milton Dickens sifted through 
and recorded the arrival times of factory workers at the Onondoga Pottery Company factory, 
while yet other graduate students gathered data on social behavior at the Civil Works 
Administration and neighborhood Catholic churches (Allport, 1934a). By 1956, Allport had 
supervised 22 doctoral students and 18 Masters students, all of whom contributed to a substantial 
program of research focused on the nature and regularities of social behavior.
45
 
 During these years, Allport also took on several administrative duties, serving as the 
American Psychological Association’s representative to the Social Science Research Council 
from 1925 to 1931. He was also active in academic societies, serving on APA’s Council of 
Directors from 1928 to 1930 as well as on the Council of Directors of the newly formed Society 
for the Psychological Study of Social Issues in 1938. He attended APA regularly, serving as 
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 With few exceptions, Allport’s students did not go on to become central figures in social psychology. Daniel Katz 
(1903-1998) was one such exception, conducting pioneering research on attitudes, morale, and stereotyping. In 
1938, he and another of Allport’s students, Richard Schanck, published a textbook on social psychology that was 
quite successful (Kahn, 2000). Schanck went on to become a professor of social psychology at the University of 
Akron, where he chaired the Akron Civil Liberties Committee. While at Akron, he and his students became involved 
in the labor movement and, after his students stole a ballot box in a union election, he was charged with “unarmed 
robbery” and jailed. He served 8 months and was released on parole in 1946 (American Civil Liberties Union, 1944; 
Two Akron Men, 1945). Correspondence between Katz and Schanck shows that while Katz supported Allport’s 
approach, Schanck did not. He was not fully convinced by Allport’s mechanism, but was also unconvinced by more 
idealistic approaches, which he associated with the approach of Gordon Allport (Schanck, 1941). Another of 
Allport’s students, Chiang-Lin Woo, who had come to Syracuse from China after reading a Chinese translation of 
Allport’s 1924 text, returned to China in 1948 to collect data on Chinese customs to compare with the data he and 
Allport had collected in the United States. As of 1961, Allport was unable to locate him, noting in a letter to another 
of his students, “Woo is incommunicado, in Communist China, since 1948—and, we fear, may be dead” (Allport, 
1961).  
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program chair and chairing sessions. He also remained tied into research efforts in the 
governmental realm, taking part in President Herbert Hoover’s conference on home building and 
home ownership in 1931 and the Department of Agriculture’s conference on surveys of farmers’ 
opinions in 1938 (Allport, 1939b).  
 Three years after his move to Syracuse, Allport’s wartime marriage to Ethel Hudson 
ended and eleven years later, he married Helen Willey Hartley, a professor of English and 
Education at Syracuse (Allport, 1941). Prior to remarrying, Allport lived alone, his children all 
having been placed in boarding schools. During these years, he began developing his interest in 
drawing and watercolor painting, becoming a member of the Associated Artists of Syracuse (and 
eventually, its president) and exhibiting his watercolors in local and regional museums (Allport, 
n.d.). He also took time to travel, visiting England, Germany, and France in 1932 for “recreation 
and education” (Allport, n.d.) and spent a summer in Colorado as visiting faculty in 1937 at the 
Colorado State College of Education (Shaw, 1937).
46
  
 During Allport’s early years as a Professor in the Maxwell School, his work began to 
expand and change considerably, taking on an increasingly political and popular tone throughout 
the 1930s. He began to give radio talks and started publishing in Harper’s Magazine as well as 
the local Syracuse newspaper, The Post Standard, writing and speaking about a variety of 
popular topics, including the role of women, religion, nationalism, and individual self-
expression. The content of these publications and presentations was diverse, but the writings 
shared a common theme or orientation. Throughout these works, Allport reacted to the 
increasingly complex and regulated nature of American life, exploring the ways in which the 
“whole individual” becomes fractionated in industrial society and behavior becomes segmented, 
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 Historian Sam Parkovnick has suggested that during this time, Allport suffered a nervous breakdown. I have 
found no evidence of this aside from a brief mention of “adjustment difficulties” in his first marriage.  
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overly regulated, and far removed from “natural” types of behavior that fulfill biological needs 
and drives. He also began to examine new ways of studying social institutions, regulated 
behavior, and conformity situations, which he saw as playing a central role in individual 
behavior. Taken together, Allport’s writings throughout the 1930s—including his continued 
attacks on group-level concepts—appear as a strong and pointed statement against increased and 
poorly-planned mechanisms of social control. It is in this period of Allport’s career that the 
moral aspects of his individualism become increasingly clear. 
Social Science and Social Institutions in 1930s America 
 Allport’s concerns about institutions, social control, and increasing regulation followed 
on the heels of major shifts in the shape and functioning of American society. In the latter half of 
the nineteenth century, America became a nation of big business accompanied by massive 
industrial growth and corporate consolidation (Wiebe, 1967). Technological innovations had 
helped to radically alter the nature of business and industry; improvements in the railway system, 
for example, had provided faster shipping at lower costs and opened opportunities for economies 
of scale (Schmitz, 1993). Corporations began to dominate the economic landscape. In the late 
nineteenth century, Rockefeller created Standard Oil, a consolidation of 27 different companies 
into a single corporation. The turn of the century also saw the struggle between large 
corporations such as those headed up by Andrew Carnegie and J. P. Morgan. Furthermore, in 
1901, the first billion dollar company, the United States Steel Company, was formed, 
exemplifying the wealth, power, and the new possibilities of the corporation (Baydo, 1982). This 
proliferation of big business led some to fear that it had replaced God as an object of worship: 
the Sears Roebuck catalog was known as the Bible; skyscrapers were deemed the temples of 
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American business; and the Woolworth building in Manhattan, the tallest skyscraper to date, was 
known as the “Cathedral of Commerce” (Baydo, 1982).  
 As one author has noted, the rise of corporate America was likely disconcerting for 
many: “To previous generations, the size and power of America’s newly created business-
industrial conglomerates would have been unbelievable. Perhaps frightening might be the word 
that some would have applied to the change” (Baydo, 1982, p. 4). Many saw large corporations 
as harmful, greedy, and self-interested and bemoaned the loss of face-to-face contact that had 
seemed to dissipate with the rise of large factories where workers became little more than cogs in 
a machine (Schmitz, 1993). Furthermore, there was a general concern regarding the power and 
widespread influence of these monopolies and unease regarding their relationship to familiar, 
traditional institutions. As Schmitz (1993) explains,  
How were Americans to understand the relationship of these commercial leviathans to the 
family, the church, the local community, and the nation itself? A giant corporation might 
exercise control over the activities and opportunities of an individual family through 
employment or welfare programs. Its assets, influence, and geographic reach might 
surpass those of one of the states and even challenge those of the nation (p. 9) 
The size, complexity, influence, and sheer number of these new conglomerates indeed fostered 
anxieties and heralded suspicions.  
 These anxieties were not limited to the general public; they were also increasingly 
evident among academics, politicians, and other public figures. From 1913 to 1914, future 
Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis wrote a series of articles in Harper’s Magazine about the 
“curse of bigness,” warning of the dangers of monopolies and large corporations and arguing that 
such centralization of power and wealth were deleterious to individual liberty and need-
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fulfillment (Brandeis, 1934). Such corporations, he believed, were directed toward increased 
power rather than increased economic efficiency. Their “bigness” was particularly disconcerting, 
as it decreased the possibility that citizens would understand these conglomerates, which had 
become so central to so many aspects of American life. Brandeis, a leader in the movement for 
decentralization of economic power, urged for measures that would cultivate an informed 
citizenry capable of contributing to a decentralized democracy through rational judgment and 
decision-making (Sandel, 1996).  
 In the early twentieth century, John Dewey had also repeatedly examined the potential 
repercussions of such “bigness,” suggesting that an entirely new ethic was required to assess the 
changing system: 
Our conceptions of honesty and justice, of rights and duties, got their present shaping 
largely in an industrial and business order when mine and thine could be easily 
distinguished; when it was easy to tell how much a man produced; when the producer 
sold to his neighbors, and an employer had also the relations of neighbor to his workmen; 
when responsibility could be personally located, and conversely a man could control the 
business he owned or make individual contracts (Dewey & Tufts, 1908, p. 496) 
The new economic and social system, he argued, required an outlook that accepted the 
collectivist nature of American life. The task at hand was one of figuring out how to secure a rich 
moral life for the individual within this new system. He believed the task was a difficult one, 
since large corporations failed to tend to individual interests and desires. According to Dewey, 
structuring society according to principles of economic efficiency may indeed result in higher 
productivity, but such an arrangement may fail to meet the needs of the majority of individuals in 
a given society.  
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The attention that social scientists were paying to changing conditions in American life is 
perhaps most clearly exemplified in Robert and Helen Lynd’s sociological examination of an 
ordinary, small American city—Muncie, Indiana—which the authors referred to as Middletown 
(Lynd & Lynd, 1929). Begun in 1923, the Middletown studies were aimed at examining one 
group unit—the city—in its entirety, including all social institutions, large and small. After 
following the citizens of Middletown for a year, the Lynds painted a picture of standard 
American life that was disconcerting. The city, it seemed, had made little progress since the 
1890s. Leisure time for citizens was scarce, and those that had it spent it playing cards, watching 
movies, or dancing. The authors noted that leisure-time reading was rare and that the ideas of the 
citizens were formed in primary and secondary education and maintained largely through 
tradition and convention. While industry had advanced in Middletown, the lives of the citizens 
had stagnated. As one reviewer noted, the citizens of Middletown looked much like Sinclair 
Lewis’s (1922) fictional character George F. Babbit, whose highly ritualized, conformist 
existence had become an implicit critique of the vacuity of American life (Hunt, 1929). In 1935, 
when the Lynds returned to Middletown to examine the effects of the Depression, they and their 
readers were surprised and dejected to find that, despite the complete breakdown of social 
institutions in 1930s, little had changed in terms of how the city operated and how its citizens 
spent their time (Lynd & Lynd, 1937).  
Works like Middletown were representative of a new turn in the study of social life that 
came to dominate in the early twentieth century. While scholars of the late nineteenth-century 
had focused on the mob and the crowd (Leach, 1992), scholars of the early twentieth-century 
began turning their attention towards rational social groupings and systems, such as business, 
industry, labor unions, the school, and the economic system. This is not surprising given that 
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social institutions of all types—political parties, law offices, universities, government agencies—
all multiplied and grew, contributing to increased bureaucracy and regulation in all spheres of 
life. As Robert Wiebe (1967) noted, by the war years, “a bureaucratic orientation now defined a 
basic part of the nation’s discourse. The values of continuity and regularity, functionality and 
rationality, administration and management set the form of problems and outlined their 
alternative solutions” (p. 295). As these institutions proliferated, so too did scholarly work on the 
topic of social institutions and social control.  
For many authors, the notion of social control carried no negative connotation. For 
example, George Payne—then the Dean of Education at New York University—viewed social 
control as a form of education that involved changing the social behavior of an individual or 
group (Payne, 1927). Forms of social control included formal education as provided by the 
school or church as well as informal education provided by the family or peer group. Formal and 
informal institutions—including commerce, industry, the press, and the theater—also functioned 
as mechanisms of social control. All played a central (and not necessarily coercive) role in 
regulating social behavior by helping to transmit social traditions, establish new social patterns, 
and create new tools of progress.  George Herbert Mead took a similar position, viewing social 
control as an inevitable part of individual development; an individual’s thought and behavior 
were said to be socially controlled whenever he or she took on or assumed the attitudes of social 
others, something he believed was necessary to development given that “any self is a social self” 
(Mead, 1925, p. 276). Psychologist Knight Dunlap, who by 1934 had attempted to build social 
psychology on the foundation of a study of desires, also viewed social control as natural and 
necessary for regulating and satisfying individual desires in order to accommodate group life. 
Indeed, it was widely acknowledged that the regulation of individual behavior was a necessary 
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and natural part of social life. For others, however, social regulation was more problematic. 
While institutions seemed necessary, their regulatory power produced anxieties. For social 
philosopher James Hayden Tufts, institutions provided much-needed stability in a world that 
seemed to be constantly in flux: “It brings a sense of direction, and organizes impulses, habits, 
and collective strength to deal with the situation of conflict” (Tufts, 1935, p. 139). However, like 
Dewey, he expressed concern regarding the role of personal liberty in the midst of a democracy 
where much power was centralized within a small number of institutions.  
While authors such as these considered the philosophical meaning of institutions for 
individual life, other authors had begun studying these institutions intensely, incorporating the 
topic into their respective disciplines. Sociologists studied a variety of institutions, including 
everything from the family (Sanderson, 1933) to the Chicago Real Estate Board (Hughes, 1931). 
Others began forming intricate social theories of the nature, birth, growth, and dissolution of 
social institutions. Sociologist Stuart Chapin, who played a major role in promoting a scientific, 
statistics-based sociology, developed an extensive theory of institutions.  In an attempt to make 
these large, complicated structures amenable to scientific study, Chapin (1928) parsed them up 
into what he saw as the major components of institutions: attitudes, conventional behavior 
patterns, symbolic cultural objects, and oral and written traditions. He held that all of these things 
could and should be studied quantitatively, though the tools had not yet been developed.
47
 
Psychologists oriented towards behaviorism also began to tackle the topic of institutions. Social 
psychologist J. R. Kantor (1924) suggested that, given the prevalence and power of institutions 
in American life, the entire field of social psychology might in fact be built on the foundation of 
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 Chapin made serious and extensive attempts to quantify the growth of social institutions by sifting through data on 
the adoption of certain customs or institutional approaches. Using such a technique he plotted, for example, 
frequency curves and growth cycles illustrating the adoption of the city manager plan by various cities over a set 
period of time (Chapin, 1928). 
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a study of institutions. He suggested that institutions be considered as stimuli to individual 
responses; social psychology would therefore become the study of individual attitudes and 
behaviors in response to institutional stimuli.  
Others believed institutions should not be parsed up into components or perceived as 
simple stimuli, but should instead be thoroughly studied as objective entities. Charles Judd, the 
Director of the Department of Education at the University of Chicago, argued that the study of 
institutions required little attention to individual attitudes or behaviors (Judd, 1931). He viewed 
institutions as powerful social forces, “reacting on the individual and determining in large 
measure his thinking and behavior” (Judd, 1926, p. 3). The ubiquity of institutions made 
understanding them on their own terms even more important: 
Modern society has reached the stage in its evolution when it aggressively imposes its 
institutions on the individual. It has gone so far as to set up special agencies in its schools 
in order to insure the transformation of every child, so far as possible, into a being able 
and willing to conform to the social pattern of action and thought (1926, p. 333) 
He urged social scientists to focus on institutions such as government, education, money and 
language, rather than on the psychological channels through which they exercise their influence.  
By 1935, the study of institutions had indeed become so commonplace that the topics of 
institutions and their role in social control was becoming a standard part of the sociology 
curriculum (Bernard, 1935).  
Allport and the Study of Social Institutions 
 Like other social and behavioral scientists, Floyd Allport also turned his attention to the 
study of social institutions and social control in the 1920s and 1930s. This was not, however, a 
new topic for Allport. As early as 1924, it was clear that Allport saw social control as a central 
                                                                                                                                          110 
 
force in the habits and behaviors of the individual. In a discussion of social conditioning, for 
example, he noted that politicians make use of previously conditioned emotions and behavior to 
induce feeling in the individual:  
The political orator has only to mention the ‘orphan children’ or the ‘rights of the people’ 
to reduce his audience to a state of tender compassion or righteous indignation…As a 
means of social control, whether for good or for ill, this arousing of sentiment through 
language stimuli is a process of inestimable significance” (1924a, p. 97).  
Such “emotional reservoirs,” he argued, should be used for more constructive purposes.  
The topic of social control was also central to Allport’s early examinations of personality, 
which were very focused on the traits of ascendance and submission (Allport & Allport, 1921). 
With his brother Gordon, Allport argued that these two personality patterns are central: in any 
relationship, one person is likely to become the “master” while the other “yields and adjusts his 
behavior to the control of the first” (1924a, p. 119). In the 1924 textbook, Allport indeed 
suggested that nearly all of individual learning and adjustment grows from attempts to master or 
control the environment. In turn, individuals come to serve as central figures in the social 
environment of others, and come to be controlled by them as well. Through these individual 
attempts at social control grows the entire system of social control which, once it is 
institutionalized, becomes a central force in the life of the individual: “The edicts of government 
and public opinion, in rumor or print, direct his thought and conduct…These forms of social 
control are ‘institutionalized’; through them, by means of language, each individual is trained 
and controlled” (Allport, 1924a, pp. 197-198).  
Given his demonstrated early interest in social control, it is not surprising that Allport 
kept informed of the burgeoning social science literature on social institutions and social control 
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in the 1920s and 1930s. Sociologists, anthropologists, and psychologists who had set about 
studying the day-to-day functioning of these myriad institutions therefore found themselves once 
again confronting a familiar foe as they tried to conceptualize this novel group-level concept. By 
the 1930s, Allport’s position on collective concepts was in fact somewhat more moderate. He 
continued to assert that such concepts were not objective, scientific entities and held no 
explanatory power, but his writings during this period demonstrate an increased sensitivity to the 
need for a basic understanding of culture, institutions, and other social groupings. For example, 
in a 1931 book chapter, he and his student Dale Hartman noted that psychologists had much to 
glean from the work of anthropologists and sociologists, particularly from their thorough and 
useful surveys of cultural traits and trends (Allport & Hartman, 1931). Such studies, they noted, 
would “stimulate fresh thought and imagination in human research” (p. 350). As early as 1925, 
Allport was suggesting that social psychology—which he saw as now being firmly established as 
the science of interindividual stimulation and response—had left a large portion of the social 
realm untouched. He saw much promise in the exchange of knowledge between the various 
social and behavioral sciences (Allport, 1925). In a 1925 article, he noted, for example, that “the 
liaison between psychology and anthropology seems interesting and full of promise” (p. 569). 
Similarly, in a 1927 article on Charles Judd’s theory of institutions, Allport noted that 
sociological descriptions of institutions “have a real value in pointing out ranges of human 
phenomena which the isolated laboratory psychologist would never see” (Allport, 1927b, p. 
178).
48
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 The reasons for Allport’s change of heart in the 1920s and 1930s are not immediately apparent. It seems likely 
that it resulted in large part from the forceful and sometimes very sophisticated critiques from other social and 
behavioral scientists. In his 1974 autobiography, he notes that by the 1930s, he realized his pure individual 
determinism was a view “which sociologists had rightly criticized as slighting the actual social reality” (Allport, 
1974, p. 16). It should also be noted that Allport’s increasing acceptance of interdisciplinarity mirrored a more 
general trend of disciplinary cooperation fueled perhaps in part by the newly created Social Science Research 
Council and their preference for funding interdisciplinary research (Fisher, 1993).  
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Yet despite these more tempered views, Allport continued to bemoan the fallacy of 
employing group level phenomena as causative factors in the production of individual behavior. 
Allport began to point out the “institutional fallacy” in the writings and theories of social 
scientists, where institutions were conceptualized as objective entities comprised of something 
more than individual attitudes and behaviors. The institutional fallacy was essentially a more 
specific form of the group fallacy. In his discussions of it, Allport took particular issue with the 
ways in which social scientists had dealt with the topic of social control, writing about 
institutions as though they controlled the behavior of the individual. Critiquing Charles Judd’s 
work on institutional control, Allport wrote,  
to say that ‘society controls the individual’ is an assertion of a metaphysical 
character…To indicate exactly who or what it is that does the controlling, who is 
controlled, and how the controlling is brought about in terms of a specific and concrete 
event would be to make a statement quite in harmony with the method of natural science 
(Allport, 1927b, p. 178)  
For Allport, to say that an institution such as the state or the church controls the individual 
obscures the fact that individuals such as “popes, churchmen, or rulers” control behavior through 
“obedient attitudes of citizens or worshippers” (p. 178). Allport continued to call for a more 
scientific analysis of institutions and other group-level concepts.
49
  
 Allport’s writings from this period make it increasingly clear that his concerns regarding 
the scientific conceptualization of group-level concepts were very much related to his concerns 
regarding their potentially coercive role in everyday life.  Specifically, Allport believed that to 
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 Allport also critiqued Stuart Chapin’s concept of institutions, but was more sympathetic to it presumably because 
Chapin’s conception was more psychological, breaking institutions down into psychological components of attitudes 
and behaviors. In a 1934 letter, Allport writes to Chapin saying he is happy to see they are both on the same track in 
their studies and suggesting that Chapin does a better job of attending to the material aspects of institutions than he 
does (Allport 1934b).  
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speak of institutions as independent entities would grant them even greater control. When 
institutions are spoken of as something “more than” a compilation of individual habits, attitudes, 
and behaviors, they appear far more powerful and immutable and less open to revision and 
critique. This leads to the assumption that when the institutional order conflicts with individual 
behavior, the only solution—or at least the easier solution—is to adjust the individual to the 
existing institution. Allport suggested that such a state of affairs masks the fact that institutions 
were, for the most part, initially established to meet the needs of individuals: “The institution as 
such becomes a kind of environment to which the individual must be adjusted through 
mechanisms peculiar to his biological nature” (Allport, 1926, p. 550). Allport urged for the 
dissolution of this myth of the personified institution as a major step toward the reinstatement of 
individual self-expression:   
A realistic attitude toward these institutions would have the effect of minimizing their 
potency for social control, of breaking them up, and of establishing new adjustments 
productive of greater individual freedom. Most of us would probably agree that this would be 
a desirable result” (Allport, 1926, p. 551)  
So long as institutions were conceptualized as something over and above individuals, 
institutional controls would be viewed as eternal laws, breeding increased conformity rather than 
individual freedom and creativity. During the 1930s, Allport’s work therefore became focused on 
providing a new outlook on institutions. This involved exposing the individual behaviors, habits, 
and attitudes behind so-called institutions and attempting to persuade the public that a “truly 
democratic” (Allport, 1944) way of life required a new outlook on social institutions.  
Rethinking Institutions: The J-Curve Hypothesis 
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 On May 10, 1926 all classes at Syracuse University were dismissed for two hours while 
students completed a questionnaire measuring their attitudes. Completion of the questionnaire 
was mandatory; students were penalized with a “double-cut”50 if they did not arrive at the 
designated testing area. When they arrived, the students were faced with an extensive 
questionnaire asking them to express their opinions and attitudes on various issues by checking 
off one of a number of possible responses. The questionnaire, comprised of 75 items, asked 
students whether they would rather be popular or smart, how often they had cheated on 
examinations, what they believed was necessary for living “the good life,” and what was wrong 
with present religious practices. They answered questions about their fraternities, their reasons 
for coming to college, and the ways in which they chose their peer groups. By the end of the two 
hours, 4,248 students had completed the questionnaire and the testing staff began compiling the 
data with a Powers Accounting Corporation punch and counting sorter.  
 When the data from the “Syracuse University Reaction Study” (Katz & Allport, 1931) 
were finally compiled and examined, some interesting results emerged. Liberal arts students 
found their college work to be a poor outlet for self-expression. Most students attended Syracuse 
because it was close to home. Many felt the administration had given them little assistance in 
choosing a vocation.  Students did not exclude others from their social groups based on 
economic status, but exclusion did result from differences in nationality, morals, and religion. 
The majority of students admitted to having cheated on at least one exam or quiz. Indeed, the 
findings provided much for the University administration to ponder.   
 The study authors, however, seemed most interested in one finding: the nature of the 
curvatures in the graphical representations of the opinion data. Allport and his graduate student 
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Daniel Katz had found that, in many instances, student opinion did not follow the normal curve 
frequently seen in physical data, where the majority of responses pile up in the middle of a graph 
and taper off gradually towards the tails of the distribution. Instead, these distributions were 
highly skewed, sometimes positively and sometimes negatively: the majority of students’ 
opinions piled up at the lower or higher extreme of the scale. Instead of depicting the normal 
curve, the data often resembled a J-shape or, if the data were negatively skewed, an inverted J-
shape.  This was particularly true when the data were parsed up by social or religious groupings, 
such as was the case when, for example, the responses for Protestants and Catholics were viewed 
separately. 
Allport and Katz suggested that while some might view this as an error in the scale, it 
may be more accurately viewed as a reflection of institutional attitudes and behaviors. They 
suggested that these responses reflected “some specific agency of teaching or propaganda acting 
throughout the group” (p. 345). These forms of “common stimulation” within a group resulted in 
an alignment of attitudes and behaviors and affected the intensity of the attitudes. When these 
skewed distributions appeared, often overriding differences due to gender or temperament, 
researchers were, they believed, measuring loyalty to an institution:  
The definition and possible measurement of the ‘power of institutions’ may be found to 
lie in such skewed and concentrated forms of distribution of attitudes as those in our 
results. This method for institutional measurement in psychological terms appears to have 
possibilities for research (Katz & Allport, 1931, p. 351) 
Katz and Allport went on to suggest that the findings pointed to the exciting possibility of 
creating similar scales for measuring loyalty, submission, and participation in a variety of groups 
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and institutions. For Allport, this was likely particularly exciting, since it seemed to provide a 
psychological method of looking at sociological concepts.  
 As Katz and Allport were working through these data, another of Allport students, Milton 
C. Dickens,
51
 was gathering data regarding motorist behavior at intersections in Syracuse and 
Los Angeles. They found that at intersections with cross traffic but no traffic signs or signals, 
motorists usually slowed somewhat, with a smaller minority stopping completely and a small 
minority failing to slow at all—a situation reflected in normally distributed data. However, at 
intersections with stop signs, the majority of motorists came to a complete stop, while a small 
minority moved slowly through the intersection without stopping and an even smaller minority 
slowed only slightly—a situation reflected in their data distribution, which resembled an inverted 
J-shape (Allport, Dickens, & Schanck, 1932).  
 Allport’s student Richard Schanck had also uncovered similar findings in his research on 
a small, relatively remote rural community outside of Syracuse (Schanck, 1932). In an 
examination of public and private attitudes, Schanck asked community members to indicate: 1. 
the behavior or attitude they deemed appropriate for themselves as members of a certain group 
(e.g., Methodists) and 2. the behavior or attitude that they endorsed privately as individuals. In 
the case of public but not private attitudes, Schanck again uncovered evidence that seemed to 
support a J-shaped distribution.  For example, Schanck questioned the Methodists in the 
community about their attitudes toward card-playing.
52
 When told to indicate the response they 
believed was appropriate for them as Methodists, about 90 percent of them responded that they 
would only play games that did not include face cards. When asked to respond with their own 
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 After receiving his Ph.D. from Syracuse, Dickens went on to become a rather central figure in the field of speech 
and communication studies, promoting interdisciplinary research in the field and serving as the president of the 
Western Speech Association in 1956 (Dickens & Williams, 1964).  
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 Methodists frequently shunned card-playing and other forms of amusement. Face cards were of particular concern 
since they were considered to be associated with the devil (“On relaxing Methodist rigors,” 1921).  
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private attitude, a small percent indicated they would not play games involving face cards, the 
majority took a more moderate position and said they would play any game unless it involved 
gambling, and a small percent said they would play any game even if it involved gambling. The 
first distribution was J-shaped while the second more closely approximated the normal 
distribution.  
 This early research led to what Allport later described as his most important work
53
: the 
J-curve hypothesis of conforming behavior. The theory was most fully expounded in a 1934 
article published in the Journal of Social Psychology. Citing the data gathered by himself and his 
students, Allport (1934a) argued that the J-curve was an accurate representation of conformity 
responses, whereby most individuals conform completely to a given institutional norm or rule. A 
small minority demonstrate nonconforming attitudes and behavior, likely due to tendencies of 
personality and chance. Allport suggested that the curve represented a struggle between two 
opposing forces: conformity producing agencies, which call on us to perform; and biological 
inertia, which calls on us to exert the least energy possible. For example, conforming agencies 
call on motorists to stop at stop signs and red lights, while biological inertia makes it more likely 
that they will cruise through intersections without stopping. These two forces, combined with 
personality tendencies and chance, dictate the nature of the curve and illuminate the ins and outs 
of institutionalized behavior (Allport, 1934a).  
 For Allport, the J-curve represented what he called a continuum of purposive behavior or 
a telic continuum. Responses in these situations represent the extent to which an individual 
fulfills the purpose set forth by an institution. Arriving at work on time represents complete 
fulfillment of the purpose of the factory, for example. A telic continuum, he argued, also has an 
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underlying empirical continuum, which is objective and has nothing to do with institutional 
purpose. Such a continuum would not involve categories such as “on time,” “half an hour late,” 
or “an hour late.” Instead, steps along the continuum are based on objective physical units, such 
as minutes or hours. Data distributed on this continuum takes on a shape that more closely 
approximates the normal curve, This was partially due to the fact that it included categories that 
preceded “on time”.  Some workers fulfill the purpose of the institution by arriving early. In an 
empirical distribution, these workers represent the minority on the lower end of the x-axis. The 
resulting distribution approximated normality, but often appeared leptokurtic, resembling a 
double J-curve. Allport and his students graphed these institutional behaviors in terms of telic 
and empirical continuums when possible.  
For Allport, the importance of the J-curve’s ability to illustrate the curvature of 
institutional behaviors lay in the possibility of trying to map institutional controls onto biological 
needs and drives. In his 1934 article on the topic, he suggested that scientists might plot first 
what behavior looks like naturally—that is, under conditions without institutional controls set 
up—and then attempt to create institutions and controls that allow the fullest expression of this 
natural state while still maintaining order. For example, Allport suggested that biological drives 
and inertia would dictate that motorists stop as little as possible, exerting as little energy as 
possible to get from one location to another. Traffic lights, therefore, should be timed such that a 
motorist is required to stop as little as possible (Allport, 1934a). Failing to consider the 
biological make-up of individuals, Allport argued, would result in a maladjustment between 
individuals and institutions. In addition to conditioning individuals to respond to institutional 
controls, institutional controls should be altered to fit individual tendencies. Allport believed the 
J-curve made it possible to look at the distribution of behaviors under a particular institutional 
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control, which opened up the possibility of examining the differences between this curve and that 
which would be produced by biological drives and personality differences alone. By doing so, 
one would “allow free play for the biological and psychological differences of the majority of 
individuals” (Allport, Dickens, & Schanck, 1932, p. 242).  
In addition, it becomes clear in Allport’s writings that he saw the J-curve approach as a 
method of demystifying institutional controls. By providing a clearer picture of the processes of 
control, the J-curve would perhaps make it clear to scientists that institutions were in fact 
composed of individual behaviors and attitudes (Allport, 1934a). However, this breaking down 
of “institituional fictions” might also affect the general public. In Allport and Katz’s large-scale 
study of attitudes at Syracuse, they had found that students who had more loyalty to and belief in 
institutions as objects in and of themselves were also more likely to willingly adhere to 
institutional controls. This was the case, for example, with students belonging to a fraternity 
“Students who accepted the institutional fiction were likely to set higher store upon 
administrative controls  generally…The individualistic fraternity students, on the other 
hand…were more disposed toward a critical and realistic view of prerogatives, responsibilities, 
and personal values (Katz & Allport, 1931, p. 352).  For Allport, this seemed to indicate that 
dissolving institutional fictions could have significant effects not only for science but also for the 
ways in which citizens viewed, experienced, and adhered to the myriad of institutional controls 
that operated in their daily lives (Allport, 1934a). Indeed, the J-Curve was significant enough for 
Allport that by 1931, he was planning a second volume of his 1924 text that would specifically 
address “The Societal Behaviors of Individuals” (Allport, 1931b).  
 Allport and his students published a handful of articles outlining the hypothesis and 
sharing the results of studies that demonstrated the J-curve in a variety of political, economic, 
                                                                                                                                          120 
 
and religious institutions. Some scholars began applying Allport’s method to conformity 
situations with considerable success (Britt, 1940; Frederiksen, Frank, & Freeman, 1939; Graham, 
1940), while others found results that were mixed in their support for the regularity of the J-
curve and suggested minor modifications (Waters, 1941). The J-curve approach was even 
featured in a 1951 laboratory manual for social psychologists (Ray, 1951). In the end, however, 
the J-curve garnered more criticism than support. Allport had noted that a situation may be 
defined as a conformity situation when 50% of observations fall into the category of complete 
conformity. This assertion was critiqued by George Dudycha, who suggested it was an arbitrary 
number. In general, Dudycha (1937) argued that the J-curve was not an exemplary curve with a 
known distribution, as was the case with the normal curve. It did not have regular, reliable 
properties and could not therefore be characterized as a statistical regularity, as Allport seemed 
to indicate.
54
 Furthermore, Dudycha analyzed some of the data of Allport’s students and found 
that when the curves were actually tested (rather than just plotted), some were in fact normal.  
Other critics pointed to a simple yet very important difficulty with the approach: the 
curve tended to reflect the scale used. For example, in the case of lateness to work, behaviors 
such as “5 minutes early,” “10 minutes early,” and “on time” would all represent one value or 
step on the scale, resulting in a build-up of cases in that step and producing a J-shaped 
distribution (Fearing & Krise, 1941). Although Allport’s students responded to some of the 
earlier critiques (Dickens & Solomon, 1938), the J-curve seemed riddled with difficulties and 
was undoubtedly overshadowed by the sophisticated surveys, attitude measures, and opinion 
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scales beginning to develop around the time of the Second World War and refined thereafter.
55
 It 
therefore began to disappear from the literature by the 1950s, as Allport himself also moved on 
to new topics and approaches that built on the ideas uncovered through his J-curve research.  
Institutional Behavior and a New Individualism 
 As Allport and his students gathered this extensive body of data on institutional behavior, 
Allport also began publishing a number of popular articles discussing the role of institutional 
control, conformity, and institutional habits in the day-to-day life of the average American. Many 
of these articles were aimed at guiding citizens toward a more realistic view of their world and 
helping them find ways to evaluate their place in it. Like other social and behavioral scientists of 
the 1920s and 1930s, Allport was concerned with the fit between the individual and the social in 
a democratic society (Morawski & St. Martin, 2011). He was particularly concerned with the 
increased complexity of the social system in the early twentieth century and the effects of this 
change on the autonomy of individual citizens who were subjected to the nearly constant 
influence of propagandists, advertisers, politicians, and other sources of social influence. For 
Allport, the layperson—without defenses against such influence—would have difficulty thinking 
rationally. He therefore suggested that one of the tasks of the psychologist might be to help 
citizens acquire insight into themselves and their world. As he stated in a 1926 lecture at 
Winthrop College, such assistance was gravely needed in the rapidly changing world of the early 
twentieth century: “We are like ships which, in dangerous seas, need not only great power and 
better driving machinery, but also more trustworthy maps and an abler helmsman” (Allport, 
1927a, p. 570).  
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For Allport, the difficulty lay in the fact that rather than being active social participants, 
citizens had become too easily controlled by others, unaware and uncritical of the ways in which 
other individuals control them. This, he believed was due in part to the fact that they viewed such 
control as emanating from metaphysical entities—namely, institutions:  
The real processes of control are thus concealed for people believe that the controlling 
agency is not specific individuals, but some higher metaphysical entity, such as society, 
the church, or the state. And since this higher being is supposed to be mysteriously 
endowed either with the common human purpose or with divine wisdom, it is regarded as 
a safe regulator of human conduct” (Allport, 1928a, p. 383).  
Without a realistic view of institutions and without greater insight, citizens are easily deceived 
and influenced and are vulnerable to widespread commercial exploitation (Allport, 1927a). 
Allport suggested that one of the central tasks of social psychology was to help citizens adopt a 
more critical attitude toward institutions and all mechanisms of control by dissolving such 
fallacies, instructing citizens on how to resist the influence of pervasive propaganda, sensational 
journalism, and well-designed advertisements. Allport argued that rather than using psychology 
to aid the development of business and industry where some individuals manipulate others to 
serve their own ends (Allport, 1928a) it should be used to help the vast majority of citizens think 
rationally about these systems. As he bluntly stated in 1928, the goal of social psychology was 
“the releasing of individual values from their unseen control by other individuals” (p. 386).  
 Allport’s views on the power of institutions and the obedience of citizens to these 
institutions were fully laid out in a 1933 book titled Institutional Behavior. The book included a 
number of the popular articles that he had published in the late 1920s and early 1930s in 
Harper’s Magazine, along with many chapters containing new material. It is in this work that 
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Allport’s distaste for American institutions becomes strikingly evident as he characterizes most 
institutions as “dishonest and dangerous” (p. ix) and operating in a manner that furthers the 
“power and greed of men who would exploit their fellows” (p. ix). The goal of the 1933 book 
was to help citizens take a closer look at such institutions, so that they might analyze their actual 
functions and purposes: 
If we would make true progress in understanding our social order, if we would take the 
first step toward extricating ourselves from our present confusion, it is my conviction that 
we must submit these controls of our thinking to a careful analysis. We must strive for a 
clearer insight into these subtle and pervasive illusions” (p. ix) 
As Allport noted in the book’s foreword, the book was not intended as a scientific treatise, but 
rather as a platform for thinking about and discussing social problems through an analysis of 
social institutions such as government, business, industry, the family, education, and religion.  
 Allport’s Institutional Behavior and his work in the 1930s more generally demonstrate a 
significant shift in his approach to group-level concepts. As he grappled with conformity 
behaviors and examined data on attitudes and opinions of a variety of social groups, his concern 
with the scientific issues surrounding the reality of group-level concepts was overshadowed by 
an increasing concern with the social implications of belief in institutions as entities. In the first 
chapter of the work, for example, he discussed the scientific reality of institutions and noted that 
the question of their reality was in fact unanswerable, requiring that some single criterion of 
reality be agreed upon. For Allport, however, the scientific reality of institutions was no longer 
the most important issue: 
The important question, however, about institutions is not the problem of their ultimate 
reality, but what they mean to us as methods of approaching our experience. Although we 
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may never know whether institutions are independently real, it does make a considerable 
difference in our thinking and living if we act as though they are real
56
  
Though Allport affirmed that his study of institutions was in fact a study of “institutional 
behavior” conceptualized as explicitly observable individual behaviors, the work demonstrates 
his acknowledgement of the psychological importance of institutions in individual life. In 
essence, the 1933 book examines the consequences of believing in the reality of institutions and 
the effects that such beliefs have on individual thought and behavior.  
 Allport began the work by noting how complicated and institutionalized day-to-day life 
had become, where even the simplest of daily behaviors and needs—such as eating and hunger—
had become part of vast institutional complexes that included production, transportation, and 
distribution. Such institutions, he argued, had become so ubiquitous and so commonplace that 
they seemed almost natural and beyond scrutiny. Furthermore, the pervasive nature of 
institutions had made it seem impossible to study and consider the well-being of individuals 
separate from or in tandem with the well-being of institutions. The result, he argued, was 
increased dissatisfaction among the majority: “while our societal experts are dallying with 
institutions and telling us how to cooperate through them so that they will solve our problems, 
the individuals of society are faced with harassing and well-nigh insoluble dilemmas” (p. 33). In 
other words, by failing to pay attention to individual needs, experts had failed to build adequate 
social institutions.  
Allport was also highly concerned with what he saw as a completely uncritical faith in 
the correctness of social institutions, which produced a social order characterized by a complete 
lack of harmony between individual and environment. Allport expressed repeated bafflement at 
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52 to 53). 
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the fact that this faith in institutions remained even as the social institutions of the 1930s 
crumbled during the Great Depression. For Allport, the most concerning aspect of this faith in 
institutions was the role it played in perpetuating and masking mechanisms of social control. The 
central role played by institutions in individual life, combined with the faith individuals have in 
such institutions stifles critical thinking and encourages “institutional idolatry” (p. 40), where 
individual emotions and sentiments become firmly attached the institution and it becomes almost 
an object of worship. As Allport wrote, “We think of them as established in some ideal realm, 
immune from human contamination, and unchangeable for all time” (p. 40).  
Institutional Behavior, along with the popular press articles and presentations that Allport 
gave at this time, were aimed at removing this mysticism from the public’s thinking about 
institutions. In the concluding sections of the book, he reiterates to the reader the dangers of 
blindly following institutions: 
When an individual allows his ‘institutions’ to do his thinking for him, it follows that the 
thinking is not done. Or worse: the man who entrusts himself to the guidance of his 
‘infallible institutions’ is in grave danger of being led by the nose by men who have 
sufficient cleverness and duplicity to exploit him” (pp. 478-479).  
He then went on to address the difficult question of how to change the institutional nature of 
American life. Allport did not suggest any kind of revolution, noting that such organizing would 
undoubtedly only lead to another form of control or an alternative form of institutionalism. 
Instead, he suggested that citizens adopt an attitude of self-determination in order to avoid 
institutional coercion; in doing so, he suggests, citizens would be capable of slowly changing the 
social system: 
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I would urge, as the only effective method, the determination of all individuals 
consistently to live their own lives. I would urge that they refuse to be coerced by a creed 
of social determinism or by an illusion of the ‘Great Society’ or of the demands of ‘social 
progress’ as embodied in institutions rather than in men and women. If enough 
individuals come, through independent and sincere conviction, to this awakening, the 
control of cultural changes can be achieved without new forms of organization and 
without the use of institutional habit” (p. 499) 
The important thing for Allport was that this change toward self-determination be self-
determined, involving no propaganda or promised utopian outcome. Instead, this “new 
individualism” would involve a new approach to education that attempted to foster critical 
attitudes with respect to the social world. 
Conclusion 
 Institutional Behavior was, for the most part, positively reviewed in the literature.
57
 
Though some still had reservations about Allport’s mechanical and individualistic interpretations 
of culture and society, his popular writing style, his plea for a rethinking of social institutions in 
the United States, and his call for a more informed citizenry seemed to strike a chord with many 
(Dollard, 1934, Hertlzer, 1934; Wyckoff, 1934). The social problems of the 1930s, particularly, 
the breakdown of the economic system, had encouraged many social scientists to turn a critical 
eye on the form and functioning of American society (Crunden, 1972). Allport’s concern with 
social control and individual freedom indeed reflected a larger concern with the effects of an 
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increasingly complex society evident in the 1920s and magnified in the 1930s. As Crunden 
(1972) explains,  
In contrast to the self in society, the twenties came to emphasize the self apart from 
society. Society became an environment unfriendly to the growth of art, of spirit, of 
freedom…Instead of reforming society, an individual should cultivate his ‘self’ (p. 72).   
Such sentiments were indeed in line with Allport’s own stated belief that “a better world can 
only be a world of better and of freer individuals” (Allport, 1933, p. 520). For Allport and other 
scholars witnessing the depths of the Depression, the time had come for major changes in 
American life. During the 1920s, Allport had come to believe that social psychology had a major 
role to play in these change first, through the measurement of institutional behaviors and second, 
through the facilitation of critical attitudes among citizens. By the 1930s, Allport had clearly 
recognized that understanding the social required a more complex approach. Studying the types 
of simple, face-to-face reactions of the laboratory—as he had done in his dissertation research on 
social facilitation—would not suffice in a world where face-to-face contact was but a small and 
diminishing aspect of an increasingly complex social life. While broadening his 
methodologically individualistic approach to the study of social life, he simultaneously produced 
popular works that called for a return to a simpler form of moral individualism.  
The difficult task of studying and facilitating social change, however, became even more 
complicated as the 1940s approached. Critical calls for social change and the very evident focus 
on individual self-development would soon be put on hold, as it became increasingly clear that 
the United States would soon be involved in another world conflict (Crunden, 1972). The War 
would permanently alter the field of social psychology and Allport himself would once again 
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alter the contours of his own individualism, as it was tested by the issues of patriotism, solidarity, 
and democracy during wartime. 
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Chapter 5 
“A Tragic Confusion of Values:” Allportian Individualism and the Second World War 
 As the 1930s came to a close, Floyd Allport—now 50 years of age—was hard at work 
conducting research, finding positions and publication opportunities for his graduate students, 
finishing up projects on personality measurement and the J-curve hypothesis, and working on a 
revision of his Social Psychology. Like the rest of the nation, however, he kept a close watch on 
the news regarding the political situation in Europe. The German invasion of Poland in 1939 and 
the declaration of war by Britain and France shortly thereafter greatly impacted American 
opinion regarding the country’s neutrality. The fall of France in 1940 and the continued 
expansion of the German invasion of Europe made it increasingly clear that a second world war 
was likely to become a reality. By 1941, Roosevelt had begun offering aid to Britain and the 
Soviet Union. The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December of 1941 officially signaled the 
beginning of America’s entry into the War (Fortescue, 2000; Kennedy, 2004). Allport followed 
the war closely and in fact had a personal interest in it due to the involvement of his children. All 
three of Allport’s children would eventually end up contributing to the war effort. His eldest son 
became a sergeant in the Army Air Corp, his daughter was a corporal in the Women’s Air Corps, 
and his youngest son Floyd was a private first class in the Army (Allport, 1953).  
During this period, Allport, like so many other scholars, began to turn his attention 
almost solely to the social and psychological aspects of the war. His individualistic philosophy 
would become even more pronounced during the war years, as the perceived threat of 
totalitarianism provided a political example of what he viewed as the dangers of collectivist 
thought. Just as social institutions had served as his central point of attack in the 1930s, nations 
and the “nationalistic fallacy” became his focus in the 1940s. The moralistic aspects of his 
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individualism became increasingly prominent during this period; rather than focusing on the 
scientific demerits of collective concepts, he began to concentrate more and more on the potent 
psychological effects of groups for the individual and the role that collective concepts could play 
in undermining democracy. For Allport, the War illuminated a “tragic confusion of values” in 
1940s America, where the wealth, prosperity, and well-being of nations was given precedence 
over the well-being of citizens. Although Allport recognized the need for a united, supportive 
home front during the war, he grappled with the task of identifying methods of securing citizen 
support without relying on nationalistic or collectivist appeals. For Allport, the value of 
individual agency and individual participation in the political system had to be valued over the 
well-being of the nation. Nearly every aspect of Allport’s scholarship during this period—
including his empirical research, his public presentations, and his popular writings—was devoted 
to unmasking nationalistic appeals and redefining the role of the individual in a democratic 
nation at war.  
Social Psychology and the Second World War 
The two world wars were critical periods in the history of American psychology. 
Psychologists volunteered and were called upon to lend their expertise to the war effort, resulting 
in vast opportunities, extensive resources, and massive growth for the profession (Capshew, 
1999; Herman, 1995). Though few subfields of psychology had emerged by 1917, some areas of 
expertise were in higher demand than others. Psychological testing is perhaps the most well-
known example of a field that thrived during the First World War. Although the creation, use, 
and administration of tests was wrought with difficulties, the wide-scale testing that occurred in 
the U. S. military during the War resulted in increased resources for and public awareness of the 
field. Historians view the War as being largely responsible for the establishment of testing as a 
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legitimate area of study and practice (Kevles, 1968). Other areas that developed and grew during 
this time include clinical and industrial psychology (Benjamin, 1986).  
During the First World War, social psychology was still largely undefined; as previously 
noted, a few textbooks had attempted to delineate the field (Ross, 1908; McDougall, 1908) and a 
few courses were being taught, but the field was still very much in an early stage of formation 
(Collier, Minton, & Reynolds, 1991). Because of this, it failed to play any kind of substantive 
role in the war effort. On the eve of the Second World War, however, the field had moved 
beyond the state of infancy and its specialists were therefore better positioned to offer expertise 
and assistance (Herman, 1995). Floyd Allport’s text had provided a basic and identifiable—if 
still somewhat contentious—scientific foundation for the field and several lines of seemingly 
promising research had begun to emerge. These included Muzafer Sherif’s studies of social 
norms (Sherif, 1936), Allport’s studies of conformity (1934; 1939), and Kurt Lewin’s studies of 
group dynamics and leadership (Lewin, Lippitt, & White, 1939). The pre-War period was also 
one in which the study of attitudes came of age, leading to the development of scales for 
measuring public feeling and sentiment toward racial and ethnic groups, religion, prohibition, 
crime rates, and a variety of other social groups, issues, and topics (Peterson & Thurstone, 1933). 
In addition, the prewar years saw the establishment of the Society for the Psychological Study of 
Social Issues, a group that worked to use social psychological ideas, principles, and research to 
address and solve social problems (Finison, 1979). Indeed, the scope of social psychology and its 
potential reach during an international conflict was far greater in the 1930s and 1940s than it had 
been during the First World War. 
The distinct climate of the Second World War also helped to encourage the participation 
of social psychologists. The power of well-orchestrated propaganda campaigns and the damaging 
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effects of poorly planned ones had been illustrated unmistakably in the work of the Committee 
on Public Information, established during the First World War (Kennedy, 2004; Steele, 1970). 
This Committee, operated by George Creel, had contributed to the growth of much public 
skepticism on government news, reports, and propaganda, resulting in heightened public distrust. 
The delivery of effective propaganda campaigns therefore became a significant priority in the 
Second World War, as the government sought to avoid a similar situation. The study of citizen 
morale also became a priority after the fall of France in 1940, since the defeat was considered to 
have been due in part to low morale among soldiers and civilians (Fortescue, 2000; Jackson, 
2003). Social psychologists—with their focus on topics such as attitudes, group processes, and 
social problems—were suddenly much-sought-after experts.  
In the 1930s and 1940s, social psychologists began taking advantage of this situation, 
putting their expertise to work and becoming heavily involved in war-related projects and 
research. These activities took place within government agencies, inside universities and 
colleges, as well as in the community more generally. By 1942, a large number of social 
psychologists were employed by Washington agencies (Cartwright, 1948), and perhaps even 
more were engaged in war-related research and teaching within the walls of universities and 
colleges across the United States. They studied citizen morale (Capshew, 1999; Faye, 2011), 
propaganda and home-front rumors (Faye, 2007), citizen attitudes toward wartime issues such as 
rationing and war bonds (Capshew, 1999), the attitudes of U. S. soldiers (Herman, 1995), and 
racial tensions on the home front (Herman, 1995). It is not surprising that once the war was over, 
social psychology grew exponentially. In 1948, the Personality and Social Psychology division 
of the American Psychological Association had 339 members; by 1960, it had 1,346 (Tryon, 
1963). As Sewell (1989) has noted, the 1940s served as a springboard for the “golden age” of 
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social psychology, characterized by the classic and memorable experiments of Leon Festinger, 
Solomon Asch, and Stanley Milgram. Indeed, World War II was a watershed event in the 
establishment of social psychology as a distinct, legitimate, and socially relevant field of study.
58
  
Social Science, Society, and Democracy  
Despite their readiness for the war, the social, political, and cultural issues surrounding a 
wartime democracy proved somewhat problematic for social psychologists and other social 
scientists as they struggled to define the role of experts in a democracy, to clarify and craft the 
relationship between objective science and democracy, and to defend against traditionalist or 
absolutist groups that portrayed science as the cold and relativistic enemy of a democratic social 
order. In the years leading up to American entry into the war, the topic of democracy had 
become central in the academic and popular literature. In 1940, the American Library 
Association published a reading list of the subject consisting of more than 290 titles (Gleason, 
1984). As historian Philip Gleason (1984) notes, the threat of totalitarianism had convinced 
many Americans “that civilization itself was imperiled, and galvanized them to a passionate 
affirmation of democratic principles” (p. 347). At the same time, however, the First World War 
had left many people disillusioned, questioning the possibility of a true democracy and the 
sincerity of the American government in attempting to provide it. The peace and democracy that 
had been envisioned at the end of the War had not materialized and some believed that the War 
had led to increased bureaucratic control and the manipulation of public opinion (Purcell, 1973). 
This increased control, many felt, had taken a toll on individual agency and initiative.  
These sentiments were reflected in the academic writing of the time and are best 
exemplified in the work of John Dewey. As Westhoff (1995) explains, Dewey expressed the 
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belief early on that the increased bureaucratic structure of the United States after World War I 
had resulted in decreased power for the average citizen, as voters came to exercise less and less 
control over the direction of an increasingly insulated government. The public, Dewey explained 
in 1927, had become apathetic and alienated from the political process, a situation that 
undermined the potential for participatory democracy. For Dewey, the individual had to be a 
fully participating member of the community and must have the opportunity to affect the 
direction of the community to which he or she belongs. Furthermore, open access to all sources 
of information was a necessary precursor to fully informed democratic participation. As 
Westhoff (1995) notes, Dewey’s critique was an important one in the 1920s which were 
characterized by “a head-on collision between the forces of patriotic fervor and academic 
freedom, of traditional values and modern intellectual thought” (p. 42).  
 These sentiments were shared by other social psychologists and gained traction in the 
years leading up to and following World War II. Floyd Allport’s brother Gordon, for example, 
bemoaned the lack of citizen participation in American democracy (G. W. Allport, 1945), noting 
that only three in five citizens voted in presidential elections. His solution to the problem, 
however, was not a call for active participation by each and every citizen in every social sphere 
of life. Such an expectation, he suggested was unrealistic. Instead, citizens should be expected to 
be actively involved in some social spheres that are important to them, while other people take 
more responsibility in other areas that are important to them. G. W. Allport argued that 
psychologists should be called on to guide the individual into participation in some social sphere 
of value, thereby nurturing the “democratic personality” (p. 127). The Second World War, 
Gordon Allport noted, had in fact opened up many areas in which social psychologists could 
work toward active citizen participation: “Committed to advancing democracy, we have found 
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tools to work with…There are polling, content analysis, group decision, leadership training, 
devices for alleviating minority tensions, and many other useful techniques” (p. 128). Indeed, 
though there were debates regarding the potentials and limitations of citizen participation in the 
political process, there was general agreement that the nature of American democracy was 
somewhat problematic and required some considerable rethinking. 
 As social scientists debated the contours and possibilities of a democratic society, they 
were confronted with several difficulties. First, they faced a heightened sense of conflict 
regarding the possibility of value-free science in a democracy that seemed faced with immediate 
threat. During the interwar years, social scientists had strongly espoused the need for a value-
neutral, objective approach to science and social problems. An objective science of society 
would ostensibly avoid value judgments regarding social order, yet the situation in Europe 
frequently bolstered personal convictions regarding the necessity of safeguarding democracy 
(Purcell, 1973). As Purcell notes, “While their scientific predispositions had led many 
intellectuals in one direction, their moral beliefs and political attitudes pulled them strongly in 
another. Totalitarianism was an intellectual and emotional challenge to their entire world view” 
(p. 138). Many scholars struggled to rethink their approach, while others failed to recognize that 
their own work was imbued with such social and political undertones supporting the notion of 
democracy.  
 Social scientists who had so successfully espoused the ideal of a value-free science of 
society in the opening decades of the twentieth century also found themselves embroiled in a 
debate with philosophers, other scientists, and theologians who began drawing relationships 
between objective social science and totalitarianism (Purcell, 1973). Such a value-neutral and 
morally relativistic science was characterized as a cold, disinterested, and amoral approach to an 
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increasingly fragile social order. The approach was likened to that used by totalitarian regimes 
and described as “materialistic” and “anti-human” (Dewey, 1945; Purcell, 1973). What was 
needed, many authors argued, was not relativism and cold analysis of existing conditions, but 
rather a return to religion, tradition, and the moral truths and imperatives of an earlier age. John 
Dewey (1945) would later describe these criticisms as an “organized attack” that characterized 
science as “inherently materialistic and as usurping the place properly held by the abstract moral 
precepts” (p. 4). The situation was indeed a very complicated one, as scholars sought to maintain 
the position of social science as an objective enterprise while simultaneously demonstrating how 
such sciences could support, serve, or—at the very least—be compatible with the principles of 
democracy.
59
  
The Individual in a Democratic Society: Floyd Allport and the “Scientific Spirit” 
In response to these accusations of science, liberal academics began implicitly and 
explicitly recasting the relationship between science, society, and democracy in a variety of 
ways. In 1943, a group of academics organized a conference in New York City for this very 
purpose. The group included John Dewey, economist Harry D. Gideonse, teacher and advocate 
of progressive education V. T. Thayer, pragmatist philosopher Sidney Hook, and many other 
scholars from various corners of academia. According to Sidney Hook, one of the central 
purposes of the conference was to combat the notion that science and naturalism were 
philosophically akin to Nazism, Fascism, and Communism and that supernatural or religious 
beliefs were needed to foster democracy. The Conference, Hook wrote, “is committed only to 
free inquiry into the educational implications of both scientific method and democracy” (Hook, 
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1945, p. 12). Another contributor described the conference as a direct response to “a new 
authoritarian movement” characterized by “allegiance to fixed principles, inflexible rules of 
morality, and unquestioned acceptance of a supernatural interpretation of human experience” 
(Lindeman, 1944, p. ix). In line with this focus, the participants focused on the inherently 
democratic nature of science and the authoritarian nature of traditionalism and religion.  
 The ideology of this group, with its focus on the importance of science, the necessity of 
experimental testing of ideas, and the provision of education for the average citizen was highly 
consonant with Floyd Allport’s own philosophy. He therefore traveled to New York City in 1944 
to attend the second conference of this group, presenting a paper titled “Scientific Spirit and the 
Common Man” (Allport, 1945a). The conference provided the ideal platform for Allport’s 
developing views on the importance of critical thought, individual freedoms, and the dissolution 
of collective fictions, particularly in relation to democracy in wartime. For Allport, nurturance of 
a “scientific spirit” was imperative for the proper functioning and maintenance of a democratic 
society. Democracy, he argued, required a scientific or, at the very least, moderately critical 
understanding of society. Because of this, the average citizen should be encouraged to think 
scientifically, which involves the disinterested, controlled observation of tangible objects. For 
Allport, disinterestedness was particularly important, and he suggested that the scientific spirit 
was best characterized as “an attitude of disinterested and selfless curiosity” (p. 55). This attitude 
or “spirit” should guide the action of citizens in every situation: “One who truly possesses this 
spirit,” he stated, “will pursue the method of science, and it will guide his thinking and his 
conduct in every circumstance where it is possible or practicable for him to do so” (p. 55). The 
purpose of education, Allport argued, was to foster this scientific spirit. In this paper, Allport 
adopts the idea that the scientific spirit, which underlies democratic principles, is a naturally 
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occurring phenomenon that becomes stifled by social environments that restrain individual 
agency. For Allport, the educator or politician need not inculcate the individual into science, 
since “the spirit of the scientific quest is latent in nearly every man and woman” (p. 55). 
Therefore, by fostering such an attitude, educators were simply “giving an opportunity for the 
unfolding of that which he already possesses” (p. 55). In short, the democratic way, characterized 
by the scientific spirit, was the correct approach, since it was consonant with the natural 
development of the individual.  
Allport also outlined the unnatural social conditions that suffocate such spirit, including 
the artificiality of urban life and the establishment and maintenance of collective fictions. As he 
had done in the 1930s, Allport criticized the mechanized and monotonous nature of urban life, 
which he viewed as being completely removed from nature and lacking in opportunities for 
“scientific adventure” (p. 56). Of even greater concern for Allport were the ways in which 
individual thought, initiative, and curiosity were curbed in such a society. This was directly 
related to his thoughts on science and democracy. For Allport, one of the keys to both science 
and democracy was freedom. This included not just visible, easily identifiable freedoms, but also 
freedom of thought and opinion. Citizens and scientists must be capable of and permitted to 
question, criticize, and examine every aspect of their world. Traditionalism and the notion of “a 
natural right or law” prohibits such critical thought “by shutting out the opportunity for raising 
questions about it…it becomes an obstacle to the scientific inquiry of citizens and to their attack 
by the scientific method upon the basic problems of their society” (p. 59). Allport also outlined 
the ways in which several psychological processes such as stereotypes and superficial or wishful 
thinking impeded the scientific spirit, arguing that such errors were fostered by the emotional, 
sensationalist, and stereotyped reports of newspapers, magazines, and radio.   
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One of the greatest impediments to the kind of clear, rational, critical thought required for 
the scientific spirit, however, was the continued use of collective fictions. This, Allport argued, 
had become increasingly imperative in wartime, when the fiction of “a corporate national Being, 
possessed, in its own right, of principles, ideals, honor, sovereignty, and rights” was used to ward 
off scrutiny and questioning of the conflict. Allport also focused on the ways in which fostering 
collective fictions enabled totalitarianism in the social order. A focus on the whole (i.e., nations), 
is adopted at the expense of focusing on benefits to the parts (i.e., individual citizens), providing 
a firm foundation for totalitarianism. The nation becomes viewed as a machine that must run 
smoothly, which requires the compliance of the individual parts:  
The parts cannot be free to deviate at odd moments, or to do other kinds of things upon 
their own initiative. What would happen to the watch if its wheels and pinions should 
suddenly decide that they would like to take time out and exercise the liberty to reflect, to 
realize their literary, artistic, or religious values, or to regard themselves and their 
neighbors as objects of scientific curiosity?” (p. 65).  
In this way, collective fictions stifle the scientific spirit, inhibit the democratic way of life, and 
provide the foundation for individual acquiescence and support in a nationalistic conflict.  
Throughout the War, Allport was always careful to note that he knew they must win the war and 
preserve American autonomy and he pointed out that he was willing to make any sacrifice 
necessary to do so, but he forcefully argued that the war should also heighten awareness of the 
need to understand nations “disinterestedly, in terms of what explicit human beings are doing” 
(p. 64). Nationalistic appeals, he argued, would do little more than result in “scientific spirit at its 
lowest ebb” (p. 63).  
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Allport’s thoughts on the role of collectivist thinking in regards to nations did not arise in 
the context of the Second World War; instead, these ideas had been formulated in the decade 
following the First World War. As early as 1927, he had already pointed to the nationalistic 
fallacy and it is in his writings on nationalism that the moralistic aspects of Allport’s 
individualism are most clearly expressed.  He argued that calls to nationalism played upon the 
group fallacy to incite civilians to action. War would then be perpetuated as politicians, by 
means of "shameless lies" and "propaganda," further played on this fallacy, evoking patriotism 
toward the non-existent nation and its elusive symbols (Allport, 1927). He outlined this process, 
employing the First World War as an example, and concluded that as a result of such 
personification, "youths…were thus led as individuals to slaughter one another in a war 
conceived and justified as a struggle between mythical overpersonages, the contending Nations" 
(p. 299).  This analysis of the nationalistic fallacy was anything but an objective assessment of 
the situation. Allport’s previous denouncements of the group concept had been focused primarily 
on the scientific status of such a concept, with occasional nuances of the social and political 
significance of reifying groups. In his analyses of nationalism, however, Allport clearly 
expressed his belief that the danger of employing collective concepts extended far beyond their 
vagueness as scientific concepts. For Allport, the dissolution of collective fictions and the 
fostering of scientific spirit in the individual were absolutely necessary for the proper functioning 
of a democratic nation.  
Redefining the Role of the Individual in a World at War 
Allport’s strong concerns regarding the problems and perils of nationalistic appeals were 
accompanied by his understanding that the country required citizen support, sacrifice, and 
obedience during a conflict of such great magnitude. For Allport, the usual methods of bolstering 
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morale through propaganda campaigns and calls to patriotism were simply not acceptable. He 
pointed directly to the kind of morale work being done by psychologists in partnership with the 
National Research Council (including his brother Gordon) and noted that such morale-building 
was not in line with democratic principles.
60
 The only democratic method of bolstering morale 
was to provide “clear statements” of the purposes of the war and to identify exactly what actions 
could be taken to fulfill those purposes (Allport, 1941). Citizens could then make their own 
informed decisions regarding support and participation. He therefore began to explore, test, and 
promote individualistic approaches to securing such support. This included seeking out 
opportunities to speak and write to the average citizen in an effort to expose the nationalistic 
fallacy and stress the importance of clear, critical thinking.  
In a 1940 article in the Syracuse Daily Orange, for example, Allport warned the Syracuse 
community of the causes and consequences of war and encouraged them to become active 
citizens in a participatory democracy. He outlined the irrational nature of war, attributing the 
conflict to the increasing complexity of society. As more societal structures are created, more 
needed to be maintained. These various structures become interdependent and threats against any 
one of them therefore loom large as threats against the entire system. Maintenance of any one 
system, therefore, becomes of primary importance and war is deemed necessary to protect 
against threats to the system. For Allport, the result was a decreased focus on individual welfare:  
the protection of social institutions becomes of greater importance than the protection of 
individual citizens. Once war is deemed necessary for the “societal good,” propaganda convinces 
individuals that they must support and protect “the Nation,” not recognizing it as a fictitious 
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entity. The result is nationalistic feeling: “they rush to the support of the system with the feeling 
that they are defending everything they hold dear. This is a tragic confusion of values” (1940a). 
In the years leading up to the war, Allport was also working on a book that he hoped  would help 
guide citizens toward rational, critical thought and expose for them the problems of collectivist 
thinking (Allport, 1937).
61
 The book, Psychological Pathways to Peace: Primer for 
Understanding the War- and Peace-Producing Behaviors of Individual Citizens, was intended to 
draw attention to the part played by the individual in national affairs. Allport aimed to provide 
the average citizen with “exercises by which he is asked to clarify his own thinking on national 
and international questions from a standpoint of pure logic” (Allport, 1937b). For Allport, the 
instigation and maintenance of war could be clearly traced back to collectivist thought and 
behavior.  
Allport argued that use of collective fictions in attempts to bolster morale not only 
hampered individual critical thought; they also induced citizen complacency, resulting in reduced 
citizen morale. In a newspaper article, he argued that when politicians and newspaper editors talk 
about the public as “some great impersonal Being,” and describe the war effort in terms of 
nations and groups, individual citizens become confused about their own role in the war effort. 
Instead, the role of citizens should be emphasized by using words such as “you, we, us” and “our 
men” (Allport, 1942). Allport applied this principle in what was one of his most unique and 
curious wartime projects intended to reinstate individual initiative into the war effort Allport and 
his students initiated a letter-writing campaign, which he dubbed the “War-Winning Words” 
project (Allport, n.d.,“War-winning words”). Over six-hundred handwritten letters were 
composed, in which the author reminded civilians that the war was directly related to their day-
to-day activities.  The letter was addressed “Dear Friend” and the contents stressed the notion 
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that the war was something that must be fought by individuals for individuals.  The letter stated, 
“This is your war, yours and mine. We must win it. How will it be won? By fighting, by bullets, 
bombs and tanks, by money—yes. But to get all these things in the strength we need them, we 
must have words also—the right kind of words.” The recipient was then asked to speak to three 
individuals regarding wartime participation.  Specifically, they were asked to tell the next 
individual in line “how you feel about this war, how it is your responsibility and his Will you, in 
your own manner inspire him or her to join with you in working, saving, and sacrificing, in 
redoubling your efforts for the great task which lies ahead?” The recipient was then told to keep 
this “chain of morale” intact by asking those three people to pass the same message on to three 
more with the same instructions. The respondent was assured of the effectiveness of this effort, 
with the letter pointing out that if twelve persons were to participate in this manner, over one 
million Americans would have their “energies aroused.” The recipient was then informed to 
return a signed slip if they were willing to participate, presumably so that Allport could track the 
effectiveness of his campaign. This direct appeal, Allport believed, was much more effective for 
garnering civilian support for the war than vague and meaningless statements regarding society, 
the nation, and patriotism.
62
   
 Allport’s attempts to foster the scientific spirit in the average citizen can also be seen in 
his work on behalf of The Rumor Clinic, a weekly newspaper column operated by Allport and 
his students to debunk common rumors in the Syracuse area. The Syracuse Clinic was part of a 
larger effort instigated by Gordon Allport at Harvard and the set-up, direction, and activities of 
these clinics was modeled on the initial Boston Herald clinic run by Gordon and  his students 
(Faye, 2007). Nonetheless, Floyd Allport saw his own clinic as a method of exposing collective 
fictions and teaching citizens how to avoid them. For Allport, rumors represented another aspect 
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of the war in which collective fictions dampened morale while the scientific spirit would help to 
foster it. In a 1943 column, Allport warned citizens that the use of a collective concept is one of 
the best indicators that one is hearing a rumor rather than a fact: 
One of the ‘spooks’ in our mind, which makes us fall a victim to the rumor-monger is 
likely materialize when some intent or action is attributed to a group, a class, or a nation 
of people. The fiction is often created that such a group or nation is a kind of Being in 
itself, apart from, or above, the individuals who compose it (Allport, 1943a) 
Allport then went on to analyze how such collective concepts could be used by Axis agents to 
undermine morale and drive wedges between Allied nations. Allport advised citizens to analyze 
these collective concepts for themselves, to remain skeptical of such fallacies and—as Allport 
explained in a column the following week—keep his or her eyes completely on “the road ahead” 
(Allport, 1943b). 
Democracy in the Laboratory: Allport’s Wartime Research 
 Allport’s popular and polemical writings and discussions of the dynamics of war and 
nationalism continued throughout the war years. Popular outlets provided a convenient and far-
reaching platform for academics discussing democracy during this time, but as Allport himself 
noted, it was difficult to bring these kinds of ideas into laboratory. As he noted in 1942 in a paper 
coauthored with one of his students, “the virtues of democracy…being in the realm of the 
implicit, cannot be agreed upon between ourselves and our enemies. They cannot be tested and 
confirmed, at least for the moment, by reference to objective, material facts” (Mathes & Allport, 
1942, p. 35). Throughout his career, Allport had made a clear distinction between pure and 
applied science, arguing for the need for scientific objectivity, completely divorced from one’s 
personal opinions. In a 1928 article titled “Social Psychology and Human Values,” Allport 
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(1928a) had noted that while it was difficult to separate one’s own beliefs from one’s science, it 
was completely possible and completely necessary. In this article, he discussed his own ability to 
do this, even in reference to his own children and in the midst of international upheaval: 
As a social psychologist, I thrust to one side the strong emotional appeal of my country's 
symbols and my patriotic impulse to obey the "will of my country." I cease to be 
interested in psychology as a means of making my children loyal and patriotic. I am 
concerned only with finding out just how and why my children have acquired their 
interest in warfare and their hatred of Germans. When in such a mood certain significant 
and guiding questions come to my mind, questions which are very different from those 
asked by the defenders of national morale (Allport, 1928a, p. 377) 
Allport also pointed out that the social psychologist, being capable of such detachment, is in a 
position to expose biases and act as a “countercheck” or “antidote” to war hysteria (p. 384). He 
believed that such disinterested social psychology had immense potential for predicting, 
controlling, and changing the social world. The disinterested science, however, had to precede 
evaluations of society and attempts to change it.  
  During the 1940s, Allport indeed attempted to adopt this objective approach to the issues 
of greatest interest during the war. His wartime laboratory was focused on a variety of issues 
including civilian participation in the war effort, the effectiveness of propaganda, the effects of 
newspaper stories and headlines, and other issues exploring civilian thought and behavior in 
relation to the war. Although Allport himself seldom drew connections between his empirical, 
laboratory-based work and his popular writings, the two were very consonant. The majority of 
this wartime research was directed at examining and testing—or perhaps demonstrating—the 
ideas he espoused in his popular work, including the errors of collective thinking, the importance 
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of rational thinking, the dangers of nationalism, and the importance of individual agency. Much 
of the research conducted by Allport and his students at this time was done under the aegis of the 
Syracuse University Morale Seminar, another effort spearheaded by Gordon Allport at Harvard 
(Faye, 2011). The Syracuse seminar was one of several devoted to examining civilian morale in 
the context of the war (Allport, n.d., Memoranda). Through the seminar, Allport and his students 
would carry out research on wartime issues and then write up memoranda and briefs on the 
findings to distribute to government agencies and news outlets.  
One such study, conducted with Gertrude Hanchett on citizen support for the war, Allport 
attempted to construct a scale of “war-producing behavior” which would measure citizens’ 
willingness to perform certain activities that help to support, produce, or advance war efforts 
(Allport & Hanchett, 1940). Participants were asked to imagine a situation—for example, a 
foreign threat to seize land in the United States—and then indicate their willingness to engage in 
activities (providing financial support, signing a petition) that would produce war if such a 
situation arose. Allport and Hanchett’s method was in fact quite unique at a time when attitude 
scales and public opinion polls frequently gauged people’s feelings or sentiments towards 
national policies or social issues. The difference was intentional; for Allport, such scales and 
polls were rooted in a “third-personized approach” (Allport & Hanchett, 1940, p. 448), where 
citizens are asked to think about fictional collective concepts such as the “nation” and “national 
policies.” For Allport, this kind of measurement failed to cast the individual as “an effective, 
dynamic agent” (p. 449) who is capable of acting to impede or further war efforts. In his 
justification for this new kind of scale focused on individual behavior, Allport stressed the 
opportunities for expressing individual agency even in an increasingly complicated society 
focused on national policy: “[the individual] can, for example, agitate others in conversation to 
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‘move the powers that be,’ he can write letters or sign petitions to his Congressman, or he can 
march in a parade” (pp. 449-450). The scale measured these kinds of activities and the results 
suggested that the relationship between how individuals feel about national war policies and 
what they are willing to do in support of such policies was in fact quite small. In short, the 
research was constructed on the basis of (and supported) many of Allport’s long-held scientific 
and personal beliefs regarding the primacy of individual behavior, the importance of individual 
agency, and the erroneous use and interpretation of collective concepts.   
Allport and Hanchett’s work on war-producing behaviors was a response to the 
increasingly popular public opinion polling methods. In a 1940 article, Allport had argued that 
public opinion, particularly during wartime, should serve as a platform for individual self-
expression regarding governmental activities. The process of public opinion polling had become 
“third-personized;” individuals were not asked about what they wanted for their country but were 
instead asked to indicate their opinion on what those in power wanted for the country. For 
Allport, this was exemplified by the dichotomous “for-or-against” nature of polling questions. As 
Allport (1940b) stated, "The question for them is not what possible alternatives there are, and 
how these fit in with the lay of the attitudes of the citizens, but whether a particular plan in which 
they are interested can be put into operation. The finer shades of individual choices are thus 
concealed" (p. 254). Allport’s work with Hanchett represents a clear attempt to create a new 
method of measurement that would omit collective fictions and provide room for gauging 
individual interests.  
Allport’s wartime laboratory work also addressed his concerns regarding the average 
citizen’s ability and freedom to think rationally and critically. A 1942 study focused on radio 
propaganda essentially sought to test Allport’s ideas regarding the importance of the “scientific 
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spirit” for the average citizen (Mathes & Allport, 1942). Allport and his graduate student Mary 
Mathes had participants listen to radio propaganda and then measured acceptance of the message 
arguments. Allport’s main focus in the study, however, was the role of critical, rational thought 
in acceptance of the arguments. They found that with some training, participants could be taught 
to react either immediately and instinctually or critically and rationally. As he expected, those 
that were trained to think critically were less likely to accept propaganda messages as being true. 
For Allport, this was a clear argument that citizens should be trained to think critically and 
should be given as much information as possible regarding the war. In confidential drafts sent to 
various government agencies, he made precisely this argument, urging government officials to 
provide citizens with facts and news regarding the war.  
Several other studies were designed to test ideas regarding the impact of using collective 
terms such as “nation” and “Japan” in appeals to citizens (Allport, 1945b), with Allport seeking 
to test the idea that the use of such collective concepts actually undermined morale. This 
hypothesis was not supported, but Allport continued to test them in a variety of ways. He also 
devised—but did not find the funding to carry out—several studies along these lines. In a 1945 
letter to Gordon, for example, he described a study in which citizens would be randomly divided 
into two groups and each group would receive a description of the individual’s role in the war 
effort. In the first group, the description would consist of simplistic, stereotyped, and collectivist 
terms for describing individual participation. In the second group, detailed charts and 
demonstrations would describe exactly what individuals could do for the war effort and exactly 
what the eventual outcome of the war would be. Morale and potential participation would then 
be measured.
63
 These planned studies and all of the others that were conducted by Allport and 
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his students during the War all seemed to have the same general purpose: to test the Allport’s 
theory that collective concepts damage morale and that fostering the scientific spirit boosts it. 
The associations he made between democracy and the scientific spirit and collectivism and 
totalitarianism also suggest that Allport was for all intents and purposes attempting to 
empirically examine totalitarianism and democracy in the laboratory. 
Beyond Nations: Allportian Individualism in the Post-War World 
At the close of the Second World War, Allport’s approach to the social remained strongly 
individualistic and his focus on individual behavior continued to be a prominent part of his social 
psychology. In fact, in some regards, his individualism was further strengthened by the war, as 
he witnessed what he believed were the detrimental effects of propaganda, nationalism, public 
opinion polls, and sensational journalism. His views at the end of the war are well-documented 
in his correspondence with his brother Gordon, where the contrast between the two brothers and 
their view of the individual is striking. Gordon believed that institutions could indeed have a 
detrimental effect on individual autonomy, but he also held that institutions might serve as an 
outlet for the realization of individual goals; that is, individuals may satisfy their own wants by 
means of participation in social institutions. Floyd disagreed. Participation in social groupings 
such as institutions or nations might begin with an individual goal, but according to Floyd, such 
participation always ends with a societal goal.  In a 1945 letter to Gordon, he wrote: 
When we channel our activities through an institutional organization…we are committing 
ourselves to a choice of values which we cannot ultimately control as individuals. We 
have to keep the business out of the red, that is make profits, we have to get votes, we 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
only turned us down, but the director, Dr. Crane, said that he could not see very much of anything in the problem” 
(Allport, 1945b).  
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have to keep the church running, etc. No other value can be placed ahead of these in case 
a conflict should arise. (Allport, 1945b) 
Allport believed that group life not only obliterates individual values, but also reduces individual 
responsibility: 
What this does to individual responsibility is clear. We simply lose control of our own 
destinies and furthermore there seems to be little hope of improving the situation by 
appeals intended to incite the individual to further and more loyal and complete 
participation in his institution. Thus, patriotic fervor, church zeal, political party 
enthusiasm, striving to improve one’s business or business in general, all have this same 
effect.  They commit the individual without permitting him to assume or take 
responsibility as an individual (Allport, 1945b) 
These two ideas—the loss of individual freedom and the lack of individual thought, intention, 
and initiative—were of major concern to Allport prior to the war and their importance for Allport 
was further strengthened by the conflict. Group-level concepts, which he had once dismissed 
rather facilely as being nonexistent and not scientifically denotable, were now examined as major 
impediments to democracy. 
 Indeed these differences between Gordon and Floyd extended beyond this discussion of 
individuals and institutions in a democracy at war and contrasting the views of the Allport 
brothers sheds light on Floyd’s conceptualization of individuality, particularly in the years during 
and after World War II. Though the two brothers had worked together over the years, and though 
Floyd had attempted to guide Gordon through his undergraduate and graduate schooling, their 
views of the person began to diverge significantly as they moved through their careers. As 
Nicholson (2000, 2003) has shown, Gordon turned to a view of personality and the individual 
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that embraced the uniqueness of each individual and the ways in which the traits of each 
individual are patterned or connected. Such a form of individuality could not be captured by the 
methods of natural science. Floyd, on the other hand, adopted a view of the individual as defined 
in relation to established norms; that is, the individual is defined by how much he or she differs 
from or is similar to others, as determined by psychometric measures. While Gordon focused on 
the distinctiveness of each individual, Floyd focused on the general responses of individuals to 
social objects and persons and the ways in which these responses diverged from the norm. For 
Floyd, providing a scientific examination of the individual by documenting these norms would 
provide a method of laying bare the ways in which the person was being subsumed by the agents 
of mass culture and social control, including advertising, institutions, corporations, governments 
and the like. In essence, Floyd’s view of the individual and his devotion to science were coupled 
with a science of the person that focused on displaying the very sameness of all human beings in 
1920s urban America. Displaying this conformity might help to dissolve it. Gordon’s view, 
however, led him to a science of person that focused on agency and purpose, highlighted the 
inestimable difference and uniqueness of individuals, and promoted the cultivation of that 
difference.  The divergent views of individuality adopted by Gordon and Floyd provide an 
interesting view of two different methodological, moral, and ontological spectrums for viewing 
the person.  
For Allport, this view of the individual was clearly strengthened during the war years, but 
it was also complicated to some extent by his social milieu. By the 1930s, Allport’s outlook on 
the social had already expanded considerably, moving from his examinations of inter-individual 
contact in social facilitation experiments to his analysis of social norms and social institutions by 
means of the J-curve. The J-curve had demonstrated to Allport that one could detect patterns in 
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social behavior, patterns that perhaps applied across a variety of situations and contexts. Such 
patterns could perhaps be used to map larger and larger segments of the social. One could 
imagine, for example, an individual’s social life mapped out in accordance with the J-curve 
hypothesis, where the individual’s participation in a variety of social institutions could be 
delineated. Such an approach might also be applied to an institution, where each purpose of the 
institution could be discerned and individual fulfillment of those purposes could be mapped. 
Such an approach to the social built on Allport’s early study of social behavior, but it shows a 
clear change in his thoughts regarding the complexity of the social and the kinds of approaches 
required for its study.   
By the 1940s, however, it became increasingly clear to Allport that the J-curve approach 
was not adequate for dealing with the complexities of the social—a world that now included not 
just face-to-face interactions, small social groups, or American institutions. It had become clear 
that the social was in fact global. In the closing years of the war, Allport therefore began to make 
more and more references to the need for a systematic understanding of collective action. In an 
undated memorandum titled “World Structure and the Origin of Modern Wars” he wrote: 
If the world were a place where every man could live within himself, if it were a planet of 
perpetually small population and pioneering activity, this question [of understanding 
collective action] would never arise. But we have reached the condition in which these 
great national and economic structures, which make up our present chaotic world, must 
be understood. Their laws must be studied if we are to survive, for human life is 
organized unalterably in this matrix (Allport, n.d., World Structure) 
Allport’s calls for an understanding of collective action were directly linked to his belief that 
democracy had become contradictory during the war: individual freedoms and liberties were 
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suppressed in order to protect the nation. As he wrote in an unpublished manuscript in 1941: “we 
have lost the individual liberties of our tradition…If we try to employ democracy as our rallying 
cry, we are shocked to find that one-half of its assumptions now contradict the other half” 
(Allport, 1941).  Allport seemed to accept that the situation was necessary, but believed that it 
also meant that the entire foundation of American democracy required a serious rethinking. A 
true evaluation of democracy and the social order, he believed, required an entirely novel 
approach to understanding the social. The war years, rife with debate regarding the structure and 
function of social institutions, had complicated Allport’s simplistic approach and, in the 
remaining thirty years of his life, he would never again return to a staunch form of individualism: 
methodological, moral, or otherwise.   
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Chapter 6 
The Master Problem of Social Psychology: Allport’s Turn to Theory, 1945-1978 
In 1955, at the age of 65 and just months away from official retirement from Syracuse, 
Floyd Allport (1955) published his first book-length work since the 1930s. This monograph—
Theories of Perception and the Concept of Structure—would not be nearly as popular as his 
Social Psychology, but it received rave reviews from his colleagues and friends and the 
publishing house quickly received requests for nearly 6,000 copies (Neilly,1955). Theories of 
Perception, like many of Allport’s later writing projects, had begun as a nearly impossible task: 
he sought to review every single leading theory in psychology, searching for any that might solve 
the problem of explaining psychological data systematically without resorting to metaphysics or 
vitalism. He eventually resolved to limit his review to contemporary theories of perception, 
including Gestalt theory, Lewinian field theory, and Donald Hebb’s associationism. The book, 
which Allport viewed as preparation for writing the most important monograph of his career, 
would in fact turn out to be his last.  
Theories of Perception reveals much about Allport’s approach to science as a whole in 
the period following World War II and sheds light on this time as one of transition for him, 
particularly in regards to his ideas regarding the individual and the social. Allport’s earliest work 
on social facilitation, personality, attitudes, and even the J-curve hypothesis was minimally 
reliant on theory; for the most part, Allport had focused primarily on gathering concrete data, 
summarizing findings from other laboratory experiments, and uncovering lawful relationships. In 
the post-War period, however, his focus turned increasingly to theory and the important role it 
played in advancing science. For Allport, data and the establishment of quantifiable laws were 
still important, but they were meaningless without theory: “Good theories give us deeper 
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understandings. They can suddenly change our entire outlook not merely upon this law or that, 
but upon a whole range of facts or laws” (p. 4). Allport went on to describe the common thought 
processes behind great theories and the role such theories played in science: 
For the most part they grew out of deep intellectual perplexities or ‘theoretical crises,’ 
and they often provided solutions that seemed to resolve apparent contradictions in 
nature. Though a background of observation lay behind them, they were the results of the 
attempt without further experiment at the moment, merely by thinking about what was 
already known, to put together the pieces of a puzzle that might reveal an order in nature 
never before envisaged” (Allport, 1955, p. 5) 
This passage, presented as an objective analysis of the role of theory in science, in fact aptly 
describes Allport’s own abandonment of experimentation in the post-War period and his turn 
toward theory development. Indeed, from the 1950s until the end of his life, Allport—considered 
by many to be the founder of experimental social psychology—would not conduct another study 
or experiment; instead, he increasingly withdrew from the laboratory and from academic circles 
more generally in order to devote his time to the construction of a grand psychological theory. 
Though his methods and approach shifted significantly during this period, his area of focus 
remained the same: it was in this last period of his life that Allport took the problem of the 
individual and the social out of the laboratory and subjected it to theoretical analysis.    
Social Psychology in the Post-War World 
The years following the Second World War were significant ones for the social sciences, 
characterized by changes in subject matter, funding sources, public visibility, size, and 
organization. Social psychology was no exception, and some scholars have suggested that it was 
in the post-war period that the discipline truly found a footing as a sub discipline of psychology. 
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Indeed, some scholars have described this period as the “golden age” of social psychology 
(House, 2008; Sewell, 1989), characterized by interdisciplinary teams of researchers working on 
socially relevant issues with substantial federal support (House, 2008). It was a period in which 
many of the classic and well-known studies were done, including Leon Festinger’s (1957) work 
on cognitive dissonance, Solomon Asch’s (1951) conformity research, and Stanley Milgram’s 
(1963) work on obedience to authority. These years were productive ones, as demonstrated by 
the sheer number of studies conducted, the growth in methodological approaches, and the 
amount of data collected (Cartwright, 1979). The field also began to acquire the markings of an 
established discipline in the post-War period, including the founding of the Society for 
Experimental Social Psychology in 1965 and, in that same year, the founding of two journals: the 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology and the Journal of Experimental Social 
Psychology.
64
  
In addition to contributing to the growth and professionalization of the field, the war 
years also seem to have affected the subject matter and general orientation of social psychology. 
The social climate of the Depression and the Second World War, characterized by social, 
political, and economic turmoil, spawned what one author has described as “a very groupy social 
psychology” (Steiner, 1974, p. 105). Steiner differentiated between individualistically-oriented 
scholars and group-oriented scholars, noting that the former treated the organism as a self-
contained unit, affecting and affected by inner states and external stimuli. Group-oriented 
scholars of the post-war period, however, viewed the individual as part of a larger system: 
The individual is presumed to be an element in a larger system, a group, organization, or 
society. And what he does is presumed to reflect the state of the larger system and the 
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events that are occurring in it. Consequently, one looks for causes that are located outside 
the individual himself, in the collective actions of others, or in the constraints imposed by 
the larger system” (p. 96).  
While many human scientists continued to focus on internal processes—including everything 
from attitudes and ego-involvement to biological processes—a growing contingent began to 
focus on social systems and the place of individuals within them. Steiner suggests that in the 
1940s, both of these viewpoints were developing congenially alongside one another and it 
seemed as though social psychology may indeed have been taking a position as a much-needed 
bridge between psychology and the social sciences: “It would connect the proximal with the 
distal, the internal with the external, and the monadic with the dyadic” (p. 98).65  
This postwar focus on groups is indeed evident in the social psychology of the 1940s and 
1950s and the focus was accompanied by a move toward interdisciplinary research efforts. Kurt 
Lewin’s work on the social psychology of small groups serves as an apt example of this kind of 
work and of the growing attention being paid to group-level concepts in the post-war period. For 
Lewin, understanding groups was necessary for the safeguarding of democracy and for the 
prevention of everything from small group conflict to international war. His Research Center for 
Group Dynamics, established at MIT in 1945, was intended for just this purpose. Lewin worked 
to bring together an interdisciplinary group of scholars that could explore group dynamics from a 
multitude of angles (Lewin, 1945). Other interdisciplinary scholarly efforts focused on similar 
topics were also developed during and after the war. Harvard’s Department of Social Relations, 
for example, was established to bring together social, cultural, and psychological sciences 
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(Allport & Boring, 1946). In the announcement of the interdisciplinary Department, it was noted 
that “World War II greatly accelerated the fusion of research activities in this common territory, 
and virtually obliterated distinctions that were already breaking down” (Harvard University, 
1946 as cited in Smith, 1998, p. 46). Interdisciplinary training programs like these were set up in 
multiple academic institutions, including Michigan, Yale, Cornell, and Berkeley. 
Interdisciplinary research programs were also established by government-run funding agencies, 
private foundations, and the military (Sewell, 1989). 
However, this focus on group dynamics and the flourish of interdisciplinary efforts did 
not make the problem of the group less difficult for social and behavioral scientists, who 
continued to struggle with studying this complicated concept within the constraints of empirical 
science. As Lewin explained in 1945, group dynamics represented an important but extremely 
complicated subject matter: 
On whatever unit of group life we focus: whether we think of nations and international 
politics; of economic life within a nation and the relation between business groups or 
between producer and consumer; of race or religious groups and of their relations in the 
community; of the factory and the relations between top management, the foreman and 
the worker—at whatever unit we look, we find a complicated network of problems and 
conflicting interests. Their degree of complication seems to be rivaled only by our lack of 
clarity about the true nature of the problems (Lewin, 1945, p. 128).  
There was indeed a sense at the close of the 1940s that group-level concepts had to be addressed 
in the post-War world and that addressing such concepts might require a novel approach to the 
field. There was also a growing sense that this new approach would necessarily be more 
theoretical, since the plethora of empirical findings produced during the War remained 
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disconnected and not well explained. As Robert Sears noted in his 1950 APA presidential 
address on personality and social behavior research, “empirical progress has been accompanied 
by the construction of but a minimal amount of theory” (p. 476). He was careful to note that a 
good theory for social psychology would necessarily include both individual and group level 
variables, since the two “are so inextricably intertwined, both as to cause and effect” (Sears, 
1951, p. 476). Sears urged scholars to design systematic, multivariable theoretical frameworks 
that could be used to predict events in the social world.  
 As social psychologists continued to navigate their way through the postwar years, they 
also faced serious internal and external questioning of their field and particularly its ability to 
produce relevant, useable knowledge. The turbulent social changes and unrest that characterized 
the United States in the 1960s and 1970s had significant effects on the human sciences, including 
social psychology. Social psychologists, who perhaps should have had the most to contribute to 
an understanding of the social and political upheavals of the 1960s seemed poorly equipped to do 
so (Faye, 2012). Criticism of the discipline, its orientation, and its methods came from the 
government, funding agencies, other academics, the student protest movement, and from social 
psychologists themselves. By the late 1960s, the field was facing an internally diagnosed crisis 
and the pressure to develop a social psychology that could more adequately conceptualize the 
complexities of the social world was acutely felt within the field (Faye, 2012).  
The Turn Towards Systems Theories 
 Social psychology’s postwar focus on theoretical development, interdisciplinarity, and 
multivariable social systems reflected the discipline’s sense of urgency when it came to 
understanding large-scale group phenomena. It also reflected larger concerns in the academic 
world regarding the integration of knowledge and the sciences. Across disciplines, scholars were 
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searching for ways to integrate subject matter and to combine multiple variables and multiple 
levels of analysis into more systematic, general theoretical frameworks. In 1956, Kenneth 
Boulding—an economist at the University of Michigan—warned of the dangers of academic 
specialization in all fields, including the social sciences, and called for “a body of systematic 
theoretical constructs which will discuss the general relationships of the empirical world” 
(Boulding, 1956, p. 197). He noted that each discipline had set about studying its own 
“individual,” whether that be a person, a molecule, or a corporation. The difficulty that arose, 
however, was that each of these “individuals” interacted with one another, formed a part of one 
another, and were inextricably interrelated. Boulding argued that rather than reducing each level 
of existence to the one below for explanation—as had been the most common scientific approach 
in the early decades of the twentieth century—scholars needed to look at each level of existence 
as a system that interacts with other systems.  
Boulding and others were very much following the work of biologist and philosopher 
Ludwig von Bertalanffy, who had critiqued modern laboratory work for its focus on the 
reduction of complex phenomena. This reductionism, he argued, resulted from a longstanding 
but unfounded fear of referring to “wholes,” since they were considered to be “metaphysical 
notions transcending the boundaries of science” (Bertalanffy, 1972, p. 415). Though Bertalanffy 
had been promoting the study of organized systems in biology since the 1920s, it was not until 
the 1950s that a broad array of fields and disciplines really began to pay attention to the 
approach; by the 1950s, general system theory (GST) had begun to spread across the academic 
landscape (Bertalanffy, 1972; Boulding, 1956). General system theory provided a new way of 
looking at groups or wholes, one that sought to include a broad array of phenomena and a diverse 
group of entities usually studied only by individual disciplines. Psychologists, whose 
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behavioristic approach was the target of much of the criticism launched by GST proponents like 
Boulding (Boulding, 1956), paid attention to GST. It was during this period that the phrase 
“behavioral sciences” was coined by a group of scholars seeking to develop a general theory of 
behavior that would be applicable to social as well as biological sciences (Miller, 1955). It was 
also during this period that hybrid disciplines involving the behavioral sciences (e.g., cybernetics 
and organization theory) began to emerge (Boulding, 1956).
66
  
The variety of systems theories that began to emerge in the 1950s were characterized by a 
significant change in approaches to science and theory. Using a systems approach, studying a 
phenomenon meant reducing it to its dynamics rather than its components, as had been the most 
dominant approach in twentieth-century science (Laszlo & Krippner, 1998). In making this shift, 
systems theorists were focused on larger patterns of behavior in a system rather than on how 
individual components behave. This shift seemed to provide a way of grasping large-scale, 
complex phenomena that could not be captured through examinations of simple functional 
relationships between a small number of variables. Rather than discerning how small changes in 
one variable create change in another, systems theorists were attempting to capture how many 
elements in a system affect one another and affect the functioning of the whole system. The 
emphasis here was always on the dynamics of systems, which was comprised of the interaction 
between elements and subsystems or suprasystems.  
As one author noted, systems theory seemed to provide a significant advance over classic 
mechanistic approaches which viewed individual elements as reactive rather than interactive; the 
mechanistic approach “had nothing to say of growth, evolution, or purpose; all they offered was 
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static equilibrium” (Thayer, 1972). Furthermore, it seemed as though the mechanistic approach 
could not contribute significantly to an understanding of the kinds of complex problems faced by 
scientists from all fields in the mid-twentieth century: 
In the 1950s, with the introduction of computers, hydrogen bombs and space exploration, 
large-scale problems began to penetrate Western society. The traffic-system breakdowns, 
environmental disasters, and the nuclear threat were immediately high on the agenda. 
Society was faced with messes, interacting problems varying from technical and 
organizational to social and political (Skyttner, 2005, p. 36).  
Systems theories seemed to provide new footing for scientists seeking to understand complex 
wholes, without resorting to the descriptive kinds of holism that had previously been proposed. 
Furthermore, it seemed to provide a way of approaching living systems without employing 
mechanistic or vitalistic thinking while still linking the social sciences with the natural sciences 
(Voigt, 2011). While this approach was far removed from classic mechanism, it would still be 
very palatable for a methodological individualist; as Langlois (1983) notes, “The parts are 
conceived of as logically distinct elements of a mathematical set; those elements exist and are 
fully defined independently of any relations that might be specified. A system is just the set of 
parts plus a set of relations among the parts” (p. 585). Furthermore, systems approaches had a 
normative aspect, focused on delineating existing systems with the idea of eventually creating 
new systems that function more efficiently (Skyttner, 2005). As Thayer (1972) noted, “few 
concepts ever bust on the intellectual scene with so much promise as General System(s) Theory” 
(p. 481). Indeed, systems theories seemed to provide an innovative new path for scientists 
struggling to conceptualize a complex world. It is understandable that such an approach would 
be of interest to social psychologists who had, since the inception of their field, struggled with 
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the conceptualization of an important, but seemingly undefinable part-whole relationship—that 
of the individual and society. 
Beyond Individualism: Allport and the Concept of Collectivity in the Post-War World 
Perhaps more than any other social psychologist of the time, Floyd Allport was paying 
close attention to the growing literature on systems theory and other approaches that moved 
away from reductionism and aimed to create a new conceptualization of “wholes” through 
integration of the subject matter of the separate sciences into a larger theoretical structure. As his 
wartime projects began to wind down, he returned to the problem that had been central to him 
since graduate school: the problem of the individual and the social. His earliest approach to the 
problem—as reflected in his dissertation work on social facilitation—had been rooted in a simple 
and straightforward, mechanistic, and behaviorist approach of observing and manipulating inter-
individual stimulation and response. It became clear to Allport, however, that such an approach, 
rooted in classical reductionist thinking, failed to account adequately for the impact of social 
factors on the behavior of the individual. Perhaps even more so, he became aware of his failure 
to explain the nature of the social and the specific ways in which it related to the individual. His 
recognition of the simplicity of his earlier approach is evident in a 1947 memorandum to the 
Dean of the Graduate School at Syracuse, where he explained his growing understanding that he 
could not facilely dismiss collective concepts. Referring to his earlier work, he wrote, “the 
question I had not fairly asked was ‘just what are institutions if they are not super-individuals?’” 
(Allport, 1947). This altered outlook was due in part to Allport’s developing idea that 
individuals, like collectivities, were not in fact singular scientific entities either: “I have come to 
believe that both the ‘individual’ and the ‘institutions’ are loose terms which need replacing if 
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we are to work toward a fuller understanding.” He had come to believe that like the “group,” the 
individual was essentially fictional, comprised of parts and processes.   
This recognition was further complicated by Allport’s growing understanding of the 
difficulty of studying the individual and the social. In a document dated 1948, Allport wrote out 
his thoughts on this issue, grappling with the idea that studying the lone individual in an attempt 
to understand social behavior meant relying on the faulty assumption that social and individual 
behavior are separate or can be logically separated. “The lone individual” he noted “is very 
difficult to find” (Allport, 1948). On the other hand, he continued to hold that the social group 
was not a scientific object that could be directly experienced. He therefore saw a central 
difficulty for the scientific social psychologist: while the social group is not a scientific object, 
the individual is not a social object. He writes,  
So we are in a dilemma. The lone individual, if we could find him, is denotable, but if we 
study only him we do not find the data of interactions of individuals (social 
psychology)…He behaves differently in groups than when alone. If we take the group on 
the other hand as an object of study, we find that it is not denotable and fails to meet 
scientific requirements. We now see the need of…arriving at a method which is both 
scientifically sound and capable of dealing with the phenomena of inter-individual action 
which we want to study” (Allport, 1948) 
The social psychologist was therefore left with no clear-cut or satisfactory method for studying 
inter-individual action. Allport’s earlier views, rooted in the reduction of the social to the 
individual and the study of the social through the study of the individual no longer seemed 
tenable. This quandary very much resembles the kind of “theoretical crisis” or “intellectual 
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perplexity” that he would describe a few years later in Theories of Perception and it was this 
theoretical problem that would guide his future work.  
In his attempt to work toward a new approach to the field, Allport continued to avoid 
commonly used phrases such as “group action” or “group behavior” and he continued to insist on 
the abandonment of group-level concepts. Nonetheless, he emphasized the importance of 
understanding “concerted action” and suggested that this problem continued to be in fact the 
most important problem for the field of social psychology: “There is need in social psychology 
and the social sciences for a better understanding of what takes place when a number of people 
act together so that a definite end result is produced” (Allport, 1940). Allport also began to see 
social psychology as being somewhat disjointed, amassing facts about social behavior without 
having adequate theoretical structures to account for these facts. As he later recalled, he therefore 
began contemplating the idea that “nearly all this large, and at present somewhat formless, mass 
of findings that constitutes current social psychology is capable of being subsumed under a 
single more general formulation” (Allport, 1974, p. 8). Referencing the work of general systems 
theorists, he noted that such work would be complicated and highly interdisciplinary: 
Such a theory would of course have to embrace not only facts of the social and 
psychological disciplines, but would have to reach down into the biological, biochemical, 
and even physical levels. It must seem presumptuous and foolhardy indeed for any one 
person to undertake so vast a problem, let alone a psychologist who had no particular 
competence in some of the disciplines involved. Nevertheless, that is the course to which 
I set myself (Allport, 1974, p. 18). 
In the 1940s, Allport began turning to other sub-disciplines of psychology and other sciences for 
new ways of conceptualizing concerted action. This led him to a diverse body of literature on 
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interdisciplinary, systematic approaches to behavior, action, function and systematic change in 
all fields of study. His reading list included articles on a variety of topics such as emergent 
evolution, new conceptualizations of the organism, relationships between physiology and other 
sciences, ecological approaches to behavior, and the statics and dynamics of populations
67
. He 
would then spend his remaining years at Syracuse, and in fact the remainder of his life, slowly 
and cautiously wading through this literature and attempting to build an elaborate theoretical 
framework for rethinking the group and conceptualizing collective action.  
Event-Structure Theory 
Allport’s work on collective action was very different from his earliest work on social 
facilitation, but it was not entirely divorced from his graduate training. In fact, this later 
theoretical work shows direct ties to the philosophical work of his Harvard mentors. In many 
ways, Allport’s attempts to create a theoretical conceptualization of individual and collective 
action fit very well with the arguments made by his main early mentor E. B. Holt at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. In defining and defending New Realism, Holt (1915a) had 
argued for a study of behavior that moved beyond reflex action and beyond physiological 
descriptions of behavior. Holt argued that reducing behavior to physiological parts and processes 
results in a lack of attention to the “state of interdependence” (p. 155) that arises in cases of 
cooperative action. He noted that relying on reductionism and the “bead theory” of causation 
proved problematic for the natural sciences as well and had resulted in a move toward more 
focus on functions of entities, a search for laws, and an examination of how objects behave in 
relation to other objects. Holt urged his colleagues who were “addicted to bead theory” to “put 
our microscope back into its case” and focus less on identifying first causes in behavior and 
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instead ask the “only pertinent, scientific question: What is this organism doing?” (p. 161). This 
would require viewing the organism in a larger system and paying attention to purpose or 
direction of behavior through neutral observation of behavioral patterns. Such an approach 
differed significantly from early twentieth century experimental work that sought to uncover 
small, simple, repeatable laws of stimulus-response behavior and search for their physiological 
substrates. 
Holt’s call for the description and observation of behavior and its relationship to the 
purpose of the organism was very similar to what Allport had begun approaching with his work 
on the J-curve and conformity behaviors. In these studies, Allport observed individual behavior 
patterns and plotted them according to the extent to which they fulfilled a particular institutional 
purpose, looking for patterns in such behaviors. As he moved away from the J-curve studies 
towards his theoretical work, his outlook continued to mimick that of Holt and the New Realists, 
as he sought to develop a new theoretical approach for social and psychological phenomena. 
Allport argued that the common scientific focus on “temporal trains of cause and effect” 
frequently masked the very phenomena they were trying to explain (Allport, 1954, p. 287). In 
what represents a significant shift from his early approach, he suggested that the focus on laws 
had led to a dead end: “the molar laws of covarying behavioral quantities have about reached the 
end of their tether…Some broader theoretical outlook is required” (p. 281). Allport illustrated 
this point, employing the example of a boy taking a drink of lemonade. Without first revealing 
the act he was describing, Allport depicted it in terms of quantitative, physiological laws such as 
evaporation, increases in sensation, and neural transmission. He then described the same act 
again, this time as a series of simple events such as the experience of thirst, the lifting of a glass, 
and drinking. Allport employed this rather extreme example to demonstrate that the behavior 
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itself is unrecognizable when described using conventional, quantitative laws. He suggested that 
if such laws could not even sufficiently describe a behavior, it was highly unlikely that they 
could explain it. What was wanted, he argued, was a description of the events that take place in 
such an act and the order in which they occur—or, as Allport called it, an outline of the patterns 
and dynamics of behavior.  
Allport’s new approach to understanding behavior was, in this respect, drastically 
different from his earliest work; reductionist, quantitative renderings of behavior were no longer 
the sin qua non of good social-psychological science. His new system gave precedence to 
qualitative laws, theoretical renderings, and simple observations of behavior. Allport argued that 
while behavior is indeed governed by quantitative laws, it is governed by structural laws as well. 
These structural laws or principles, he argued, might in fact be found not just in human behavior, 
but throughout all of nature more generally. Allport therefore began to promote an approach to 
science that would seek the structure of phenomena as diverse as a boy drinking lemonade, a 
factory producing steel, or the actions of the nervous system. Such an approach required viewing 
phenomena as belonging to “a system of events or happenings between explicitly denotable 
things” (Allport, 1940, p. 418).  When such systems are uncovered, prediction and control 
become possible. As he explained in 1940, “Unless a collective situation is looked at as a 
system…its variables cannot be sufficiently controlled to secure workably adequate prediction in 
terms of one variable” (p. 418).  
Allport named this approach event-structure theory.
68
 The social world, he argued, could 
be fruitfully conceptualized as a system of events, or rather, as several event systems that are 
interrelated to make up a larger social system. A factory, for example, is one event system made 
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were event-systems theory and event-structure theory.  
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up of individual sub-systems such as the production of metal plates, the selling of such plates, 
and the purchase of supplies. Each of these sub-systems is made up of nodes and events. For 
example, the creation of the metal plates involves individual people (nodes) making particular 
things happen (events). Allport believed all event-systems were circular, beginning in a state of 
inactivity, moving toward activity, and eventually returning to a state of inactivity or 
equilibrium, operating much like the physiological concept of homeostasis. The system is driven 
by purpose, such that each event is geared at fulfilling a purpose. Allport believed that all of 
nature was filled with these systems, including biological, psychological, and social systems. 
Eventually, Allport would go on to assert that nature in its entirety could be conceptualized as a 
large system comprised of these interconnected subsystems, each operating by the same 
structural and dynamic rules and patterns. His previous reductionism of the social into the 
psychological and the psychological into the biological had, by the 1960s, been replaced by an 
attempt to find common patterns among these vast and interrelated systems (Allport, 1954).  
Allport emphasized the necessity of describing these systems both qualitatively and 
quantitatively. Qualitatively, researchers needed to observe a system, figuring out where each 
node was in relation to other nodes and what events regularly occurred within a system. Systems 
could essentially be identified wherever one saw regularly occurring patterns of behavior. Laws 
of the system could also then be identified and described qualitatively. In addition, systems could 
be described quantitatively, though such description would require a very in-depth understanding 
of the system and its qualities. Allport suggested that systems involved energy and probability. 
Each node carries a certain amount of energy which is transferred around the system, used, and 
stored. Finding measures of this energy would allow theorists to measure potentialities for 
certain actions within the system. Though Allport himself never successfully reached the point of 
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quantitatively analyzing such systems, his archival notes are rich with lengthy formulas he 
devised and revised precisely for this purpose (Allport, 1954, 1955, 1967a).
69
 
As the 1940s drew to a close, Allport began to pour all of his energy into this theoretical 
work, hopeful that by developing the laws of particular systems, he would work out a theoretical 
skeleton that applied to all systems at all levels of analysis. He was secretive about his work, 
publishing little and requiring his graduate students to agree “that they would keep the 
methodology reasonably confidential and not publish their findings” until he felt his own work 
on the theory was ready to be fully revealed. The work, however, became increasingly 
complicated as Allport pushed forward. He began to remove himself from academic circles in 
order to focus almost entirely on the manuscript. His work with graduate students ended in 1954 
(Allport, 1956) and in 1956, he officially retired from Syracuse (Crawford, 1956) and moved to 
California. Though he did teach classes at Berkeley, he was focused on his theoretical work 
(Ghiselli, 1957). The work became larger and larger as more time passed. By 1951, he had 
planned a two-volume work on the theory. By 1952, he had decided to expand the manuscript to 
three volumes. This was due in part to the fact that Allport had become increasingly confident 
that the approach was not just a new way of conceptualizing social psychological phenomena, 
but rather it was a method that required an entirely new idea of reality. Allport’s manuscript, 
tentatively titled Structure in Nature, was intended to outline the theory as it would apply in this 
broad manner.  
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 For example, in a set of notes dated 1951, Allport (1951) wrote the following formula: 
“Ex=Px+Py1(Rxy1+Ry1x)+Py2(Rxy2+Ry2x)…Pyn(Rxyn+Rynx)  
E=energy predicted to e spent by individual in structure x 
y1, y2…yn = structure of individual other than x 
R=relevance 
Rxy=relevance of structure x to structure y, etc” 
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Allport’s friends, students, and colleagues had mixed feelings about the work. His brother 
Gordon was very supportive of the work, but also seemed to recognize the magnitude of the 
project if carried to completion in the manner Floyd envisioned. After reading one of Floyd’s 
first articles on the topic, Gordon congratulated him, noting “I cannot help but feel that the line 
of thought you are following, and have followed these past years, is somehow ‘right’ in a 
completely cosmic sense.” He expressed his belief, however, that “it may take science a 
millennium to know why and how in detail” (G.W. Allport, n.d.). He referred to Allport’s work 
as “highly original” and “Einsteinian…nothing less than a major contribution to cosmology” and 
noted to Floyd that his delay in publicizing the theory was understandable given the magnitude 
of the task at hand (G. W.Allport, 1954a). In a 1955 letter, after congratulating him on the release 
of Theories of Perception, Gordon chided Floyd, suggesting that perhaps he had come to 
recognize the reality of the social after all, since social groupings were made up of event cycles 
just as individuals were: “Unless I am mistaken your erstwhile views of the group mind are here 
drastically revised. If collective structures are as self-maintaining as inside structures, we really 
have a kind of reversal in FHA” (G. W. Allport, 1955).  
Hadley Cantril was another supporter of Allport’s work; in a letter regarding event-
structure theory, he noted, “It only confirms my feeling that 100 years from now when nearly all 
APA members will have been completely forgotten, you will stand out as one of the people of 
our day to be reckoned with” (Cantril, 1961). J. J. Gibson, then in the midst of developing his 
ideas regarding ecological approaches to perception, was also interested in event-structure 
theory; he saw significant similarities between Allport’s work and his own, writing to Allport in 
1966, “The problem of the structure of events and sequences is coming to be recognized as 
crucial at last. I hope you have it licked. I am taking a crack at it myself in my forthcoming 
                                                                                                                                          172 
 
book” (Gibson, 1966). Allport received similar encouraging letters from those outside of 
psychology, including biophysicist Martin Zwick (Zwick, 1973), linguist Jim Soffiete (Soffiete, 
1967), and communications scholar William King (King, 1961). He also received offers to 
publish the manuscript (Putnam, 1967).  
 Despite some of this enthusiasm for the work, others openly admitted to Allport that the 
theory was all but impossible to follow. Richard Solomon, a former graduate student of Allport’s 
who had worked on the J-curve hypothesis, was hesitant about event-structure theory. As the 
editor of Psychological Review, he wrote to Allport to indicate that while Allport should feel free 
to send his work to the Review, outside reviewers would be needed to judge its suitability. 
Referring to Theories of Perception, Solomon noted, “I found that last part of your book…very 
hard going, and I confess that I understood very little of it.”70 His verbal explanations of the 
theory did not fare much better; after presenting it at APA in 1966 in New York City, Allport 
wrote: “The audience was very cordial (and chilly!) and I learned that they probably had 
difficulty following its oral presentation (Allport, 1966).  
Some of Allport’s other former students attempted to spread word of the theory and 
pushed Allport to publish on it. Charlotte Simon, who had gone on to work in a VA hospital, 
wrote to Allport twice in 1958 noting that while people were showing interest in the theory, they 
had trouble understanding it. She therefore urged him to publish a more comprehensive account 
of it, since the account provided in Theories of Perception seemed too sketchy for some (Simon, 
1958). Another former student, Leo Meltzer, suggested in 1961 that they apply to the Social 
Science Research Council to fund a week-long or perhaps even summer-long conference on 
                                                          
70
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event-structure theory (Meltzer, 1961). Similarly, Daniel Katz suggested they compile a volume 
in Allport’s honor, comprised of his key papers and some of those of his students (Katz, 1965). 
Allport turned these offers down, indicating that he would rather spend his time pushing forward 
with the multi-volume book.   
From Event-Structure to Enestruence: An Unfinished Manuscript 
 By the 1960s, Allport’s connection to his friends and colleagues began to fade further, as 
he turned down the already decreasing number of academic offices and publication opportunities 
offered to him (Darley, 1962). He remained highly engaged with his theoretical work and was 
optimistic about its eventual impact. In 1965, referring to E. G. Boring’s request for him to write 
a publishable autobiography, he noted to Gordon that his “REAL or most significant contribution 
to psychology” had not yet been made. He turned down the autobiography because “it might 
deprive me of the time and energy to do it if I devoted time to a somewhat premature swan song” 
(Allport, 1965a). In the meantime, Allport’s theoretical work became increasingly complicated. 
In the 1960s, he came to the conclusion that the common words used in his theory—words such 
as “event” and “closure”—were too connected to their colloquial meanings. Because of this, he 
began creating what he described to Gordon as “a whole new vocabulary of Latin and Greek-
rooted terms” (Allport, 1965b) and he began to describe the theory in completely abstract terms 
and principles that he believed now spanned all of science. Familiar scientific words, such as 
particle, mass, motion, and force were replaced with terms such as kappa, delta, and chi.  
In line with this new vocabulary, Allport changed the name of the theory to a theory of 
enestruence. His explanation of the name change illuminates the degree of complication the 
theory had acquired by 1967: 
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The physical reality, “est,” is “strewn along” the line of our denotational experience 
(kappa-delta). The prefix “en” will indicate that this is neither a mere inorganic nor a 
random strewing (“estruence”), but the constituting of an actual concrete entity—that is, 
“enestruence.” (Allport, 1967a, p. 5).  
By the following year, the two-volume work was tentatively titled Structure, Form, and Process 
in Nature (Theory of Enestruence): An Inquiry in to the Problems of Form, Structure and 
Process in Animate Nature as Seen in the Light of a Neglected Ontological Aspect of Physical 
Reality. His archival notes indicate that the first volume would be focused on the “chi-existential 
organism” while the second would focus on the “quasi psi-chi existential collectivity” (Allport, 
1968a). In other words, the first volume dealt with biological and psychological phenomena 
while the second dealt with social phenomena. This new vocabulary made an already difficult 
idea nearly impossible to follow. Some of his colleagues continued to suggest that he present the 
material in a more simplified manner. Harvard psychologist Kurt Fischer noted that “your 
language…makes things a little harder sometimes; the strange words scare people away.” Allport 
replied, noting that the language was necessary so that readers would not bring previous 
meanings to new concepts (Allport, 1968b).  
 Despite its growing size and complexity, Allport remained confident that he could 
complete Structure in Nature. However, the 1960s and 1970s proved to be difficult ones for 
Allport, as he dealt with the death of loved ones and his own deteriorating health. In 1965, his 
wife Helene died, affecting him deeply. Writing to Gordon, he noted that his manuscript had 
been put aside for months as he dealt with his grief: “I suppose one does pull through even such 
losses as this, though it’s not been clear as yet just how” (Allport, 1965a). Six months later, he 
again expressed his grief to Gordon, noting its effect on his work: “How to go on—doing the 
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things we have to do, accomplishing what we want to, and realizing something of the dreams we 
have cherished if we can…that is the problem” (Allport, 1965c). Gordon continually acted as a 
friend, confidant, and supporter in these later years, but he too died just two years after Helene. 
In his last letter to Gordon, Floyd’s awareness of his own limited time for completing the 
manuscript is apparent: “I find myself trying to get some faint glimpse of answers to what life is, 
before I have to pass on from mine in a cloud of human ignorance. I’m facing a dead-line, 
literally” (Allport, 1967b). Allport indeed began to struggle with his own health in the late 1960s, 
dealing with arthritis, a hernia operation, cataracts, and other ailments. This too slowed his work 
and he wavered between being confident that he would finish and then later doubting the 
possibility. He noted to a former student: “I feel myself increasingly now under the limitations of 
time and energy and must work more slowly than I did before” (Allport, 1968c) and to another 
friend, he wrote “I am not too hopeful about my project, but nevertheless will not change it even 
a little bit” (Allport, 1967c). In 1972, he was in and out of the hospital and his former students 
urged him to take a break from his manuscript (Rhine, 1972), but Allport pushed on anticipating 
a completion date of March, 1974. Structure in Nature, however, would never be completed; the 
last barely legible page is dated April, 1978, just six months before Allport’s death on October 
15, 1978 (Allport, 1978).  
“A Problem of Cosmic Proportions” 
 Despite the time and effort that Floyd Allport devoted to event-structure theory, the 
theory had very little influence on the social and behavioral sciences. References to the theory 
appear intermittently in the scholarly literature from the 1950s to the present, most commonly in 
the fields of leadership, management, communications, and organization studies (Klein, Tosi, & 
Cannella, 1999). The works that do reference the theory only scratch the surface of it, steering 
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clear of the later, more complicated incarnations. No one would pick the theory up after Allport’s 
death and the manuscript for Structure in Nature remains in boxes in the Syracuse University 
Archives. Allport’s final attempt to solve the problem of the individual and social was for all 
intents and purposes, unsuccessful.  
 Though it was abstract, complicated, and seemingly far removed from his earliest work 
on social facilitation, Allport’s theory of enestruence was in fact just one final attempt to 
explicate the nature of the social and its relationship to the individual. Looking back on his 
career in 1974, Allport noted that his turn towards theory was precipitated by a colleague’s 
critique of his reductionist, individualistic stance in the 1930s: 
One of my more thoughtful critics wrote me in substance as follows: "You'd better be 
careful how you attack the group concept or use the term ‘group fallacy.’ Is not the 
individual also simply an integration of many parts or processes which often cannot be 
explained or spelled out in detail? In your attacks on `group fictions' you may also be 
selling the individual short." It struck me that this critic was absolutely right (Allport, 
1974, p. 17) 
Allport’s theoretical work was therefore a way of addressing this central difficulty of his earlier 
approach. However, it did not lead Allport to withdraw his earlier criticism and accept group-
level concepts as tenable scientific objects. While Allport’s thoughtful critic seemed to be 
intimating that he should abandon his reduction of wholes into parts and processes, Allport 
instead began to treat the individual much as he had the group; he began to rethink the idea of 
collectivity altogether and suggested that the individual also represents a kind of collectivity. 
Taken even further, Allport began to see all phenomena in the biological, psychological, and 
social realms as collective action situations, comprised of entities involved in series of events.  
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Reading the progression of Allport’s work during this time, it becomes clear that as he 
settled deeper into the theory, he repeatedly stumbled upon the same problem, a problem that 
seems akin to what Hofstadter (2007) has called the “strange loop” phenomenon. Shifting from 
one level of analysis to another, from the biological to the individual, for example, Allport found 
himself always having to posit the existence of some entity, which when viewed through the lens 
of his theory, could not itself be considered an entity at all, but rather another collective structure 
of some sort. The “nodes” in his event-cycle always required explanation via the establishment 
of yet another event cycle. Furthermore, just what the nodes might be depended on one’s 
subjectively adopted point-of-view. As Allport noted in 1961,  
What we see or conceive as the entity is relative to the coarseness or fineness of our 
observation or interpretation, and relative also to whether we are considering an 
aggregate situation as if from the outside or the inside. When we are in a position to work 
with an entity that we experience at one level, the entity as experienced by us at the other 
level disappears. We have never been able to identify and chart, or even to establish the 
existence of both levels and the structure of their connection in a single observation 
(Allport, 1961b, p. 196) 
When viewed one way, any one of these entities may be a node; when viewed another way, it 
may be seen as the system itself, requiring further analysis. Furthermore, Allport viewed each 
entity and each system as being always in a dynamic state, resulting in structural changes both 
locally and across the entire system. Capturing this system at any level of analysis was therefore 
no simple task. It was perhaps this problem that led him to abandon the notion of nodes or 
entities altogether and revert to the language of Greek letters to avoid perception of the nodes in 
a cycle as self-contained entities. In essence, Allport abandoned the notion of an “entity” 
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altogether by the 1970s. His search for the social had morphed into a search for the basic 
structure and dynamics of reality.  
 In some respects, Allport’s theory of enestruence illustrates a significant change in his 
views on the problem of the individual and the social. It is clear that by the 1960s, Allport no 
longer supported the notion that wholes could be simply reduced to their parts for the purposes of 
explanation. His early views of the division of labor among the sciences—whereby sociologists 
could describe groups at a sociological level while psychologists explained them at a 
psychological level—were clearly very much changed. Reductionistic explanation no longer 
made sense for Allport in the 1960s. As he struggled with the notion of scientific entities more 
generally, his confidence in the individual as the central object for psychological science waned 
and eventually dissipated. The individual, like the social, was a system requiring explanation. 
His previous denouncements of the group seemed to him now to have been overly simplistic 
(Allport, 1961b).  
It is important to note, however, that Allport’s later theoretical work was still very much 
tied to the problem of the individual and the social. While he recognized that his earlier views 
were too facile, he also saw them as simply not having gone far enough. In an article reviewing 
his previous ideas about the individual and the group, Allport noted this change, stating, “it is not 
a question of a ‘societal’ versus a ‘natural’ order, or even of the ‘individual’ versus the ‘group’” 
(Allport, 1961b, p. 196). Instead, the problem was much larger, since it involved understanding 
collectivity more generally:  
It may seem to the reader very strange, if not incredible, that behind the comparatively 
simple issue of the ‘group mind,’ in 1924, there could have been lurking a problem of 
such cosmic proportions, and that everyone concerned, in one sense or another, had 
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‘missed the boat.’ Yet to me in 1961 it seems all too evident that this was so” (Allport, 
1961b, p. 196) 
Looking back on his career, Allport himself saw continuity in his work, describing his repeated 
attempts to explicate the nature of social groups. He believed that while he had not erred in 
attempting to expose the group fallacy, he had erred in failing to see just how large the difficulty 
was. Rather than critiquing the sociologists’ conceptions of the group, he believed he should 
have delved further into the problem. Dispelling talk of groups, he recognized, would not have 
done much to advance the social sciences; such collective concepts needed to be thoroughly 
scrutinized rather than dismissed (Allport, 1962).  
 Indeed, reading Allport’s Social Psychology alongside his later work on enestruence, one 
sees another kind of continuity in his work over the course of his life—the extremely ambitious, 
confident, and aggressive way that he approached the problem of the individual and the social. 
Following his work, it becomes clear that Allport was always steadfastly searching for a 
scientific solution to the social that would provide the field with a framework characterized by 
finality. Allport’s writings demonstrate an almost unparalleled confidence in the existence of 
some theoretical and scientific framework that could and would end debates about sociality and 
his life’s work—from 1919 until the 1970s—shows the unfolding of his search to find it. Though 
his theoretical outlook changed over time and he began to see the simplicity of his earliest work, 
his assertive, ambitious, and uncompromising search for that framework is evident across his 
career.   
The failure of Allport’s theory was undoubtedly a combination of many factors, not the 
least of which was his own increasing isolation from the discipline and the increasing complexity 
of his work. In 1968, upon receiving the Gold Medal Award for Lifetime Achievement from the 
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American Psychological Association, Allport recognized this isolation, noting that as he delved 
further into his theoretical work, “I began to lose my colleagues, the social science profession, 
and in general everybody in my environment. They all said I was tilting at windmills” (Allport, 
1968d). Indeed, as Allport continued to struggle with the concepts of collectivity, aggregates, 
and groups, the discipline he played a substantial role in creating had moved on, flourishing 
through the golden age of the 1950s, boldly facing the social conflicts of the 1960s, and 
struggling through the debates and disciplinary crisis of the 1970s. The problem of the individual 
and the group, which Allport believed was the “master problem of social psychology” (Allport, 
1962), would continue to emerge from time to time in the literature. However, after almost 60 
years of grappling with the issue, Allport’s work—concentrated as it was so fully on the 
philosophical nature of reality—had little to readily contribute to this conversation.  
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Conclusion 
 In 1955, Gordon Allport wrote to his brother Floyd to acknowledge Floyd’s latest work 
on the problem of the individual and the group in social psychology. He reminded Floyd that 
their father had always hung mottoes over his desk and suggested that Floyd perhaps do the 
same, using a poem by Austrian poet Rainer Maria Rilke: 
 I live my life in growing rings 
 which move out over the things of the world 
 Perhaps I can never achieve the last 
 but that will be my attempt.
71
 
Indeed, Gordon’s choice of motto for his brother seems quite astute: Floyd Allport’s attempts to 
find a satisfactory way of approaching the individual and the social—something he had devoted 
his work to since graduate school—was a project that he would leave unfinished. From his 
earliest work on social facilitation until his final work on the theoretical structure of collectivity, 
Allport’s entire career was centered on exploring the nature of the social in society and 
attempting to understand how  to conceptualize it within the boundaries of a natural scientific 
framework. As the nature of sociality in American society shifted and changed, Allport’s 
struggle with his subject matter also shifted, becoming increasingly intense until it saturated his 
entire outlook on social psychology, society, and eventually his entire philosophy of science.   
 As many authors have noted, this issue of conceptualizing, measuring, and modeling the 
social has been a part of social-psychological science since the discipline’s inception (Faye, 
2005; Greenwood, 2004). It has existed sometimes at the periphery and sometimes at the center 
of the field, and has resurfaced sometimes with force and sometimes as background noise (Faye, 
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2012). As the present work has shown, the issues at the center of the disciplinary debate were 
always alive and well in the work of Floyd Allport. His position in the field’s history is therefore 
an interesting and important one. Allport helped to establish an individualistic social psychology 
in the 1920s and then spent the remainder of his life grappling with the methodological, moral, 
and conceptual difficulties that such an approach engendered.  
Allport’s Influence on American Social Psychology 
There is little doubt that Allport’s early work had a significant, lasting, and defining 
impact on the scope and content of contemporary social psychology. As other historians have 
noted, Allport paved the way for a psychological social psychology that focused on individuals 
in interaction (Farr, 1996; Greenwood, 2004). His forceful and confident approach to the social 
indeed helped to establish the fledgling field along these lines in the early 1920s. However, it 
also served to alienate the field from approaches, philosophies, and methods that did not conform 
to an individualistic, behaviorist, experimental framework. As many scholars have rightly noted, 
Allport’s work, and particularly his 1924 textbook, provided a sort of canon that psychologists 
could point to and give to new students when they required a view of the field that was 
straightforward and seemingly non-argumentative. Though his work would not eliminate other 
approaches, it did facilitate their marginalization from mainstream social psychology.  
As Branigan (2004) has aptly noted, “textbooks make controversies disappear” (p. 165); 
this was indeed the case with Allport’s work. The book provided psychologists with a view of 
social psychology as a settled science, characterized by consensus and progress rather than 
controversy and disparate problem-solving. This consensus was somewhat illusory in 1924. As 
Robert Farr (1996) demonstrates, the field was still in chaos in the 1930s, lacking a core subject 
matter, but Allport provided psychologically-oriented scholars with a concrete foundation upon 
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which they could build a science. In the 1930s, social psychologists may not have had a distinct 
sense of what their discipline was, but Allport’s work had provided a strong argument for what it 
was not. Whether Allport’s promotion of an individualistic social psychology was beneficial or 
detrimental to the field, it was—in this respect—highly successful. As was demonstrated in the 
first chapters of this work, the social had always posed a problem for social philosophers and 
social scientists. The problem had been both ontological and methodological, with scholars in 
constant debate over just what the social is and how such a thing could be fruitfully studied. The 
greatest difficulty for these scholars was the problem of individualism and collectivism: was the 
social simply a collection of individual entities or did the “whole” have characteristics that could 
not be gleaned from an understanding of the parts? This debate—so prevalent in the context of 
turn-of-the-century discipline building—was central to the newly emerging field of social 
psychology.  
 Allport was not the first to suggest that the field focus on individual psychological 
processes rather than collective concepts. Gabriel Tarde before him had taken a similar stance as 
had some early sociologists like Franklin Giddings. In fact, most early scholars of the social had 
to take a stance on this issue and individualism was promoted by many, resulting in many 
varieties of an individualistic social science, as well as many varieties of collectivist science. 
With so many varieties circulating in the early 1900s and the availability of many versions 
focused on the individual, it becomes necessary to ask why Allport’s version was so widely 
adopted by psychologists while other versions—though well received—did little to quell the 
ongoing controversy over the future shape and form of the disciplines devoted to studying the 
social. A close examination of Allport’s work suggests that his success was at least partially 
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rooted in two key characteristics of his work: his confident approach and its suitability for the 
Zeitgeist of 1920s psychology.   
Allport presented his social psychology not as one potential approach to a fledgling field; 
instead he presented it as an objective summary of psychological social psychology, a definable 
field with clear boundaries and a clearly identifiable, cumulative body of scientific data. Such a 
formulation stood in stark contrast to the expansive philosophical literature on social psychology 
that was focused on debating different conceptualizations of the social. In addition, Allport’s 
success was also rooted in the extent to which his approach conformed to the Zeitgeist of 
twentieth-century social science in the United States. It provided a practical way of studying the 
social at a time when social change and social influence were topics of central importance in 
growing urban centers. Importantly, it provided a way of studying these issues within a 
controlled, experimental framework focused on observable behavior. Such an approach had great 
appeal in the 1920s when behaviorism and experimental control were coming to exert significant 
influence on psychology and other human sciences (Danziger, 2000).  
Because of these two characteristics of Allport’s work—its forceful, confident character 
and its suitability for the Zeitgeist—Allport’s social psychology was indeed central to the 
founding of the kind of experimental social psychology that dominates contemporary American 
psychology. As other scholars have noted, this focus on science and experiment indeed made his 
work particularly palatable for early twentieth century psychology. However, my work suggests 
that Allport’s influence on the field was somewhat more intricate, involving more than just the 
provision of a prototype for social psychology that was in line with the scientism of the day. 
Allport’s success was indeed rooted in his ability to draw psychologists to his social psychology, 
but it was also very much rooted in his successful alienation of other social scientists. This 
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alienation accelerated the establishment of psychological social psychology as an independent 
discipline by stifling interdisciplinary conversations—and therefore controversies and debates—
regarding the contours of the social. Though interdisciplinary efforts would continue to some 
extent and their popularity would wax and wane over the following decades, American social 
psychology itself became a primarily psychological discipline that studied the individual.  
Though there were exceptions, the different and sometimes contradictory approaches to 
early social psychology tended to line up according to disciplinary allegiances: psychologists 
maintained a view of the social that was different from that of the sociologists who maintained a 
view that was different from that of the cultural anthropologists and so on with economists, 
philosophers, and political scientists each taking different positions. Because these disciplines 
tended to work at different levels of analysis, they tended to adopt different conceptualizations of 
the social. Debates between these groups were often heated and not always congenial, but the 
conversation was usually a vibrant one, as scholars across disciplines argued for and negotiated 
their own versions of the social. Allport’s contribution to this debate, however, had a strikingly 
different tone and approach. He claimed a very particular brand of the social as belonging to the 
realm of psychology, excluding all other forms of sociality from that field. In adopting such a 
firm, territorial, and unyielding approach to the social, Allport’s work was pivotal in severing 
ties between the social science disciplines. Furthermore, his descriptions of and prescriptions for 
the treatment of the social in other areas of study irritated scholars of those disciplines. This, 
combined with the rigidity of his own views of the social, made disciplinary exchange seem 
nearly impossible.  
At a time when disciplinary boundaries were already losing their fluidity, Allport’s work 
contributed significantly to the growing practice of carving up the social world between the 
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disciplines and letting each address it in its own ontological and methodological manner. This 
division of labor most definitely helped to establish the disciplines, including social psychology. 
In this way, it becomes clear that while Allport’s influence was indeed a result of the 
attractiveness of his system for psychologically-oriented scholars, it was also a result of his 
confrontations with scholars from other disciplines. He drew psychologists in, but perhaps his 
more formidable task was the extent to which he shut most sociologists and anthropologists out. 
It is in his debates with these social scientists that he expressed his views most clearly and in 
some cases, most bitingly.  
Finally, it is also important to recognize that Allport’s role as gatekeeper of psychological 
social psychology extended beyond his textbook and his academic writings into his work as 
editor of the Journal of Abnormal Psychology and Social Psychology. The journal was one of 
only a few outlets for social-psychological work and as the first editor, Allport had a distinct 
opportunity—through vetting of content and reviewing of current work—to further promote a 
particular brand of social psychology and direct the discipline towards to it. Using all of these 
means, Allport’s altered the course of American social psychology by temporarily containing 
debates about the social using forceful arguments for the sovereignty of an individualistic 
approach for psychological science. Other approaches to the social could coexist, but they would 
have to do so in separate, descriptive, quasi-scientific disciplines.  
After 1924: Allportian Individualism in Flux 
 Histories of social psychology almost always include the work of Floyd Allport as an 
important historical piece of the discipline’s history. However, with few exceptions, Allport does 
not appear in these histories after the 1920s has been discussed and analyzed. As these histories 
leave the 1920s behind, they also leave Allport behind—perhaps rightfully so, since Allport’s 
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direct influence on the discipline faded after the 1920s (see Collier, Minton, & Reynolds, 1991; 
Jackson, 1988). The field of social psychology, once embroiled in philosophical and disciplinary 
debates about methods and subject matter, became more problem-oriented in the 1930s and 
1940s. The Depression and the war years nourished a social psychology that was more focused 
on defining, studying, and ameliorating the myriad of social problems and conflicts that seemed 
to plague the nation. The philosophical problem of the individual and the social, so fervently 
debated in the early 1900s, took a backseat as studies of poverty, conflict, race relations, 
propaganda, and morale came to the fore (Cantril, 1934; Cartwright, 1948; Krech & Crutchfield, 
1948). Though Allport participated in this study of relevant social problems, his work during this 
period simply did not stand out in any particular way or impact the field significantly. Because of 
this, little is written about this second period in Allport’s career.  
 An examination of Allport’s later work, however, paints an interesting and much more 
complex picture of his individualism, and in doing so also sheds light on the relationships 
between ideas about sociality and the larger social context in which they are developed. Allport’s 
early individualism is relatively well-understood and well-documented. However, as this work 
has shown, it was also relatively short-lived. By the 1930s, he had come to question his early, 
simplistic approach and began to view his reductionism as untenable. He came to believe that 
such a reductionism, if carried through logically, would dissolve not just the social group but all 
collective entities more generally. Though Allport continued to espouse an individualistic 
position for the next four decades, it was a very different and always changing form of 
individualism. Furthermore, though the rest of the discipline moved forward employing many 
facets of the experimental, behaviorist, and individualistic framework laid out by Allport in the 
early 1920s, Allport himself began to see problems with this framework and experienced 
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difficulties with his own conceptualization of the social. Unwilling to abandon his individualism 
and his scientific ideals, yet also aware of the complications of reductionism, he began to rethink 
his conceptualization of the social and of collectivity more generally in the 1930s, commencing a 
project that would consume him until his death 40 years later.  
Allport’s ongoing struggle to grapple with the notion of the social also reveals the extent 
to which ideas about sociality were so strongly tied to the changing social and cultural fabric of 
twentieth-century American life. Placing Allport’s early radical individualism in its context and 
following it through the later stages of his career makes it seem less simplistic, less radical, and 
almost commonplace. Allport’s individualism was conceptualized at a time when many were 
concerned over the place of the individual in an increasingly complex, urban, industrialized 
society. Furthermore, it captured an understanding of the social as rooted in small groups and 
face-to-face interactions, an image that made sense in the early 1900s before sociality and ideas 
of social influence were drastically altered by a multitude of social factors such as large-scale 
urbanization, radio, television, increasing social bureaucracy and regulation, and continued 
global conflict. It is also likely that this more simplistic vision of the social made more sense to a 
younger Allport, who—having grown up in small towns and smaller urban centers of Northeast 
Ohio—had lived in Boston for only a short time when he formulated his earliest social 
psychology. It is important to remember that Allport’s theoretical ideas about the social were 
formed very early on, as part of a doctoral dissertation that was based on the work and ideas of 
his first mentors.  
Allport’s understanding of the individual and the social consistently mirrored the social 
changes he witnessed, as he focused first on interindividual contact, then institutions and nations, 
and eventually grand, dynamic systems of collectivity. As the social world around Allport 
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became increasingly complex and as his own awareness of just how complex it could be 
expanded, Allport’s theories and approaches to collectivity also underwent significant changes. 
This suggests a somewhat different view of Allport, one that is not entirely consistent with our 
view of him as a staunch, unyielding proponent of an individualistic social psychology. 
Examining the later periods of Allport’s career and placing his work within the social context 
paints a picture of him as a scholar and a citizen struggling to identify a useable approach to 
sociality that could address modern problems while still abiding by the much-cherished 
principles of scientific inquiry. For Allport, this task proved extremely difficult, so much so that 
in addition to rethinking his approach to sociality, he also began rethinking his approach to 
science. Though the discipline adopted many aspects of his framework for conceptualizing the 
individual and the social, he himself struggled with it for decades, labeling it the “master 
problem” of social psychology.  
Exploring Allport’s work beyond 1924, examining the archival record, and delving into 
the social context of that work also illuminates another significant aspect of his individualism: 
the highly moral and political nature of it. Branigan (2004) has suggested that in social 
psychology particularly, experiments provide a way of dramatizing or staging a moral 
imperative: 
We look to social psychology, not only to learn ‘facts’ about ourselves, but to assist us in 
determining how to act and behave in society. In other words, the objective of our 
knowledge is deeply intertwined with our moral and political imaginations, and our 
projection of how we plan our futures (pp. 149-150) 
Branigan views social-psychological experiments as “morality in an experimental idiom”, almost 
akin to therapy, allowing scientists to “confront what troubles people in everyday life” (p. 33) 
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while still maintaining the authority, expertise, and respect associated with the scientific 
enterprise. For Branigan, it is not a simple matter of science being a reflection of social context, 
nor is it simply a matter of science being imbued with social values, with the experiment serving 
as a mask for these values. Instead, the process is more subtle. Often unbeknownst to the 
experimenter, he or she identifies pressing social and ethical issues, formulates ideas regarding 
the mechanisms behind them, and then creates conditions under which these mechanisms can be 
put on display. In this way, science becomes a theater of sorts. Brannigan argues that this was the 
case with Milgram’s obedience experiments, as well as the work done on conformity by 
Solomon Asch and Muzafer Sherif.  
The present work suggests that this was also the case for Allport, despite his own 
repeated insistence on value-neutrality in social psychology. Allport’s individualism is most 
commonly described in the context of 1920s experimentalism and behaviorism and characterized 
primarily as a form of radical, methodological individualism. These facets of his work are indeed 
prominent and important, but as one follows Allport’s story beyond 1924, it becomes 
increasingly clear that his focus on the individual was rooted not just in his ideals regarding 
methods and science, but also in his ideals regarding society. This later work makes it clear that 
for Allport, the dangers of personifying collective concepts were not limited to the potential for 
crossing the boundaries of scientific rigor. In fact, in the 1930s and 1940s, Allport seemed much 
more concerned with the moral and political dangers of such personification. Though he 
conducted few experiments in these later years, those that he did design served as platforms for 
exploring the potential outcomes of such personification and simultaneously demonstrating how 
to cultivate freethinking, rational individuals who would not succumb to such collectivist 
thought. This moral aspect of Allport’s individualism is pervasive from 1930 to 1950 and his 
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system of thought cannot be understood apart from it. Furthermore, it is nearly impossible to 
detangle the methodological, ontological, and moral aspects of Allport’s individualism in this 
period. What is clear, however, is that it had changed significantly since 1920, as Allport 
struggled to relocate the individual in the increasingly complex web of social life in twentieth-
century America.  
Founders and Unfinished Projects 
 In a 2006 article titled “Lunch with Leon,” psychologist Michael Gazzaniga recounted 
his memories of his colleague and close friend, Leon Festinger (Gazzaniga, 2006). Most scholars 
know Festinger as the man behind theories of social comparison and cognitive dissonance and 
identify him with his book When Prophecy Fails. His work on dissonance, conducted during the 
golden age of social psychology, was highly successful and as Gazzaniga rightly notes, Festinger 
was, by the 1950s, considered a “doyen” of the field. But, what became of Festinger after his 
groundbreaking, golden-age studies? As Harold Gerard (1999) notes, Festinger’s involvement 
with social psychology was relatively short-lived. After noting that Festinger’s impact on the 
discipline may have been greater than that of anyone else, Gerard points out that “he spent so 
little time—about twenty years—working among us” (Gerard, 1999, p. 60). Indeed, in the 1960s, 
Festinger moved away from social psychology into the study of visual perception and in the 
1970s ceased to do laboratory work altogether.  
By 1980, Festinger had become rather disillusioned with experimental social psychology, 
expressing distaste for both quick laboratory projects and problem-driven applied work 
(Festinger, 1980). He had come to see laboratory problems as too narrow and his own interests 
had become increasingly broad. Such work, he suggested, was suitable for the young: “Young 
men and women should work on narrow problems. Young people become enthusiastic easily. 
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Any new finding is an exciting thing. Older people have too much perspective on the past and 
perhaps, too little patience with the future” (Festinger, 1983, p.1). From this point forward, 
Festinger devoted his time to an in-depth study of the history of technological innovation in 
different cultures, exploring traditions and practices dating back to the seventh century. He 
became more and more entrenched in a large and increasingly unwieldy project, studying a wide 
range of interacting social factors such as economics, religion, and climate. Reading Festinger’s 
work, however, one can see that he was still concerned with the same kinds of problems that he 
had found himself confronting in the laboratory: the problems of social life. As he noted in 1980: 
“I would only wish for…a place far enough away to stand so that I could see human society 
clearly” (Festinger, 1980, p. xv). Festinger would never complete this project; the manuscript 
was unfinished when he died in 1990.  
Festinger’s early and quick rise to scientific fame followed by his rather rapid exit from 
the field is strikingly similar to the story that unfolded a few decades earlier for Floyd Allport. 
He too conducted early pioneering work, quickly became very well-known in the field, and then 
just as quickly began to follow other interests that were far removed from those that made him 
famous. He too became dissatisfied with the very kind of science that he helped to usher in and 
turned to a large and complicated project that would not—and perhaps could not—be finished in 
his lifetime. One might also point to Kurt Lewin, whose early and very celebrated experimental 
and applied work overshadowed his later attempts to construct a grand psychological theory that 
would help to conceptualize the individual and the social (Eng, 1978). Lewin, too, was unable to 
complete the work and despite his continued popularity in the field, few of those who came after 
and followed him understood this later work (Danziger, 2000; Eng, 1978). These three central 
contributors to social psychology—Allport, Festinger, and Lewin—contributed to social 
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psychology in very different ways, but they share this interesting pattern of having moved further 
away from the phenomena and practices with which they are most commonly associated and 
searching in other fields and disciplines for assistance in formulating an adequate 
conceptualization of social life.
72
 
There were other interesting commonalities in the later work of Allport, Lewin, and 
Festinger. All three seemed to question the utility of the kind of cause-and-effect social 
psychology that currently dominates the field. For Festinger, this kind of approach failed to 
advance the field and he turned to comparative history, paleontology, archaeology, and other 
methods of study. For Lewin, this philosophy of science simply made no sense for social 
psychology since small changes in one variable cannot be readily observed in relation to small 
changes in an effect; instead, any change in a system or field is accompanied by a multitude of 
other changes, affecting the entire system (Lewin, 1927; Lewin & Korsch, 1939). For Allport, 
the experimental method—though useful—failed to capture the systematic patterns of collective 
action in social psychology as well as other sciences; instead, he began looking to systems 
theories, kinematics, and the structure of collective action to attempt to understand how variables 
in nature—including the social world—relate.  
Another commonality among these pioneers is the extent to which their later work was 
forgotten by history or else assessed rather harshly. As one textbook author has noted “Lewin’s 
topological theory, along with his egg-shaped illustrations of it, has disappeared from modern 
social psychology” (Goodwin, 2012, p. 305). Indeed, it has not fared well over the years, fading 
from the history of the field or being evaluated quite critically: one author described it as “no 
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 Robert Farr (1996) notes a similar pattern in the work of William James, whose Principles of Psychology and his 
establishment of a laboratory of psychology helped to establish him as a leader in the newly developing field of 
experimental psychology. Only a short decade later, he turned to studies of religion and philosophy, becoming 
ambivalent about the science he helped to establish, which also led him to occupy a somewhat complicated place in 
the history of the field, something Farr refers to as the position of “compromised scientist.” 
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more scientifically persuasive than a model made of toothpicks and marshmallows over dessert” 
(Martin, 2003, p. 17). Similarly, Festinger’s later comparative historical work had little following 
among social psychologists, who continue to remember him as “brilliant, creative, and 
meticulous in designing and conducting experiments” (Aronson, 1999, p. 87). In some cases, 
Festinger’s followers have also expressed considerable ambivalence about the experimental 
legacy that Festinger left for the field (Aronson, 1999). We have seen that this too was true for 
Allport. His later theoretical work, in which he reassessed many of his earlier ideas, is largely 
unknown; for social psychologists and for most historians, he is remembered as the scientist 
behind the phenomenon of social facilitation and as the spokesperson of early experimental 
social psychology. Ironically, the field became tied to the experimental practices and methods 
that they associate with these pioneers, though the pioneers themselves all eventually devoted 
their time to searching for a broader vision of the social. For Allport, Festinger, and Lewin, the 
approach, methods, and philosophy of social psychology were works in progress and, for all 
three, it was work that they left unfinished.  
Perhaps, as Festinger himself noted in 1983, the laboratory is a place suitable to the 
temperament of youth, while theoretical and comparative system-building is more satisfying to 
those further along in their careers. Undoubtedly, a more extensive examination would reveal 
many scholars who have turned to theoretical or historical pursuits later in their careers. 
Nonetheless, the reasons for their turn toward theory and the nature of these pursuits are not 
frequently examined in the historical literature. Excellent work has been done examining the 
ways in which these early pioneers ushered in an experimental, laboratory-based social 
psychology. However, we know very little about how these early proselytizers later assessed the 
very paradigms they helped to create. It is an interesting question in social psychology, a field 
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which has, as Branigan (2004) notes, undergone repeated “periods of hand-wringing…that are 
never formally resolved” (p 19). These periods of conflict and debate in social psychology, 
epitomized by the crisis of the 1970s (Faye, 2012), were very much focused on critical 
examinations of experimentation and laboratory methods. Though Kurt Lewin had died before 
the onset of the crisis, Festinger and Allport were still working away on their individual projects. 
Neither contributed to the fervent debates over experimentation, instead choosing to pursue 
studies of the social that were quite far removed from the kind under fire by their fellow 
psychologists. In fact, by the time the discipline found itself in crisis, these early proselytizers of 
the experimental method may have already, for many years, been questioning the methods and 
philosophy of American social psychology.
73
  
The absence of this later work from the historical record is somewhat understandable, 
since it had far less impact on the development of social psychology as a discipline. Historical 
stories focus on founders and fathers, paying attention to pivotal, important moments in the 
discipline under scrutiny, leaving other stories out in the interest of clarity and brevity. The 
historian, of course, must always be selective. However, this focus can often present a narrative 
with perhaps too much clarity, a narrative that masks the complications of a discipline and the 
concerns, conflicts, and uncertainties of its founders. Leon Festinger promoted the experimental 
method relentlessly, but he also struggled with it. Floyd Allport may have helped to usher in the 
age of individualistic, experimental social psychology, but his relationship with it became 
increasingly uneasy, leading him to set experimentation aside and search for a new philosophy of 
science. As Stam, Radtke, and Lubek (2000) have noted, social psychology’s relationship with 
the experiment has always been a strained one; the present work suggests these strains may have 
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 It would be fascinating to have had any comments from Allport regarding the crisis. However, he did not 
contribute to the literature and  I have found nothing in his writings regarding it. Allport was quite elderly and in ill 
health when the crisis reached its height. 
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been particularly acute for some of the experiment’s early and most ardent promoters. If these 
founders have played such a significant role in the history of American social psychology—as 
current historical narratives suggest—it seems it would be fruitful to explore their ideas and their 
work beyond the moment of what is considered to be their central contributions to the field’s 
development.  
The Hero and the Villain: The Making and Meaning of Myths in the History of Social 
Psychology 
This kind of talk of fathers and founders always raises historiographical questions 
centered on “old” and “new” history, on historicism and presentism. Given Allport’s status as 
ambivalent founder, these questions are important ones for understanding his role in the history 
of social psychology. The distinction between "old" and "new" history is by now a common one. 
Old history, also referred to as celebratory or ceremonial history, tends to focus on disciplinary 
progress. Leahey (2002) describes it as "smug and self-satisfied…viewing the past as a series of 
progressive steps leading to the supposed scientific wisdom of the present" (p. 15) and 
characterizes it as Whiggish, presentist, internalist, and historically ignorant. Leahey contrasts 
this type of history with new history, which conceives of science as "a fallible human enterprise 
inextricable from the rest of human history" (p. 15). Woodward (1980) points out that 
contemporary historical scholarship attempts to correct for bias via a "judicious combination 
of…presentism, historicism, internalism, externalism, quantitative, and qualitative" (p. 35). 
While such attempts by no means completely eliminate bias in historical scholarship, they are 
thought to reduce such bias.   
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 Indeed, new history, contextualist history, or revisionist history
74
 has contributed much to 
our understanding of the historical record across a multitude of disciplines, including the social 
sciences. By offering a novel perspective on a familiar series of events, revisionist historians not 
only greatly enrich our interpretation of those events; they also compel us to critically examine 
the ways in which we choose to package and portray our history. As such, they serve as an 
essential counterpart to the customary celebratory histories that precede them.   
In a consideration of celebratory and revisionist history, however, a question arises: is 
one of these types of history more factual or ‘true’ than the other?  In an essay entitled “Myth, 
rumor, and history,” Cooper (2003) convincingly argues that both types of accounts may miss 
the mark. Employing the case of Eli Whitney, Cooper demonstrates that two historical accounts, 
both outlining Whitney's role as a progenitor of modern industry, have developed. She refers to 
the first as the “heroic inventor myth” (p. 84), while the second is deemed the “myth of the 
villainous charlatan” (p. 87). Early histories of Whitney focused on his successes and 
contributions and greatly exaggerated his influence on modern industry. Whitney is portrayed as 
having single-handedly created much of early twentieth-century technology. This, Cooper 
argues, presents a classic version of the hero myth. 
 As the history of technology began to proliferate, however, “the myth began to unravel” 
(p. 90). Historians began to question whether the multiple “firsts” attributed to Whitney were 
actually “firsts,” whether Whitney should be given sole credit for these inventions, and most 
importantly, they began to question whether Whitney’s actions were actually admirable. In the 
rewriting of history, the “hero myth” was debunked and surreptitiously replaced with the “villain 
myth:”  
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The revisionist articles…effectively demolished the heroic Whitney myth among 
historians of technology, demoting Eli Whitney from Father of the American System of 
Manufacturers to fast-talking arms contractor whose only distinction was his earlier 
invention of an improved cotton gin. The rumor-like processes that had created the myth 
were now acting to create a new one, featuring Whitney as charlatan instead of hero 
(Cooper, 2003, p. 92). 
As Cooper goes on to note, however, neither the hero story nor the villain story turned out to be 
quite accurate. Only once historians of technology “began to unpack and consider separately the 
characteristics [of] both the hero myth and the villain myth” (p. 93) did they began to gain 
insight into the intricate nature of the historical record. In the consideration of both accounts, a 
more comprehensive chronicle emerged.
75
   
 Cooper (2003) notes another interesting outcome of such an analysis. In an examination 
of hero stories and their villain story counterparts, the aim is not simply to “debunk” existing 
accounts or to offer alternative perspectives. While these may indeed be the outcomes of such a 
process, they do not necessarily constitute the sole aim of such an undertaking. Myths, Cooper 
argues, are not simply something to be debunked; rather, since they are culturally shaped, they 
may offer much insight into the nature of the culture in which they are created. “Myths” she 
argues, “tell us about belief systems of different societies, including our own, and beliefs have 
force in shaping actions that are the stuff of history” (p. 84). By examining both the hero myth 
and the villain myth, we may further our understanding of the contexts in which these myths are 
created. We may question the purposes that such myths serve and examine the ways in which 
they simultaneously document the history and shape the future of an object, person, or idea.  
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Myths, therefore, are not viewed as simple ‘falsehoods;’ rather, they are stories with an 
ideological purpose; historical changes in ideology lead to historical changes in the story.  We 
may therefore look to the story in our attempt to understand these shifting ideologies. 
 Cooper’s analysis of the making and meaning of historical myths aptly applies to the field 
of social psychology. Like the history of technology, the history of social psychology has its own 
set of myths and ideologies. Accounts of the history of the discipline, particularly textbook 
histories, have been largely dominated by celebratory hero stories. Among social psychology’s 
one-time heroes, we may include Auguste Comte, Kurt Lewin, Norman Triplett, and William 
McDougall (cf, G. W. Allport, 1954; Jones, 1985). More recently, however, many historians 
have questioned the contributions of these previously nominated founders and have suggested 
that the best work of the discipline is to be found in the writings of other figures such as George 
Herbert Mead, Wilhelm Wundt, William James, and James Mark Baldwin (Farr, 1996; 
Greenwood, 2004; Morawski, 2000). In order to substantiate claims regarding disciplinary 
founders, both celebratory and revisionist historians tend to glorify the contributions of their 
nominated founder while simultaneously villainizing other contenders. It is thus that a historical 
figure becomes both hero and villain. Furthermore, temporal trends in the naming of particular 
heroes and villains reveal a great deal about changes in ideas regarding what social psychology 
was, is, and should be; as the ideology of the discipline changes, so too does its historical record. 
There is perhaps no better illustration of this phenomenon than the case of one of social 
psychology’s most contentious figures: Floyd Henry Allport.   
 At the beginning of this work, I discussed an interesting trend in the portrayal of Floyd 
Allport in disciplinary histories of social psychology: Allport has frequently been cast as either 
the hero or the villain of the field—as the progenitor of an innovative and fruitful conception of 
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the social or as the father of a restrictive and asocial social psychology. After an extensive 
analysis of Allport’s work in its social and intellectual context, it appears that both of these 
stories indeed have some veracity. Allport’s work was indeed pivotal in the history of 
experimental, social psychology, helping to promote and spread the idea of an independent field 
rooted in experiment, individualism, and behaviorism. Social psychology indeed became 
increasingly experimental after the era of Allport’s textbook and his vision of the social—
centered on the individual in relation to social others and social objects—still permeates 
introductory textbooks and can be readily spotted in the general orientation of the kinds of 
experimental social psychology that dominate the contemporary periodical literature. 
Contemporary social psychology continues to study individual cognition, emotion and behavior 
in relation to social objects and social others. It relies primarily on experimental work devised in 
the context of relatively straightforward cause-and-effect mini theories that are tested by way of 
monitoring some kind of observable behavioral response (Kruglanski, 2001). Allport’s vision for 
an experimental, individualistic social psychology is indeed alive and well in the field. For these 
reasons, his status as father or founder seems very much justified.  
 The question remains, however, regarding whether Allport was a heroic father or a 
villainous one. Clearly, evaluations of the qualitative impact of Allport’s work are strongly tied 
to one’s ideals regarding the scope, focus, methods, functions, and ideal future of social 
psychology. If one views the current individualistic, experimental focus of the field as a good 
model for social psychology, Allport becomes the hero, helping to establish this foundation and 
providing experimental exemplars that demonstrated how it could operate.  If, however, one 
views contemporary social psychology as impoverished and asocial, as many contemporary 
authors do, then Allport may indeed be identified as the villain of the field, serving to put method 
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ahead of subject matter and dispelling a certain form of sociality from the field. Stories of the 
development of social psychology have hinged on this important interpretive lens: Allport’s 
place in historical narratives has depended largely on the historian’s own idealistic vision of a 
science of the social and, in that respect, on whether he or she is telling a story of progress or 
decline in relation to that vision. There is nothing inherently wrong with such narratives; as one 
historian noted in 1958, history is useful for both description of the past and prescriptions for the 
present and future: “Society’s doctor, like the individual’s, may justifiably inquire in the 
patient’s past to prescribe for present pain to promote future health” (Stephenson, 1958, p. 21). 
Tales that employ an understanding of the past to understand, critique, or celebrate a particular 
present; to potentially track a missed utopia; or to urge disciplinary reform all hold an important 
place in tracing the history of a field.   
 Nonetheless, there is still something troubling about these tales of heroes and villains. In 
his exploration of the historiography of rhetoric and composition, Charles Paine (1999) rightfully 
notes that these kinds of histories provide a great deal of continuity and relevance in our 
narratives, but in doing so they often miss the complexity of the events and our relationship to 
them: “We seem to prefer to use history to tell us that we are either very much like or very 
different from our forebears, when we should also note that our relationship with the past is 
highly complex” (p. 36). Thinking about this statement in relation to Allport and our portrayal of 
his role is compelling. Allport’s work is presented as a complete break from philosophical 
traditions, a prototype for experimentalism, and the launching pad for an asocial social 
psychology. When we take a closer look, however, we find that Allport himself remained tied to 
his philosophical past, continued to explore new philosophies of the social and of science more 
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generally, and fretted continually over the nature of the social both morally as well as 
scientifically. Our hero or our villain was indeed an ambivalent and troubled one.  
Incorporating this ambivalence into the historical record complicates the categories of 
hero and villain but by no means dissolves the links between the historical narrative and the 
present. This ambivalence has a long history in the field and tracing that history may shed light 
on our continued debates regarding sociality and the history of its study. In addition, 
incorporating this ambivalence provides a different and perhaps more complex kind of link 
between social psychology’s history and its present, one that recognizes the ongoing 
complications of the discipline and the consistent struggle to capture sociality. Indeed, 
conflicting stories about Allport result in part from clashes and discontinuity in contemporary 
ideas regarding what kind of sociality social psychology should embrace.  
A New View of Allport’s Role in the History of Social Psychology 
My own interpretation of Allport’s place in the history of social psychology differs 
somewhat from those that have come before it in one central way. My reading of his story does 
not provide a picture of Allport as being either hero or villain. Instead, my story seems to cast 
Allport as an outspoken, ambitious, and somewhat stubborn scientist who was struggling with a 
particularly complicated subject that also seemed to elude his contemporaries and successors. 
Indeed, the bold claims he made early in his career changed his field significantly and the ways 
in which he positioned himself as a champion of individualism make it tempting to tell his story 
and the story of social psychology by focusing on those early events. And, indeed, it is important 
to understand the ways in which Allport’s work helped to shape the field in the early years. 
However, looking at Allport’s work across the first half of the twentieth century provides an 
interesting view of him not as the hero or villain of social psychology, but rather as a sort of 
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mirror or microcosm of the larger field of social psychology. For both Allport and the discipline 
as a whole, conceptualizing the social—a project that initially seemed to have been simplified 
through the adoption of a natural science framework—proved to be difficult and required 
constant rethinking and revision.  
For both Allport and the field at large, the early twentieth century was full of promise and 
excitement regarding the future prospects of social psychology. Scholars of the social seemed 
hopeful and confident that the adoption of a natural-scientific model of the social—something 
that was already underway—would prompt a turning point for the field, which had struggled to 
come to any kind of agreement regarding its subject matter and methods. Scholars expressed an 
unbridled enthusiasm for and faith in the experimental method as the key to social psychology’s 
productive future. As psychology began to adopt the experimental method in the early 1900s, 
there was a growing sense that once social psychology followed suit, its progress would be 
immediate and immense. Perhaps even more importantly, experimentation was thought to be the 
key to creating a social psychology that could help to solve social problems.  
John Dewey expressed these sentiments clearly in the midst of World War I, suggesting 
that the social sciences of his time were in the same position as the natural sciences in the 
seventeenth century; the adoption of an attitude of experimentation would help the social 
sciences see the same kind of steady progress witnessed in the natural sciences:  
if the history of human achievement in knowledge proves anything, it is that the all-
decisive discovery is that of an effective and fruitful method. When men once hit, after 
endless awkwardness, upon the right road, the rest takes care of itself. Scientific 
movement becomes orderly and cumulative in the very process of occurring. Social and 
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mental phenomena become intelligible because they come within the scope of the 
experimental method of attack” (Dewey, 1917,p. 274) 
Dewey went on to note that, once they adopted the experimental method, the physical sciences 
made great strides in terms of controlling the natural environment. He argued that control of the 
social environment would similarly follow from an experimental social psychology. The result 
would be not just a scientific field marked by steady progress, but also a field with many needed 
practical applications. Like Floyd Allport, the majority of early social psychologists placed 
intense faith in this new method and its seemingly vast potential for understanding and 
ameliorating social problems. This faith translated into practice, as experimentation gained 
prominence in social psychology in the 1920s and 1930s (Danziger, 2000). By 1937, the 
experiment was considered by many to be the primary method of distinguishing social 
psychology from social philosophy (Britt, 1937). This trend continued into the 1960s, when 87% 
of studies published in the leading social psychology journal involved some form of 
experimental manipulation (Higbee & Wells, 1972).   
 However, the rise of experimentation did not prove to be the all encompassing solution 
that social psychologists, Allport included, had hoped for. Dissatisfaction with the progress of 
the discipline continued to be expressed. In 1939, Kurt Lewin argued that experimental social 
psychology had not adequately addressed larger-scale social patterns or phenomena, including 
cultural, historical, sociological, and psychological facts. He noted that if the field was to 
succeed, it would have to find a way of bringing these kinds of concepts together into the 
laboratory (Lewin, 1939). Muzafer Sherif also questioned the extent to which the field had 
adequately conceptualized its subject matter, observing that “our knowledge of social 
psychology has advanced but a tiny fraction in proportion to the tons of research done in the 
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field” (Sherif, 1947, p. 73), and he argued that as a result, social psychologists could not 
adequately address pressing social problems. He suggested that the solution to this problem was 
to “stop the experiments for the time being, no matter how excellent they might be technically” 
(p. 74). In a 1950 article, Leonard Cottrell similarly questioned the advances of experimental 
psychology, even in the wake of the postwar boom in the field: 
Notwithstanding some rather reckless promises made by some in the heat of seeking 
commercial and government research contracts, a candid appraisal must find much of our 
terminology extremely fuzzy, our hypotheses lacking in rigorous casting and our methods 
as yet not well adapted for operationally testing our hypotheses or for yielding that 
consensual validation of observation upon which any community of scientists must rely 
(Cottrell, 1950, p. 706).  
Other scholars expressed their concerns over social psychology in a more subdued manner, but 
they continued to openly question the progress of the field and the adequacy of its approach for 
addressing the realities of the social world (Klineberg, 1940; Murphy, Murphy, & Newcomb, 
1937). Though the discipline flourished in these years, it continued to struggle with its subject 
matter, its methods, and its ability to adequately capture the social world, with scholars 
continually questioning the progress of the field. 
 This internal questioning in the field continued quietly but steadily throughout the early 
decades of the twentieth-century, but in the 1970s, it began to take center stage, as social 
psychologists grappled with a self-diagnosed disciplinary crisis (Faye, 2012). Many of the issues 
that arose in the course of the crisis were similar to those that had been debated throughout the 
discpline’s history, including the theoretical orientation of social psychology (Ayres, 1918; 
Pepitone, 1981), the relationship between psychology and sociology (Ellwood,1919; Tosti, 
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1898), the appropriate methodological approach for studying social phenomena (Allport, 1919; 
Blumer, 1940; Pepitone, 1981), and the relevance of social science findings (Britt, 1937; Cantril, 
1934). These issues, always present in the field’s margins, were highlighted in the social context 
of the turbulent 1960s and 1970s, when the field’s ability to solve pressing social problems came 
under close scrutiny. Social psychologists began to feel increased pressure from government and 
funding agencies to demonstrate that their field could do something to contribute to an 
understanding of real-world domestic and international problems. In-depth examinations of the 
field conducted at this time found it to be seriously lacking in this regard, contributing 
significantly to an ever-growing sense of disciplinary crisis (Faye, 2012).  
As the 1970s drew to a close, the crisis began to dissipate, as scholars honed in on a new 
and productive social-cognitive approach to social psychology (Adair, 1991). Debates regarding 
disciplinary progress again took a backseat, but they continue to occupy a marginal but visible 
position in the field’s periphery. As was the case in the early 1900s, social psychologists 
continue to grapple with the very complex nature of their subject matter: the individual and 
society. As Vallacher and Nowak noted in 1997:  
The phenomena of social psychology are remarkably complex. An individual’s set of 
possible states and behaviors is complex enough in its own right; the interdependencies 
of different individuals increases such complexity in a multiplicative manner. Within 
even the most tightly constrained situation, the potential range of interpersonal thought 
and behavior is enormous (Vallacher & Nowak, 1997, p. 73)  
Like Allport did in the 1950s, these authors question the utility of classic mechanistic approaches 
to the social, arguing that capturing the social in any thorough scientific sense would require an 
entirely novel theoretical framework. Such a system would necessarily be capable of grasping 
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the complex interrelatedness and interdependence of individual variables in a social system. 
Vallacher and Nowak (1997) therefore propose the use of nonlinear dynamical systems as a 
foundation for studies of the social and suggest that the laws of such systems are general enough 
that they apply not just to the social, but to “all systems that have similar relations among 
elements” (p. 96). Though the work is much clearer than Allport’s, the resemblance between the 
two approaches is striking.  
For both Allport and the field of social psychology, solutions regarding the 
conceptualization of the social have always been much more tenuous than they seem in our 
current historical accounts. Allport’s social psychology was not linear or cumulative. Instead, his 
career looks more like a set of repeated experiments, as he sought to find some kind of fit 
between his scientific and social ideals, while also constantly adapting to the social changes 
around him. In this way, his work and his life reflect the same kinds of trials and tribulations that 
are visible in the biography of the discipline as a whole, including the tension between applied 
and basic work, the difficulties of maintaining the perhaps impossible line between science and 
activism, and of course the matter of dealing with the perennial problem of grasping sociality in 
a way that fulfilled the requirements of science but still accurately accounted for a social world 
that grew more complex with each passing decade.  
 Examining Allport’s work in this manner and exploring it as an allegory for the trials and 
tribulations of the larger field provides us with a view of social psychology not as a progressive 
movement to or away from some desirable or undesirable version of social psychology. In the 
same way that we move away from a heroic or villainous Allport, we also begin to move past the 
historical story of social psychology as a discipline marching steadily towards one particular 
conceptualization of the social. Instead, we see a figure and a field both constantly experimenting 
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with a different version of the social, taking it as far as that conception of sociality seems to 
allow, and then altering it when it seems to fail. Both struggled to capture a subject matter that is 
extremely broad, constantly changing, and often of serious personal significance to those who 
study it. Tracing these various attempts to build a science of the social, and tracing them through 
their successes and their failures might not always lead us to a very cohesive narrative of social 
psychology, but it has the potential to lead us to something that is perhaps more interesting: a 
history of the construction, negotiation, and revision of the social within the field of social 
psychology as it has developed in the context of twentieth century history.  
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